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Maher S.T.,Risk Management Professionals Inc. | Norton K.D.,Risk Management Professionals | Surmeli S.,Risk Management Professionals
Chemical Engineering Progress | Year: 2012

Some of the tools that can be used to identify opportunities towards inherently safer design (ISD) strategies and can be applied at different points during the design work are discussed. Identifying these opportunities and making changes prior to a detailed design avoids the added costs and schedule delays that would be incurred later for the design rework. The front-end engineering and design (FEED) phase relies on estimates of process variables, and the tools available to help the process designer identify ISD alternatives during the FEED phase include the hazard and operability (HAZOP) study and the layer of protection analysis (LOPA). Cost-benefit analysis allows decision makers to systematically consider design alternatives, taking into account both benefits and costs. Revalidating periodically allows a facility to evaluate the hazards and consider new mitigation measures based on technology advancements.


Scholtz C.R.,Risk Management Professionals Inc. | Maher S.T.,Risk Management Professionals Inc.
28th Center for Chemical Process Safety International Conference 2013, CCPS - Topical Conference at the 2013 AIChE Spring Meeting and 9th Global Congress on Process Safety | Year: 2013

Specific requirements exist in all Safety Management Systems Guidelines/Requirements (e.g., Process Safety Management, Risk Management Program, Safety and Environmental Management Systems) for the creation, content, quality review, and periodic update/certification of Operating Procedures. However, the creation and actual implementation of Operating Procedures is fraught with challenges that often result in safety deficiencies, regulatory citations, and in some cases, unfortunate tragedies. Although Operating Procedures concepts involve the straightforward documentation of specific steps and precautions to take for safe and effective operation, many process facilities struggle with: • securing the focus and specific content from operations personnel for the creation of quality procedures • securing feedback from operations personnel if procedural steps do not coincide with actual practices • ensuring the steps outlined in procedures avoid introducing additional process hazards • creating procedures that are in a user-friendly format and written to facilitate training and understanding • identifying the most effective level of information and depth to include in the procedure • determining sensible levels of detail for consequences of deviation and the appropriate corrective actions • implementing meaningful competency testing • assigning the correct "skill set" to the development and update of Operating Procedures • addressing all modes of operations, including defining appropriate responsibilities Beyond the requirements, good-quality Operating Procedures are critical for encapsulating operational best practices for all of the different operating modes that the process may have to address and also provide a basis for ensuring consistent quality assurance. The objective of this paper is to convey an understanding of the challenges that must be considered with the development of Operating Procedures and provide tips and specific examples that will facilitate the creation and ongoing application of this important element of Safety Management Systems.


Norton K.D.,Titan Engineering and Consulting LLC | Saura M.B.,Risk Management Professionals Inc. | Scholtz C.R.,Risk Management Professionals Inc.
Process Safety Progress | Year: 2014

Upstream oil and gas facilities are typically exempt from the Occupational Safety and Health Administration Process Safety Management standard; however, in light of recent regulatory scrutiny on the safety of upstream operations, many operating companies have extended their safety management programs to their upstream facilities creating challenges for implementation. Many of these facilities have been operating without significant incidents for many years without proper Process Safety Information, Process Hazard Analyses, Management of Change programs, etc. making the challenge of accepting and implementing these programs difficult to embrace. This article is focused on providing insights and practical tips for the implementation of safety programs at upstream facilities to enhance the commitment to implementing process safety with limited resources. © 2013 American Institute of Chemical Engineers.


Norton K.D.,Risk Management Professionals Inc. | Saura M.B.,Risk Management Professionals Inc. | Scholtz C.R.,Risk Management Professionals Inc.
AIChE Annual Meeting, Conference Proceedings | Year: 2013

Upstream oil and gas facilities are typically exempt from the OSHA Process Safety Management (PSM) standard; however, in light of recent regulatory scrutiny on the safety of upstream operations, many operating companies have extended their safety management programs to their upstream facilities creating challenges for implementation. Many of these facilities have been operating without significant incidents for many years without proper Process Safety Information, Process Hazard Analyses, Management of Change programs, etc. making the challenge of accepting and implementing these programs difficult to embrace. This paper is focused on providing insights and practical tips for the implementation of safety programs at upstream facilities to enhance the commitment to implementing process safety with limited resources.


Norton K.D.,Risk Management Professionals Inc. | Surmeli S.,Risk Management Professionals Inc. | Maher S.T.,Risk Management Professionals Inc.
Process Safety Progress | Year: 2013

While safety instrumented systems (SISs) can be an essential element of process facility design to minimize the potential for process incidents, in some cases they can also be over-applied in the design phases of capital projects where the safety instrumented functions (SIFs) associated with the SIS are defined before the process hazards have been fully characterized. This approach may provide one mechanism for achieving a robust process control system design; however, the application of SIS also brings increased costs associated not only with the robust equipment needed to meet safety integrity level (SIL) requirements but also with the ongoing maintenance, testing, and procedures required throughout the SIS lifecycle. In order to balance the important safety benefits associated with the SIS with the increased capital costs it is critical to have a specific and comprehensive basis for decision-making. This article will illustrate the value engineering benefits of using the combined Hazard and Operability (HAZOP) Study and Layer of Protection Analysis (LOPA) methodology to comprehensively evaluate a design and provide a decision-making platform for determining whether protection for process hazards should be implemented using a SIF, a basic process control system (BPCS) feature, or alternate safeguard categories (e.g., relief valves, alarms, etc.) to ensure an adequate level of reliability without compromising safety. When the HAZOP/LOPA Study is performed following the value engineering session, the HAZOP/LOPA Study provides a critical cross-check to ensure safeguards are adequate and that changes made during the value engineering study do not introduce additional hazards. In contrast, when the HAZOP/LOPA Study is performed prior to the value engineering session, it provides a basis for decision making to remove SIFs or switch the function to the BPCS when the risk was determined to be low by the team (as defined by specific operating company criteria). © 2012 American Institute of Chemical Engineers.

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