Summers A.E.,SIS Technology Solutions LP |
White J.D.,Lloyds Register
3rd AIChE Regional Process Technology Conference 2011 | Year: 2011
Process safety isn't one department - it's everyone's responsibility Process safety isn't a one-time job or a project - it's everyday, all day Process safety isn't paperwork - it's a way of thinking and acting - Process safety is a culture; it's a way of doing business.
Summers A.E.,SIS Technology Solutions LP
3rd CCPS Latin American Process Safety Conference and Expo 2011 | Year: 2011
The concept of process safety management is well known throughout the world and relies on reducing risk continuously throughout the process life. The process equipment design and operation determine the limits of safe operation and the potential process hazards. It is the process engineer's responsibility to define a risk reduction strategy that addresses identified hazards, to develop and maintain the process safety information that supports this strategy, and to ensure operating procedures are available that result in timely and consistent execution of this strategy. This paper primarily focuses on how these activities apply to instrumented safety systems (ISS), as defined by CCPS Safe and Reliable Instrumented Protective Systems. It also identifies the unique requirements for safely instrumented systems (SISs) from IEC 61511.
Mostia Jr. W.L.,SIS Technology Solutions LP
Proceedings of the Annual Symposium on Instrumentation for the Process Industries | Year: 2011
This paper describes a systematic program approach to reducing the risk of tower overfills in process units. This approach was taken on large project in a U.S. refinery which had embedded within its scope a program to reduce the risk due to tower overfill hazards. This program was tasked with analyzing and evaluating the risk due to tower overfills for 176 towers in over 25 operating units. This included consequence and severity identification, risk assessment, and identification of risk reduction means using Layer of Protection Analysis (LOPA) to reduce the tower overfill risk to the corporate risk reduction criteria. The program also identified the minimum tower instrumentation required for tower overfill protection. Each tower in the program was subject to a consequence based screening which identified and prioritized the towers for further analysis. Seven standard LOPA tower overfill scenarios were applied to each tower and project scope was identified based the LOPA recommendations.
Summers A.,SIS Technology Solutions LP
29th Center for Chemical Process Safety International Conference 2014, CCPS 2014 - Topical Conference at the 2014 AIChE Spring Meeting and 10th Global Congress on Process Safety | Year: 2014
Decision makers need reproducible, believable results to support investment decisions. A wide variety of hazard identification and risk analysis methods are available to support process safety decisions. All methods require knowledge in the fundamentals of process design and experience in the process operation under consideration. Every method has uncertainty and no method yields any better reflection of the risk than the level of engagement that the analyst or team has in the assessment. Traditional approaches work well on processes with a long history of operation, but are difficult to apply in the rapidly evolving environment of modem manufacturing. This paper discusses the challenges that the risk analysis process is facing in today's work environment. These challenges include advances in chemical manufacturing techniques, the rapid evolution of vogue practices, the focus on hazard scenarios, the false security of calculations, the rampant pace of technology change, and the increase in complexity of human and automation interaction. Copyright © (2014) by AIChE All rights reserved.
Summers A.E.,SIS Technology Solutions LP |
Hearn W.H.,SIS Technology Solutions LP
Process Safety Progress | Year: 2012
Risk analysis assesses the likelihood and consequence of events. The acceptability of the identified risk is determined by comparing it to a specified risk tolerance. The criteria applied depend on the analysis boundary, which may be the hazardous event or extend to the harm posed by the hazardous event. Risk analyses generally begin with a determination of the likelihood that the hazardous event occurs. This is where the process deviation exceeds the safe operating limit of the process resulting in loss of containment, release of hazardous materials, or other undesirable consequence. These analyses require estimation of the likelihood that the initiating event occurs and the probability that the proactive protection layers do not operate as required, allowing the hazardous event to occur. Reactive protection layers and conditional modifiers are considered when the analysis is evaluating the likelihood that harm is caused by the hazardous event. Various methods for performing risk analyses are discussed in several CCPS publications including Chemical Process Quantitative Risk Analysis [CCPS/AIChE, Guidelines for Chemical Process Quantitative Risk Analysis, 2000], Hazard Evaluation Procedures [CCPS/AIChE, Guidelines for Hazard Evaluation Procedures, 2008], and Layers of Protection Analysis [CCPS/AIChE, Layer of Protection Analysis: Simplified Process Risk Assessment, 2001]. However, the link between the selected risk criteria as described in Guidelines for Developing Quantitative Safety Risk Criteria [CCPS/AIChE, Guidelines for Developing Quantitative Safety Risk Criteria, 2009] and the factors considered in the analysis is not clearly described in these texts. Recognizing this opportunity, this article begins with a brief introduction to risk analysis concepts to provide a foundation for a discussion of the typical analysis boundaries and associated risk criteria. Then, it discusses how the analysis boundary and risk criteria affect the consideration of protection layers, enabling conditions, and conditional modifiers. © 2011 American Institute of Chemical Engineers (AIChE).