Time filter

Source Type

Haeussler C.,University of Passau | Harhoff D.,Max Planck Institute for Innovation and Competition | Harhoff D.,Ludwig Maximilians University of Munich
Research Policy | Year: 2014

In the presence of asymmetric information, economic agents need to communicate their quality to investors and other parties. This paper investigates how information generated during the patenting process affects the ability of new ventures to attract VC financing. While much of the literature on information asymmetries focuses on patent applications, we argue that the entire examination process should be considered, including information that emerges in the course of patent examination and review. We test several hypotheses using a sample of British and German companies that seek venture capital. We find that the filing of patent applications is positively related to VC financing. Moreover, the examination process at the patent office generates valuable technological and commercial information via search reports, citations and opposition procedures which affect the likelihood of VC financing. Our results suggest that the patenting process supports investors in updating their expectations regarding the quality of new ventures. © 2014 Elsevier B.V.


Andreoli-Versbach P.,Max Planck Institute for Innovation and Competition | Andreoli-Versbach P.,Ludwig Maximilians University of Munich | Mueller-Langer F.,Max Planck Institute for Innovation and Competition | Mueller-Langer F.,Innovation International
Research Policy | Year: 2014

Data-sharing is an essential tool for replication, validation and extension of empirical results. Using a hand-collected data set describing the data-sharing behaviour of 488 randomly selected empirical researchers, we provide evidence that most researchers in economics and management do not share their data voluntarily. We derive testable hypotheses based on the theoretical literature on information-sharing and relate data-sharing to observable characteristics of researchers. We find empirical support for the hypotheses that voluntary data-sharing significantly increases with (a) academic tenure, (b) the quality of researchers, (c) the share of published articles subject to a mandatory data-disclosure policy of journals, and (d) personal attitudes towards "open science" principles. On the basis of our empirical evidence, we discuss a set of policy recommendations. © 2014 Elsevier B.V.


Graham S.J.H.,Georgia Institute of Technology | Harhoff D.,Max Planck Institute for Innovation and Competition
Research Policy | Year: 2014

This article assesses the impact in the US of adopting a patent post-grant review (PGR) procedure similar to one provided in the America Invents Act (AIA) of 2011. We employ novel methods for matching US patents to their European counterparts to find that opposition rates are about three times higher among European Patent Office (EPO) equivalents of US litigated patents as against control-group (unlitigated) patents. Contingent on reaching a final judgment in EPO post-grant opposition, we find that about 70% of these equivalents have challenged claims that are either completely revoked or amended. Using our empirical findings to inform a series of welfare estimates, we calculate benefit-to-cost ratios that the US may expect from implementing PGR in the range of 4:1-10:1. We also discover that these large social benefits result primarily from eliminating unwarranted market power in the current stock of granted patents, and much less so from litigation cost savings per se. Our results provide evidence that the US may benefit substantially from adopting the AIA post-grant review, but only provided that costs are controlled and that administration and appeals are not allowed to become too costly. © 2014 Elsevier B.V.


Torrisi S.,University of Bologna | Torrisi S.,Bocconi University | Gambardella A.,Bocconi University | Giuri P.,University of Bologna | And 6 more authors.
Research Policy | Year: 2016

This paper employs data from a large-scale survey (InnoS&T) of inventors in Europe, the USA, and Japan who were listed in patent applications filed at the European Patent Office with priority years between 2003 and 2005. We provide evidence regarding the reasons for patenting and the ways in which patents are being utilized. A substantial share of patents is neither used internally nor for market transactions, which confirms the importance of strategic patenting and inefficiency in the management of intellectual property. We investigate different types of unused patents-unused blocking patents and sleeping patents. We also examine the association between used and unused patents and their characteristics such as family size, scope, generality and overlapping claims, technology area, type of applicant, and the competitive environment from where these patents originate. We discuss our results and derive some implications for innovation and patent policy. © 2016 Elsevier B.V.


Engel C.,Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods | Kleine M.,Max Planck Institute for Innovation and Competition
Research Policy | Year: 2015

In the policy debate, intellectual property is often justified by what seems to be a straightforward argument: if innovators are not protected against others appropriating their ideas, incentives for innovation are suboptimally low. Now, in most industries and for most potential users, appropriating a foreign innovation is itself an investment decision fraught with cost and risk. Nonetheless, standard theory predicts too little innovation. Arguably the problem is exacerbated by the sensitivity of innovators to fairness; imitators do get a free lunch, after all. We model the situation as a game and test it in the lab. We find more appropriation, but also more innovation than predicted by standard theory. In the lab, the prospect of giving imitators a free lunch does not have a chilling effect on innovation. This even holds if innovation automatically spills over to an outsider and if successful imitation reduces the innovator's profit. Beliefs and the analysis of experiences in the repeated game demonstrate that participants are sensitive to the fairness problem. But this concern is not strong enough to outweigh the robust propensity to invest even more in innovation than predicted by standard theory. The data suggest that this behavior results from the intention not to be outperformed by one's peers. © 2014 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.


Hoisl K.,Max Planck Institute for Innovation and Competition | Hoisl K.,Ludwig Maximilians University of Munich | Stelzer T.,Vodafone | Biala S.,Gehrlicher Solar
Research Policy | Year: 2015

Building on the existing literature on evolutionary innovation and technological change, this paper aims to identify potential signals of technological discontinuities and to obtain assessments of experts to what extent these signals help them to predict discontinuities. Furthermore, we analyze whether internal experts (experts employed with firms) and external experts (e.g., consultants) differ in the importance they attribute to signals as predictors of technological discontinuities. The empirical analysis is based on a unique dataset obtained from a conjoint analysis conducted with 29 experts in the ICT industry. The conjoint approach allows for a simulation of the forecasting process and considers utility trade-offs. The results show that for both types of experts the perceived benefit of users most highly contributes to predicting technological discontinuities. Internal experts assign more importance to legal frameworks (e.g., standards) as signals helping them to predict technological discontinuities than external experts. The latter, in turn, assign more importance to profit margins and the recombination potential of technologies than their internal counterparts. Our results add important insights to the literature on R&D and innovation management. © 2014 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.


Andreoli-Versbach P.,Max Planck Institute for Innovation and Competition | Franck J.-U.,University of Mannheim
International Journal of Industrial Organization | Year: 2015

This article studies dynamic pricing strategies in the Italian gasoline market before and after the market leader unilaterally announced its commitment to adopt a sticky-pricing policy. Using daily Italian firm level prices and weekly average EU prices, we show that the effect of the new policy was twofold. First, it facilitated price alignment and coordination on price changes. After the policy change, the observed pricing pattern shifted from cost-based to sticky-leadership pricing. Second, using a dif-in-dif estimation and a synthetic control group, we show that the causal effect of the new policy was to significantly increase prices through sticky-leadership pricing. Our paper highlights the importance of price-commitment by a large firm in order to sustain (tacit) collusion. © 2015 Elsevier B.V.

Loading Max Planck Institute for Innovation and Competition collaborators
Loading Max Planck Institute for Innovation and Competition collaborators