Time filter

Source Type

London, United Kingdom

Bonsall-Clarke K.,RSSB | Pugh S.,Northern Rail
Rail Human Factors: Supporting Reliability, Safety and Cost Reduction | Year: 2013

Analyses of incidents and accidents within the rail industry and trends within other safety critical industries consistently demonstrate the importance of non-technical skills (NTS) in helping to prevent incidents and accidents. Non-technical skills have been defined as the cognitive, social and personal resource skills that complement technical skills and contribute to safe and efficient task performance (Flin, O'Connor and Crichton, 2008). Examples of NTS are conscientiousness, communication, rule compliance and workload management. Despite this evidence, until recently there has been very little formal coverage of NTS in front-line staff competence management systems. Training programmes for operational staff within the GB rail industry have been based largely on rules and traction training, and on-going competence development has been concerned only with technical skills. In response to this growing evidence highlighting the key role of NTS in safe and effective performance, RSSB undertook a research project to identify relevant NTS and develop, pilot and evaluate NTS training courses and other reinforcement activities for front line staff and their managers. Long-term, the vision is for this suite of training materials to be widely adopted within the rail industry, and for it to be adapted as necessary for application to other safety critical roles. The evaluation of the front-line staff and manager training courses clearly demonstrated the benefit of the research in the rail context, with significant improvements in a number of NTS. The companies involved in the pilot of the course continue to monitor their incident and accident levels over time in an attempt to establish the impact of the NTS initiatives on safety. This paper reports on some initial feedback from one of the companies involved in the piloting of the RSSB NTS materials and guidance - including key successes and challenges - and outlines next steps. © 2013 Taylor & Francis Group, London, UK. Source

Thompson E.,Mott MacDonald Ltd. | Kazi T.,Mott MacDonald Ltd. | Scott A.,RSSB
Rail Human Factors: Supporting Reliability, Safety and Cost Reduction | Year: 2013

The rail industry has realised that there are potential benefits of adopting new technology in helping to achieve key business and operational objectives in delivering rail services. The McNulty report (McNulty, 2011) recommends the adoption of existing technology and discourages costly customised design development. Increasingly, suppliers outside the Rail industry are being approached to enable the adoption of existing technology in the rail sector, or technology that has been used in rail in other countries are being considered for GB adoption. However, historically the rail culture can provide challenges when attempting to integrate new technology with existing legacy systems and adapt "off the shelf" technology to the rail environment and working practices. Often, the supplier is unaware of standards and practices that are imperative to the rail organisation. As Human Factors practitioners we can facilitate value engineering and ensure user requirements are being appropriately captured. There are several key considerations that we must be cognisant of: • the reality of commercial budgets • the client's business and operational aspirations • the scope and functionality of the supplier's technology solution. This paper presents a case study which focussed on the feasibility and options for the fitment of the ERTMS (the European RailTraffic Management System) Driver Machine Interface (DMI) within new build train cabs and retro-fit to existing cabs.1 As ERTMS will be fitted on routes where trains will transition from ERTMS train control to Class B or legacy forms of train control, the key question for the analysis was the level of integration that should be provided between these types of train control. For example, should the AutomaticWarning System (AWS) and Train ProtectionWarning System (TPWS) controls and indications be integrated within the DMI or kept separate? To evaluate the options we developed a framework to guide our investigation. Specific tasks included: • Establishing the operational requirements for the transition between ETCS Level 2 and the Class B train control systems. • Establishing the technology requirements for the ERTMS/ETCS DMI and investigated technology options and the factors that would need to be considered when choosing specific technology. • Identifying the risks and benefits for the integration of AWS/ TPWS with the ERTMS/ETCS DMI. The results of these analyses were used to provide guidance as to how the AWS/TPWS controls and indicators could be integrated within the ERTMS/ETCS DMI. © 2013 Taylor & Francis Group, London, UK. Source

Bearfield G.J.,RSSB
IET Conference Publications | Year: 2011

If not done correctly, safety analysis and assurance work can lead to significant project costs partly because of the inherent costs of undertaking these activities but perhaps more importantly because the use of ineffective processes can lead to key safety issues emerging late in the project lifecycle, requiring costly fixes or creating the inability to demonstrate safety (leading to costs associated with project overrun and delay). A project was undertaken to review current practice in safety engineering and analysis in Great Britain's (GB) railway industry to determine potential areas for developing guidance, refining processes, developing improved tools and techniques, and ensuring that opportunities created by changes in the legislative framework to improve processes are maximised. One particular finding of this work was that there is an opportunity to develop more standardised hazard lists, to be used across a range of projects. This would allow projects to make better use of the information in the industry Safety Risk Model (SRM) to develop safety targets, and undertake safety related project optioneering earlier in the lifecycle of a given project. It would also make safety analysis more repeatable and hence improve the efficiency with which it could be undertaken. Source

Zacher M.,DB Netz AG | Nicklisch D.,DB Netz AG | Grabner G.,Siemens AG | Polach O.,Bombardier | Eickhoff B.,RSSB
Proceedings of the Institution of Mechanical Engineers, Part F: Journal of Rail and Rapid Transit | Year: 2015

The project DynoTRAIN, which was funded under the European Seventh Framework Programme, was set-up in order to close the open points in the Technical Specification of Interoperability (TSI) of the trans-European rail system. The project was divided in seven work packages. The focus in work package 3 (WP 3) was the contact geometry between wheels and rails. More general information about the DynoTRAIN project is given in the foreword of this special edition. WP 3 was split into several tasks. In the first and second tasks worn wheel and rail profiles were collected. Since the wear behaviour of wheels and rails depends (among other factors) on bogie design, operating conditions, rail inclination and curve radius, a large number of wheel and rail profiles were investigated in order to obtain a representative picture of the contact conditions on the trans-European network. The wheel and rail profiles were analysed in terms of equivalent conicity, which is an important indicator for the running stability of railway vehicles. Based on the collected data, reference profiles for wheels and rails were defined for the calculation of conicity maps. The reference wheel and rail profiles act as a sort of coordinate (scaling) system for the conicity maps. The conicity maps were calculated from selected wheel and rail profiles that had the same frequency distribution as the whole sample. The conicity maps were calculated for different speed categories and for wheels operating on networks with rail inclinations of 1/20 and 1/40. Finally, limit values of the equivalent concity for the authorization of vehicles and in-service limits for tracks were derived from these conicity maps. This approach enabled the open point €equivalent conicity' in the TSI: Locomotives and Passenger Rolling Stock and TSI: Infrastructure to be closed. © MechE 2014. Source

Bearfield G.,RSSB
IET Seminar Digest | Year: 2014

Presents a collection of slides covering the following topics: risk evaluation; risk assessment; health and safety; and safety decisions. Source

Discover hidden collaborations