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Lunden L.P.,Sigra Group | Fjaertoft D.,Sigra Group | Overland I.,Norwegian Institute of International Affairs | Prachakova A.,Norwegian Institute of International Affairs
Energy Policy | Year: 2013

The non-Gazprom gas producers (NGPs) doubled their share of the Russian domestic gas market between 2000 and 2010 and have continued growing since then. For several years especially Novatek expanded. More recently, Rosneft has emerged as a key player, not least through its purchase of TNK-BP. This article begins with an overview of the companies in the Russian gas sector, their resource bases and capacities, and subsequently examines whether differences in field development costs and export market access may make it rational for Gazprom to continue ceding market share to the NGPs. With rising costs of Gazprom's queue of greenfield developments, any delays in Gazprom's investment program may be compensated through increased NGP production. The article argues that the NGPs are ready to fill the gap, may be allowed to do so and are already increasing their market share in an increasingly competitive market. The stage may now be set for a continued gradual transformation of the Russian gas market, in which the interests of Gazprom and the NGPs may be complementary or may be pitted against each other, but those of the Russian Federation are in any case likely to be better fulfilled than in the past. © 2013 Elsevier Ltd.


Overland I.,Norwegian Institute of International Affairs | Godzimirski J.,Norwegian Institute of International Affairs | Lunden L.P.,Sigra Group | Fjaertoft D.,Sigra Group
Polar Record | Year: 2013

During an intense period of only 14 months, from June 2010 to August 2011, six major cooperation agreements between oil companies were announced in Russia. Almost all of these partnerships involved offshore projects, with an international oil company as one of the partners and Rosneft as the other. The agreements were concentrated along Russia's Arctic petroleum frontier, and the three that survived the longest involved oil or gas extraction in the Arctic. This article analyses and compares the contents and contexts of the agreements, to ascertain what they have to tell about access for international companies to Russia's offshore petroleum resources and the influence of competing Russian political actors over the country's petroleum sector. The article argues that the new partnerships did represent an intention to open up the Russian continental shelf, and that the agreements were driven and shaped by a series of needs: to secure foreign capital and competence, to reduce exploration risk, to lobby for a better tax framework, to show the government that necessary action was being taken to launch exploration activities, to improve Rosneft's image abroad, and either to avert or prepare for future privatisation of state companies such as Rosneft. Copyright © Cambridge University Press 2012.


Fjaertoft D.,Sigra Group | Lunden L.P.,Sigra Group
Energy Policy | Year: 2015

This article maps and analyses petroleum taxation policy in Russia to investigate the extent to which it reaches the goal of maximizing government revenue from new petroleum field developments. Expected cash flows from four real-world fields in Russia are modeled in four real-world tax regimes in an attempt to determine whether the so-called 'tax maneuver' of December 2014 helps the government to reach its goal. Russia's tax policy is further analyzed in terms of the desirable tax system design features of simplicity, flexibility, stability and competitiveness. The article concludes that the changes to the tax system introduced additional incentives for field developments but failed both to improve tax system design per se and to maximize government tax revenue. © 2015 Elsevier Ltd.

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