Osaka University of Economics and Law

www.keiho-u.ac.jp/english/index.html
Osaka, Japan

Osaka University of Economics and Law is a private university in Yao, Osaka, Japan, established in 1971. Wikipedia.

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Miyazaki Y.,Osaka University of Economics and Law
Advances in Modal Logic | Year: 2016

Irreflexive frames sometimes play a crucial role in the theory of modal logics, although the class of all such frames that consist of only irreflexive points can not be determined by any set of modal formulas. For instance, the modal logic determined by the frame of one irreflexive point is one of the two coatoms of the lattice of all normal modal logics. Another important result is that every rooted cycle-free frame, that consists of irreflexive points only, splits the lattice of all normal modal logics. In this paper, we consider a family of axioms Cycl(n) (for n ≥0), which forces frames to be n-cyclic. Seeking out the distribution of modal logics of irreflexive frames in the lattice of normal extensions of the modal logic with a cyclic axiom gives us information about the structure of this lattice. We mainly discuss the case n = 1 (the structure of the lattice of normal extensions of K⊕Cycl(1)) and the case n = 2 (that of normal extensions of K⊕Cycl(2)). Finally we discuss the possibility that a similar or a refined argument may bring us information on the structure of the lattice of normal extensions of the logic K⊕Cycl(n) for every n≥1.


Maezuru M.,Osaka University of Economics and Law
Studies in Regional Science | Year: 2010

The purpose of this paper is to investigate a stochastic differential game of transboundary pollution and environmental policy. We considered two asymmetric countries. The production process results in the emission of pollutants that are added to the existing stock common to both countries. The pollution accumulation dynamics is affected by an additive shock, the mean and variance are known. In both countries, the government controls emission levels. Uncertainty is incorporated into the model through a shock. The stock of pollution evolves stochastically according to geometric Brownian motion. In order to maximize the expected net present value of social welfare, the two governments should set the emission levels. We formulate stochastic differential games that need to be solved by the two governments and derive unique Markov-perfect Nash and cooperative equilibrium solutions. Subsequently, we propose a mechanism to derive the payoff distribution procedures of subgame consistent solutions in cooperative stochastic differential games for the two governments, and are able to derive a subgame consistent solution based on the Nash bargaining axioms. In conclusion, we show how the governments agree to maximize the sum of their expected payoffs and divide the total cooperative payoff so that the Nash bargaining outcome is maintained at every instant of time. Moreover, we show conditions guaranteeing individual rationality. © 2010, JAPAN SECTION OF THE REGIONAL SCIENCE ASSOCIATION INTERNATIONAL. All rights reserved.


Murata K.,Osaka University of Economics and Law | Aoki S.,Idemitsu Kosan Co.
Review of High Pressure Science and Technology/Koatsuryoku No Kagaku To Gijutsu | Year: 2016

In this article, high pressure medium, Daphne7474 and Daphne7575 which solidify around 4 GPa at 25℃ is presented. Most of the physical high pressure parameters of Daphne7575 are slightly superior to those of Daphne7474. However, probably the great benefit with Daphne 7575 is that this new material would more easily be spread to because of the (expected) less strict international trade regulations for this material. © 2016 The Japan Society of High Pressure Science and Technology.


Maezuru M.,Osaka University of Economics and Law
Studies in Regional Science | Year: 2014

This paper analyses the political economy of environmental policies in the presence of an eco-industry pressure group. Previous studies deal with two kinds of lobbiests: capitalists and environmentalists. We introduce into the process a third pressure group representing the eco-industry sector. An incumbent government maximizes its chances of being reelected with an objective function that includes both social welfare and political contributions. Introduction of the eco-industry lobby introduces new political contributions and modifies the incentives of the traditional lobbiests. We suppose an open economy context. In two countries, two polluting sectors are subject to an environmental policy. Therefore, an eco-industry sector that supplies polluting firm abatement goods and services arises. Abatement goods and services are assumed internationally traded, creating the only industrial interaction between the two countries. Pollution affects consumers in both countries and can be transboundary or purely local. Both cases are analyzed. Our main findings can be summarized as follows. Eco-industries will lobby in favor of more stringent environmental policies unless the impacts of foreign competition more than compensate for the increase in turnover that a tighter environmental policy induces. Polluting firms always lobby against tighter environmental policies. © 2015 Japan Section of the Regional Science Association International. All rights reserved.


Morisawa Y.,Osaka University of Economics and Law
Proceedings of the 20th Workshop on General Relativity and Gravitation in Japan, JGRG 2010 | Year: 2010

We investigate the geometrical properties of the target space of the five-dimensional Einstein-Maxwell-Chern-Simons system admitting two commuting spacelike Killing vector fields whose Chern-Simons coupling constant is the non-SUGRA value.


The purpose of this study was to investigate how the presence of green and producer lobbies can affect the political determination of environmental policies. We considered the economies of two countries-Home and Foreign. Both countries were perfectly similar, except for the presence of environmentalists in Home who are negatively affected by pollution abroad. There existed a polluting sector where two polluting firms-one in Home and the other in Foreign- competed strategically in a third market. We assumed that the green lobby existed only in Home and was concerned about environmental damage in Home. Moreover, the producer lobby existed only in Foreign and was concerned with industrial profit in Foreign. Political competition can be modelled as a two-stage game. In the first stage, the green and producer lobbies simultaneously present incumbent politicians with contribution schedules, namely functions describing their political contributions contingent on the chosen environmental policies. In the second stage, given the equilibrium contribution schedules, incumbent politicians select environmental policies and collect the corresponding contributions from each lobby. The implicit objective of the incumbent politicians is to be re-elected. They are concerned with social welfare and support from lobby groups. We determined the impact of an increase in the size of each lobby depends on whether pollution is local or global, and the extent to which environmentalists are concerned about pollution in the other country.


Maezuru M.,Osaka University of Economics and Law
Studies in Regional Science | Year: 2011

The purpose of this study was to investigate international cooperation on pollution control between asymmetric countries under uncertainty. We considered any two countries that are asymmetric with respect to their technological level and the amount of environmental damage they incur. Production processes result in the emission of pollutants that are added to the existing pollution stock common to both countries. The stock of pollution evolves stochastically, according to the geometric Brownian motion. The governments of the two countries set their pollutant emission levels at the Markov perfect equilibrium to maximize their expected net present value of social welfare. In addition, they set their pollutant emission levels at cooperative equilibrium to maximize the sum of their expected net present value of social welfare. In cooperative stochastic differential games, a credible cooperative agreement must be sub-game consistent. Subgame consistency ensures extension of an optimal policy to a later starting time, and any possible state brought about by prior optimal behaviour of the governments remains optimal. We considered a cooperative game in which the governments of two countries agree to maximize and divide the sum of their expected net present value of social welfare in a way that shares the gain from their cooperation proportional to the relative sizes of their expected non-cooperative net present value of social welfare at every instant of time. In conclusion, the country with a higher technological level or that incurs lower environmental damage obtains a larger instantaneous payoff at the subgame consistent solution. JEL Classification: F18, L13, Q58.


Maezuru M.,Osaka University of Economics and Law
Studies in Regional Science | Year: 2013

Recent research concerning environmental policies emphasizes a specific characteristic of environmentalists, particular disconcertment about foreign-source pollution. A polluting sector exists where two polluting firms-one at home and the other foreign-strategically compete in a third market. Each government taxes its domestic polluters on the basis of the emissions level. Therefore, each firm invests in pollution abatement to reduce the emissions level. An environmental lobby group in the home country initiates action by offering the foreign government a contribution schedule that specifies the payment to be made to the government as a pollution tax. Taking the contribution schedule, the pollution abatement levels and the production levels of the two firms as given, the government then implements a politically optimal pollution tax. This study investigates the implications of lobbying to the foreign government, when environmentalists are negatively affected by pollution from abroad. We found that the impact of an increase in environmentalism on the politically optimal pollution tax rate depends on(i) whether the pollution is local or transboundary,(ii) the extent to which environmentalists are concerned about pollution in the foreign country and(iii) the marginal cost of investments in pollution abatement by the foreign firm. Moreover, we compared the non-cooperative pollution tax rate with the politically optimal pollution tax rate and found that a differential between the two rates increases as environmentalism increases.


Morisawa Y.,Osaka University of Economics and Law
Proceedings of the 21st Workshop on General Relativity and Gravitation in Japan, JGRG 2011 | Year: 2011

We investigate the geometrical property and the symmetry of the target space of the five-dimensional Einstein-Maxwell-Chern-Simons system admitting two commut- ing spacelike Killing vector fields whose Chern-Simons coupling constant is the non- SUGRA value.


Oh C.-H.,Osaka University of Economics and Law | Honda K.,Osaka Prefecture University
Procedia Computer Science | Year: 2013

Fuzzy co-clustering is a basic technique for revealing intrinsic co-cluster structures from cooccurrence information among objects and items. In most of fuzzy co-clustering algorithms, objects and items are partitioned based on different constraints. Objects are forced to be exclusively partitioned like as Fuzzy c-Means (FCM), while item memberships often represent just the relative significance of items in each cluster, i.e., items can be shared by multiple clusters. In a previous work, exclusive partition of items were achieved by introducing a penalty term in Fuzzy Clustering for Categorical Multivariate data (FCCM), which is an FCM-type co-clustering with entropy regularization mechanism. In this paper, the applicability of dual exclusive partition of objects and items are discussed in the frameworks of Fuzzy CoDoK and SCAD-based fuzzy co-clustering. © 2013 The Authors.

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