Ministry of Social Affairs and Employment SZW

The Hague, Netherlands

Ministry of Social Affairs and Employment SZW

The Hague, Netherlands
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Bellamy L.J.,White Queen Safety Strategies | Mud M.,RPS | Manuel H.J.,Dutch National Institute for Public Health and the Environment RIVM | Oh J.I.H.,Ministry of Social Affairs and Employment SZW
Journal of Loss Prevention in the Process Industries | Year: 2013

In the Netherlands there are around 400 "Seveso" sites that fall under the Dutch Major Hazards Decree (BRZO) 1999. Between 2006 and 2010 the Dutch Labour Inspectorate's Directorate for Major Hazard Control completed investigations of 118 loss of containment incidents involving hazardous substances from this group. On the basis of investigation reports the incidents were entered in a tailor-made tool called Storybuilder developed for the Dutch Ministry of Social Affairs and Employment for identifying the dominant patterns of technical safety barrier failures, barrier task failures and underlying management causes associated with the resulting loss of control events. The model is a bow-tie structure with six lines of defence, three on either side of the central loss of containment event. In the first line of defence, failures in the safety barriers leading to loss of control events were primarily equipment condition failures, pre start-up and safeguarding failures and process deviations such as pressure and flow failures. These deviations, which should have been recovered while still within the safe envelope of operation, were missed primarily because of inadequate indication signals that the deviations have occurred. Through failures of subsequent lines of defence they are developing into serious incidents. Overall, task failures are principally failures to provide adequate technical safety barriers and failures to operate provided barriers appropriately. Underlying management delivery failures were mainly found in equipment specifications and provisions, procedures and competence. The competence delivery system is especially important for identifying equipment condition, equipment isolation for maintenance, pre-start-up status and process deviations. Human errors associated with operating barriers were identified in fifty per cent of cases, were mostly mistakes and feature primarily in failure to prevent deviations and subsequently recover them. Loss of control associated with loss of containment was primarily due to the containment being bypassed (72% of incidents) and less to material strength failures (28%). Transfer pipework, connections in process plant and relief valves are the most frequent release points and the dominant release material is extremely flammable. It is concluded that the analysis of a large number of incidents in Storybuilder can support the quantification of underlying causes and provide evidence of where the weak points exist in major hazard control in the prevention of major accidents. © 2013 Elsevier Ltd.


Bellamy L.J.,White Queen Safety Strategies | Damen M.,RIGO Research and Advies | Jan Manuel H.,National Institute for Public Health and Environment RIVM | Aneziris O.N.,Greek National Center For Scientific Research | And 2 more authors.
Reliability Engineering and System Safety | Year: 2014

The risk of a serious occupational accident per hour exposure was calculated in a project to develop an occupational risk model in the Netherlands (WebORCA). To obtain risk rates, the numbers of victims of serious occupational accidents investigated by the Dutch Labour inspectorate 1998-Feb 2004 were divided by the number of hours exposure for each of 64 different types of hazards, such as contact with moving parts of machines and falls from various types of height. The exposures to the occupational accident hazards were calculated from a survey of a panel of 30,000 from the Dutch working population. Sixty risk rates were then used to predict serious accidents for activity sectors and jobs in the Netherlands where exposures to the hazards for sectors or jobs could be estimated from the survey. Such predictions have been called "horoscopes" because the idea is to provide a quick look-up of predicted accidents for a particular sector or job. Predictions compared favourably with actual data. It is concluded that predictive data can help provide information about accidents in cases where there is a lack of data, such as for smaller sub groups of the working population. © 2014 Elsevier Ltd.


Papazoglou I.A.,Greek National Center For Scientific Research | Aneziris O.,Greek National Center For Scientific Research | Bellamy L.,White Queen Safety Strategies | Ale B.J.M.,Bosboom Toussaint Plein 117 | Oh J.I.H.,Ministry of Social Affairs and Employment SZW
Risk Analysis | Year: 2015

Occupational risk rates per hour of exposure have been quantified for 63 occupational accident types for the Dutch working population. Data were obtained from the analysis of more than 9,000 accidents that occurred over a period of six years in the Netherlands and resulted in three types of reportable consequences under Dutch law: (a) fatal injury, (b) permanent injury, and (c) serious recoverable injury requiring at least one day of hospitalization. A Bayesian uncertainty assessment on the value of the risk rates has been performed. Annual risks for each of the 63 occupational accident types have been calculated, including the variability in the annual exposure of the working population to the corresponding hazards. The suitability of three risk measures-individual risk rates, individual annual risk, and number of accidents-is examined and discussed. © 2015 Society for Risk Analysis.


Bellamy L.J.,White Queen BV | Aneziris O.N.,Greek National Center For Scientific Research | Papazoglou I.A.,Greek National Center For Scientific Research | Damen M.,RIGO Research and Advies | And 3 more authors.
Safety, Reliability and Risk Analysis: Beyond the Horizon - Proceedings of the European Safety and Reliability Conference, ESREL 2013 | Year: 2014

For several years the Dutch Ministry of Social Affairs (SZW) together with the Dutch National Institute of Public Health and the Environment (RIVM) has contracted work on analysing the underlying causes of both major hazard chemical accidents and serious occupational accidents using the same basic modelling principles of a technical system with safety barriers and a human system of barrier tasks with task resourcing by management. Using 23,030 Dutch serious occupational accidents analysed by the model, this paper looks at 3 main classes of factors contributing to safety which have been identified from this database: 1) Safeguarding within the technical system itself; 2) Operational control of the hazard agent; 3) Keeping people within (relatively) safe boundaries of activity. Performance measures are suggested for each based on the patterns of the direct and underlying causes. It is concluded that such patterns could be used to fingerprint the hazards for safety monitoring. © 2014 Taylor & Francis Group, London..

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