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Combs D.L.,Support Intelligence | Merkt C.,Support Intelligence
Annual Forum Proceedings - AHS International | Year: 2010

During the last decade, a significant amount of resources and attention have been placed upon simulation and evaluation of proposed combat systems, tactics, and techniques by the United States Army and its sister services. As a result of the requirements identified in pursuit of these efforts, the need for a viable, non cooperative Threat Team was identified by the United States Army Commander of Training and Doctrine command (TRADOC) to "level the playing field" for test and evaluation of proposed systems and tactics. Further, the Commanding General (CG), TRADOC directed that the Red Team should be used as a standard in all TRADOC supported simulations and experimentation. The Chief of StaffIntelligence (TRADOC G-2) was given the mission to establish a Threats "RED TEAM" for the described purpose.

Maher J.,Mount Vernon Hospital | McConnell H.,Support Intelligence
British Journal of Cancer | Year: 2011

Background:Two million people in the UK had a cancer diagnosis at the end of 2008. Understanding the number of people diagnosed with cancer with and without health needs is valuable information that can be used to inform service planning, treatment provision and support for people at the right time in the right place as demand grows over time.Methods:Using available data and clinically led assumptions about patient need and outcomes, we make indicative estimates. We quantify, for three common cancers, the number of people in each of the five main identified phases of the cancer care pathway.Results:Estimates are provided for each phase of the pathway for breast, colorectal and lung cancers. We estimate that there are nearly 575 000 women a year with breast cancer in the care pathway at some point in the year, 8% are in the rehabilitation phase and 4% in the progressive illness phase. This compares to nearly 270 000 with colorectal and around 95 000 with lung cancer.Conclusion: Using readily available data, we estimate the numbers of patients with different health needs. These numbers could inform the targeting of resources for service providers. © 2011 Cancer Research UK All rights reserved.

Bonser C.D.,Support Intelligence | Fawcett J.R.,Headquarters 1st United Kingdom Armoured Division formerly SO2 Medical Force Protection
Journal of the Royal Army Medical Corps | Year: 2013

Disease and non-battle injury have historically caused greater morbidity and mortality than battle trauma during military operations, and continue to do so. As a countermeasure, medical force protection (Med FP) measures will assist in the maintenance of combat efficiency, reducing manpower wastage and the inherent consumption of medical, infrastructural and logistical resources at the tactical, operational and strategic levels. This paper considers recent improvements in provision and delivery of essential Med FP measures and outlines the effect and confounding factors associated with pragmatic Med FP delivery across the Task Force Helmand area of responsibility during Op HERRICK 11B-14A (January 2010-July 2011) in Afghanistan, with a particular focus on military environmental health assets.

Hladun O.,Institute Catala Of La Salut | Grau A.,Institute Catala Of La Salut | Esteban E.,University of Barcelona | Jansa J.M.,Support Intelligence
Journal of Travel Medicine | Year: 2014

Background A total of 3,132 immigrants from low- and middle-income countries were involved in a cross-sectional observational study to screen for infectious diseases among immigrants attending public primary health care (PHC) centers. The study was conducted to clarify the degree of demographic differences and risk predictors of these diseases. Methods Demographic and clinical variables, screening for infectious diseases [hepatitis B and C, human immunodeficiency virus infection, syphilis, and tuberculosis (TB)], and analytical data (anemia, hematuria, and liver function) were recorded from immigrants attending a public PHC unit in Barcelona. Results Global hepatitis B, including chronic and previous, reached 18.1%; Morocco as the country of origin [odds ratio (OR) 2.1, 95% confidence interval (CI) 1.07-4.14] and gastrointestinal symptoms (OR 1.9, CI 1.18-3.02) were risk factors. Hepatitis C prevalence was 3.3% with elevated hepatic transaminase levels as a risk factor (OR 26.1, CI 8.68-78.37). Positive syphilis was 3.1%; latent and active TB rates were 28.1 and 5.8%, respectively. Concerning TB, we found remarkable differences both among WHO regions of origin (the Eastern Mediterranean region showed the highest rate of active TB, 8%) and the three categories of years of residence in Spain (6.5% for <1 year, 12.8% for 1-5 years, and 10% for >5 years). Conclusions The data allowed recommendation of a minimal screening of TB in immigrants from low-income countries regardless of the years of residence in Spain, hepatitis C in patients with altered transaminase levels, and hepatitis B in patients with gastrointestinal symptoms and/or from Morocco. © 2013 International Society of Travel Medicine.

Moreira-Matias L.,Support Intelligence | Moreira-Matias L.,University of Porto | Gama J.,University of Porto | Ferreira M.,University of Porto | And 3 more authors.
IEEE Transactions on Intelligent Transportation Systems | Year: 2013

Informed driving is increasingly becoming a key feature for increasing the sustainability of taxi companies. The sensors that are installed in each vehicle are providing new opportunities for automatically discovering knowledge, which, in return, delivers information for real-time decision making. Intelligent transportation systems for taxi dispatching and for finding time-saving routes are already exploring these sensing data. This paper introduces a novel methodology for predicting the spatial distribution of taxi-passengers for a short-term time horizon using streaming data. First, the information was aggregated into a histogram time series. Then, three time-series forecasting techniques were combined to originate a prediction. Experimental tests were conducted using the online data that are transmitted by 441 vehicles of a fleet running in the city of Porto, Portugal. The results demonstrated that the proposed framework can provide effective insight into the spatiotemporal distribution of taxi-passenger demand for a 30-min horizon. © 2000-2011 IEEE.

Haug P.J.,Intermountain Healthcare | Ferraro J.P.,Intermountain Healthcare | Holmen J.,Intermountain Healthcare | Wu X.,Intermountain Healthcare | And 4 more authors.
Journal of the American Medical Informatics Association | Year: 2013

Objectives: To present a system that uses knowledge stored in a medical ontology to automate the development of diagnostic decision support systems. To illustrate its function through an example focused on the development of a tool for diagnosing pneumonia. Materials and methods: We developed a system that automates the creation of diagnostic decision-support applications. It relies on a medical ontology to direct the acquisition of clinic data from a clinical data warehouse and uses an automated analytic system to apply a sequence of machine learning algorithms that create applications for diagnostic screening. We refer to this system as the ontology-driven diagnostic modeling system (ODMS). We tested this system using samples of patient data collected in Salt Lake City emergency rooms and stored in Intermountain Healthcare's enterprise data warehouse. Results: The system was used in the preliminary development steps of a tool to identify patients with pneumonia in the emergency department. This tool was compared with a manually created diagnostic tool derived from a curated dataset. The manually created tool is currently in clinical use. The automatically created tool had an area under the receiver operating characteristic curve of 0.920 (95% CI 0.916 to 0.924), compared with 0.944 (95% CI 0.942 to 0.947) for the manually created tool. Discussion: Initial testing of the ODMS demonstrates promising accuracy for the highly automated results and illustrates the route to model improvement. Conclusions: The use of medical knowledge, embedded in ontologies, to direct the initial development of diagnostic computing systems appears feasible.

News Article | September 6, 2007

Spammers have set a new benchmark for mockery, hijacking PCs inside drug giant Pfizer to send out adverts for the company’s most famous product, Viagra, it has been claimed. According to US botnet tracking company Support Intelligence, a total of 138 IP addresses inside the company’s various networks have had to be blacklisted after being found to be relaying spam. In an interview with Wired, the company reports that it has kept 600 examples of spam emails said to have come from Pfizer-owned computers in the last six months. Most incredible of all, however, is the fact that some of these emails appear to have been designed to sell the company’s own erectile dysfunction product, Viagra, as well as equivalents from rivals such as Eli Lily. None of the recipients of these emails would have been aware that Pfizer was being used to send the spam, however, as the spoof return address gives the impression that they are from Google Gmail accounts. Other leading companies, including Toshiba and Bank of America have also been affected by the botnet/zombie phenomenon. Oddly, Support Intelligence had informed Pfizer of the particular issue on its network, but that hadn’t stopped the activity, the company said. The company appears to take some pleasure in pointing out just how many large organisations are affected by the botnet scourge, even, in some cases, as they report on it. In a June blog, the author taunts the BBC for having problems on its own network, but ends up grudgingly commending the organisation for solving the issue in advance of being notified.

News Article | April 19, 2007

Support Intelligence, a networking monitoring company, is busting some of the world’s largest corporations for having malware-infected or PWNED machines that are spewing spam from within corporate firewalls. Using spam honeypots (fake email addresses left laying around the internet for a spam bot to find) and reverse IP addresses lookups from spam headers, the company has fingered Bank of America, Toshiba, Aflac (I never trusted that duck), AIG, and Business Week among others for having compromised machines on their networks. UPDATE: AFLAC says it’s network wasn’t infected, saying it found that the spam came out of their network via an employee’s infected home machine that connected to the AFLAC network through a VPN. We have observed many months of good behavior from BofA but starting on April 2, 2007 a lone system named [] got infected with something nasty. The situation lasted until the evening of April 6th. During this time we collected 226 SPAM. Support Intelligence wasn’t the only place that noticed this box spew,System6 was blacklisted by CBL, TQM 3, and UCEProtect. We also note that this same system has been blacklisted by SpamHaus before on 2006-12-31 and 2007-03-30. None of the Spam we collect from System 6 had any Received headers so we believe all the mail to have originated from hosts outside of Bank of America, probably via socks proxy – so lets be clear that this appears to be a casual penetration of [our attorney has encouraged us to leave this space blank] Via TaoSecurity via Emergent Chaos, both of which have more…

News Article | November 3, 2008

The Air Force is fed up with a seemingly endless barrage of attacks on its computer networks from stealthy adversaries whose motives and even locations are unclear. So now the service is looking to restore its advantage on the virtual battlefield by doing nothing less than the rewriting the "laws of cyberspace." It’s more than a little ironic that the U.S. military, which had so much to do with the creation and early development of internet, finds itself at its mercy. But as the American armed forces become increasingly reliant on its communications networks, even small, obscure holes in the defense grid are seen as having catastrophic potential. Trouble is that even a founding father can’t unilaterally change things that the entirety of the internet ecosystem now depends on. "You can control your own networks, rewrite your own laws," says Rick Wesson, CEO of the network security firm Support Intelligence. "You can’t rewrite everybody else’s." But the Air Force Research Laboratory’s "Integrated Cyber Defense" program, announced earlier this month, is part of a larger military effort to accomplish just that. "The ‘laws’ of cyberspace can be rewritten, and therefore the domain can be modified at any level to favor defensive forces," announces the project’s request for proposals. Some of the rewrites being considered: It’s part of a larger Air Force effort to gain the upper hand in network conflict. An upcoming Air Force doctrine calls for the service to have the "freedom to attack" online. A research program, launched in May, shoots for "gain access" to "any and all" computers. A new division of information warriors is being set up under Air Force Space Command. "Our mission is to control cyberspace both for attacks and defense," 8th Air Force commander Lt. Gen. Robert Elder told earlier this year. Apparently. At the moment, though, online aggressors have the edge on the military’s network protectors, the Air Force says. "Defensive operations are constantly playing ‘catch up’ to an ever-increasing onslaught of attacks that seem to always stay one step ahead," says the Air Force Research Laboratory’s "Integrated Cyber Defense" request for proposals. "In order to tip the balance in favor of the defender, we must develop a strategic approach to cyber defense that transcends the day to day reactive operations." "[M]ost threats should be made irrelevant by eliminating vulnerabilities beforehand by either moving them ‘out of band’ (i.e., making them technically or physically inaccessible to the adversary), or ‘designing them out’ completely," the request for proposals adds. "Can we create a cyberspace with different rules?" asks Paul Ratazzi, a technical advisor at the AFRL’s Information Directorate. "Let’s challenge those fundamental assumptions on how these things work, and see if there’s a better way." For instance, it’s extraordinarily difficult to find the hacker behind a cyberattack today. Network traffic can be run through dozens of different proxies and anonymizers; "botnets" of enslaved computers can be controlled from the other side of the world; millions of PCs spew out malicious data without their owners ever catching on. AFRL would like to see a way to change existing network protocols, to make it easier to trace and locate the source of an online threat. Or perhaps today’s protocols can be tailored, to make military networks "technically or physically inaccessible" to malicious traffic. "We’ll start with blue," says Information Directorate chief Donald Hanson, using the military term for friendly forces. "If you’re not blue, you can’t come in." Hanson is also interested in finding ways to dodge electronic attacks, rather than figure out new ways to stop them, or lock them out. "A lot of our [defenses] up to now have been about defeating an attack," he says. "We’d rather avoid it altogether." Digital radios communicate today by "frequency-hopping" — jumping across multiple bands of the spectrum. Perhaps the Air Force’s online traffic could do something similar. There are some network precedents for the idea, Wesson explains. So-called "honeypot" servers are used to lure in hackers with fake targets to attack. But the hackers are often aware which IP addresses are really honeypots. So hosted servers are used to mask those addresses — and, with a secure network "tunnel," run the traffic back to the honeypots. "If you can do that with honeypots, you can do it with all kinds of other things," Wesson says. Hanson refused to comment on that technique. But Ross Stapleton-Gray, with the Packet Clearing House research group, isn’t sure cyberstrikes can be avoided, really. "The way networks work, it’s always going to be easier for a nimble attacker than a nimble defender," says Ross Stapleton-Gray, with the Packet Clearing House research group. "There’s always a scarcity of bandwidth — somewhere. There are always chokepoints — somewhere."

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