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Sandvik K.B.,Peace Research Institute Oslo PRIO | Gabrielsen Jumbert M.,PRIO | Karlsrud J.,Norwegian Institute of International Affairs NUPI | Kaufmann M.,University of Hamburg
International Review of the Red Cross | Year: 2014

New technology may offer many opportunities for humanitarian action, but it also presents a number of challenges. Currently, most of the critical analysis of these potential challenges takes place in the blogosphere, on tweets and on listservs. There is a strong need for more scholarly engagement on the subject. This article offers an agenda for critical inquiry into the emergent field of humanitarian technology as applied to a broadly defined context of crises, encompassing both natural disasters and conflict zones, by identifying what technology does to the humanitarian enterprise, and by reflecting on the key challenges that emerge. © 2014 icrc. Source

Reid-Henry S.M.,Queen Mary, University of London | Reid-Henry S.M.,Peace Research Institute Oslo PRIO
Environment and Planning D: Society and Space | Year: 2015

This paper presents a genealogical analysis of the relationship between liberal state violence and the contemporary liberal will-to-care by way of an exploration of what is sometimes referred to as ‘humanitarian war’. I explore the historical convergence of contemporary human rights norms with military intervention in the post-Cold War context. I suggest that, far from representing a limit upon state violence in the present, human rights in fact move us closer to the ‘emancipation’ of state violence as an instrument of liberal police power. Further I take up the question of the law as it structures and shapes this emergent form of state violence more directly. Focusing on the doctrine of the Responsibility to Protect (R2P), I suggest that the form of power that is made possible by military humanitarian interventions, and in doctrines such as R2P in particular, is an international variant of what Michel Foucault termed the power of the ‘police’. I suggest that thinking about this power as a form of distributional authority may be helpful in holding to account both liberal interventionism and its underlying will-to-order in favour of an international politics of care. © SAGE Publications Ltd, 2015. Source

Holtermann H.,University of Oslo | Holtermann H.,Peace Research Institute Oslo PRIO
Terrorism and Political Violence | Year: 2014

How can insurgent groups that are militarily far weaker than the state survive and grow? Influential accounts drawing on Kalyvas' "control-collaboration" model argue that limited state reach can make this possible by allowing rebel groups to carve out pockets of control where they can elicit collaboration. I suggest that this account is inadequate. Even states with limited reach are likely to transfer sufficient forces to rebel-affected areas to establish at least partial control. Weak rebels therefore often face the challenge of building capacity without local control to begin with. I identify two broad factors that can make this feasible: first, strong pre-existing rebel networks, which facilitate collaboration through solidarity, norms of reciprocity, and social incentives; and second, counterinsurgency policies and practices that fail to exploit the opportunities that control offers for incentivizing collaboration and shaping political preferences. These arguments are grounded in a fieldwork-based case study of insurgency processes in a hamlet of Rolpa, Nepal. © 2014 Copyright Taylor & Francis Group, LLC. Source

Song Y.-H.,Academia Sinica, Taiwan | Song Y.-H.,Uppsala University | Tonnesson S.,Uppsala University | Tonnesson S.,Peace Research Institute Oslo PRIO
Ocean Development and International Law | Year: 2013

This article examines the impact of the UN Law of the Sea Convention on conflict behavior and management in the South China Sea during four periods: during its negotiation (1973-1982); from its signing to the entry into force (1982-1994); from then until the China-ASEAN Declaration on the Conduct of Parties in the South China Sea (1995-2002); and from the setting of a timeline for outer limits of continental shelf submissions to the events following the 2009 submissions (2003-2013). Ambiguous effects were found. On the one hand, the Convention has generated or exacerbated conflict by raising the stakes, failing to resolve key legal issues, and encouraging overlapping zone claims. On the other hand, it has provided obligations, language, and techniques for conflict management and resolution. The conflict-enhancing impact was found to have been more substantial than the peace-promoting effects. Nevertheless, the balance has shifted toward more emphasis on conflict management and also some utilization of the Convention's peacemaking potential. If this long-term trend continues and the Convention is more rigorously respected and applied, the Convention may in the end be found to have contributed to regional peace. © 2013 Copyright Taylor and Francis Group, LLC. Source

Jensehaugen J.,Norwegian University of Science and Technology | Jensehaugen J.,Peace Research Institute Oslo PRIO | Waage H.H.,University of Oslo
British Journal of Middle Eastern Studies | Year: 2012

The Arab states suffered humiliating defeats at the hands of Israel during the first Arab-Israeli war. Immediately following the war, Israel made brilliant and shrewd use of diplomacy to achieve its goals at the negotiating table, much as it had previously used armed force. Israel refused to negotiate with a united Arab negotiation team, preferring to isolate the states, picking them off one after the other. The Israeli-Transjordanian talks differed radically from the other armistice negotiations. Here, two parallel tracks were followed. At Rhodes, the two countries negotiated openly under UN auspices, while in Jerusalem and at King Abdullah's palace in Transjordan, representatives of the two countries held secret bilateral talks. Israel masterfully used the context of these talks to maximise its gains, using military operations to create 'facts on the ground', combinedwith direct coercion in the shape of blackmail, while taking full advantage of international power structures and abusing the trust thatKing Abdullah had placed in personal relations. TheUNActing Mediator, Ralph Bunche, was aware of the secret back channel, where the clearest cases of coercion took place. Physically and mentally exhausted by the protracted negotiations, he allowed the secret talks to progress despite his dislike of the outcome. The British government, at the time the protector of Transjordan, was unable to assist its client for fear of falling out with the USA, while the US government, in many ways the protector of Israel, maintained an equally 'hands off' stance because the talks concerned only an armistice, not a peace treaty. Already at this early stage in their relations, the power asymmetry between Israel and the Arab states was the main reason the parties could not arrive at a peaceful, sustainable solution. This article reinvestigates this diplomacy by using a combination of US, Israeli, British and UN archives, as well as the almost untouched Ralph Bunche diary. © 2012 British Society for Middle Eastern Studies. Source

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