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Nandi A.,The Center for Disease Dynamics | Ashok A.,The Center for Disease Dynamics | Guindon G.E.,McMaster University | Chaloupka F.J.,University of Illinois at Chicago | Jha P.,University of Toronto
Tobacco Control | Year: 2015

Background Bidis, the most common smoking tobacco product in India, remain largely untaxed and are subject to very few regulations to discourage their use. A major argument against tax increases is the large potential loss of economic activity and employment in the bidi industry from reduced consumption. Methods We used a nationally representative survey of unorganised bidi manufacturing firms (n=2841) in India to estimate the economic contribution of the industry. Results We find that of the 35 states and union territories of India, the bidi industry operated across 17 states, with over 95% of its production concentrated in 10 states. Bidi manufacturing firms contributed 0.50% of total sales and 0.6% of the gross value added by the manufacturing economy in 2005-2006. The industry employed approximately 3.4 million full-time workers, which comprise about 0.7% of employment in all sectors. A further 0.7 million were part-time workers. Bidi workers were also among the lowest paid employees in India. The industry offered only 0.09% of all compensation provided in the manufacturing sector (organised and unorganised). Conclusions Considering the relatively small economic footprint of the bidi industry in India, higher excise taxes and regulations on bidis are unlikely to disrupt economic growth at an aggregate level, or lead to mass unemployment and economic hardship among small bidi workers. On average, the economic annual output per bidi worker is about US$143, which is an order of magnitude smaller than the large economic losses from the several hundred thousand deaths due to bidi smoking per year. © 2015, BMJ Publishing Group. All rights resereved. Source

Nandi A.,The Center for Disease Dynamics | Phoebe Holtzman E.,University of Chicago | Malani A.,University of Chicago | Laxminarayan R.,The Center for Disease Dynamics
Indian Journal of Medical Research | Year: 2015

In this review the existing evidence on the impact of Rashtriya Swasthya Bima Yojana (RSBY) is discussed in the context of international literature available on health insurance. We describe potential pathways through which health insurance can affect health and economic outcomes, discuss evidence from other developing countries, and identify potential biases and inconsistencies in existing studies on RSBY impact. Given the relatively recent introduction of RSBY, lack of quality, verifiable data on utilization patterns, and the absence of reliable evaluation studies, there is a need to exercise caution while assessing the merits of the programme. Considering the enormous potential and cost of the programme, we emphasize the need for a rigorous impact evaluation of RSBY. It will not only help capture the real impact of the scheme, but may also be able to estimate the extent of systemic inefficiencies at the level of the consumer. © 2015, Indian Council of Medical Research. All rights reserved. Source

Nandi A.,The Center for Disease Dynamics | Ashok A.,The Center for Disease Dynamics | Laxminarayan R.,The Center for Disease Dynamics
PLoS ONE | Year: 2013

The Rashtriya Swasthya Bima Yojana (RSBY), which was introduced in 2008 in India, is a social health insurance scheme that aims to improve healthcare access and provide financial risk protection to the poor. In this study, we analyse the determinants of participation and enrolment in the scheme at the level of districts. We used official data on RSBY enrolment, socioeconomic data from the District Level Household Survey 2007-2008, and additional state-level information on fiscal health, political affiliation, and quality of governance. Results from multivariate probit and OLS analyses suggest that political and institutional factors are among the strongest determinants explaining the variation in participation and enrolment in RSBY. In particular, districts in state governments that are politically affiliated with the opposition or neutral parties at the centre are more likely to participate in RSBY, and have higher levels of enrolment. Districts in states with a lower quality of governance, a pre-existing state-level health insurance scheme, or with a lower level of fiscal deficit as compared to GDP, are significantly less likely to participate, or have lower enrolment rates. Among socioeconomic factors, we find some evidence of weak or imprecise targeting. Districts with a higher share of socioeconomically backward castes are less likely to participate, and their enrolment rates are also lower. Finally, districts with more non-poor households may be more likely to participate, although with lower enrolment rates. © 2013 Nandi et al. Source

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