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Alonso-Meijide J.M.,University of Santiago de Compostela | Casas-Mendez B.,University of Santiago de Compostela | Fiestras-Janeiro M.G.,University of Vigo | Holler M.J.,University of Hamburg | Holler M.J.,Public Choice Research Center
Control and Cybernetics | Year: 2010

This paper introduces two variations of the Public Good Index (Holler, 1982) for games with a priori unions. The first one stresses the public good property which suggests that all members of a winning coalition derive equal power. The second variation follows earlier work on the integration of a priori unions (Owen, 1977 and 1982) and refers to essential subsets of an a priori union when allocating power shares. Axiomatic characterizations of both indices are discussed. Numerical examples, one of them taken from a political setting, illustrate the new power indices presented in this paper. Source

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