CGE Risk Management Solutions

Australia

CGE Risk Management Solutions

Australia
SEARCH FILTERS
Time filter
Source Type

Pitblado R.,DNV GL | McGrath T.,Genentech | Manton M.,ABS Group | Cowley C.I.,CCPS | And 5 more authors.
Global Congress on Process Safety 2017 - Topical Conference at the 2017 AIChE Spring Meeting and 13th Global Congress on Process Safety | Year: 2017

Bow tie analysis has been in use for many years, with applications in both the upstream and the downstream petrochemical industries, as well as other major hazard industries. The method is qualitative and uses a diagrammatic representation of major accident threat and consequence pathways showing the hazard, top event, threats, and potential consequences, with intervening barriers and degradation factor pathways linked to the main pathway barriers. Bow ties can be compiled from Process Hazards Analysis, Hazard and Operability Study, Layers of Protection Analysis and Safety Integrity Level safety studies to summarize and more effectively communicate the controls (barriers and safeguards) organizations rely on to protect against threats and to mitigate against the consequence should the top event occur. One of the primary aims of bow ties is enhanced communication of how major hazards are controlled. A problem with bow ties has been that there is no widely accepted methodology or definitions and this has resulted in inconsistent diagrams often with structural errors. Additionally, diagrams frequently show many barriers that are actually not 'effective, independent and auditable', misleading the organization into believing they have a greater level of protection than is actually present. CCPS has developed a concept book to better define the bow tie analysis method and to promote best practice ideas. The book aims to ensure consistent application of the bow tie technique by defining structural elements together with good and poor examples for clarification. For example, the book provides guidance on what constitutes a barrier and what differentiates barriers from measures that merely prevent a barrier degrading. The aim of this guidance is to avoid the overrepresentation of controls, which may otherwise lull the workforce into a false sense of security that an event can never occur. The biggest area for inconsistency is the treatment of HOF - human and organizational factors. No current guidance addresses this topic well and the CCPS Committee along with the Energy Institute developed novel guidance for this area. Copyright © (2017) by AIChE.

Loading CGE Risk Management Solutions collaborators
Loading CGE Risk Management Solutions collaborators