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Arnhem, Netherlands

Liander is a Dutch utility company which operates in the distribution of electricity and natural gas in part of the Netherlands. Liander NV is the largest utility company in the Netherlands, managing the energy network in the provinces of Gelderland and Noord-Holland entirely, and in large parts of Flevoland, Friesland and Zuid-Holland.Liander NV was formerly known as Continuon, and is now a division of the umbrella-company Alliander. Alliander includes also Liandon , focused on building and maintenance of large energy infrastructures, and Lyandin that operates in lighting of public spaces.Liander was split from the Nuon group in July 2008 and since 12 November 2008 it has operated under the new name Liander. Nuon continues to operate as a production and supply company, under the name Nuon Energy. Wikipedia.

Janssen A.,Liander | Makareinis D.,Siemens AG | Solver C.-E.,STRI
IEEE Transactions on Power Delivery | Year: 2014

Since the 1970s, CIGRE has conducted three worldwide surveys on high-voltage circuit-breaker (CB) reliability. The results of the last inquiry, published last year, are presented and compared with those of the former inquiries. With a focus on the CB's fundamental functions for the system, figures show the growth in reliability during the past decades. The reliability is expressed in failure per 100 CB years (CBY) or per 10\thinspace000 operating cycles for the relevant failure modes. The overall major failure rate improved largely from the first (1.58 per 100 CBY) to the second (0.67 per 100 CBY) to the third enquiry (0.30 per 100 CBY). The failure rate increases with higher voltage classes; GIS CBs have been shown to be twice as reliable and live tank CBs twice as bad as the average failure rate. Although improved, the mechanical operating mechanism is still the subassembly responsible for most failures; besides, CBs applied for frequent switching purposes show a higher failure rate than average. © 1986-2012 IEEE. Source

Forys M.B.,Catholic University of Leuven | Kurowicka D.,Technical University of Delft | Peppelman B.,Liander
Reliability Engineering and System Safety | Year: 2013

In this paper we propose a model for the probability of an explosion caused by a leakage form grey cast iron pipes in the city of Amsterdam as a function of pipeline and environmental characteristics. The parameters in the model are quantified, with uncertainty, using historical data and structured expert judgment, by use of the Classical Model. Eleven experts from Dutch distribution system operators (DSO) and Kiwa Gas Technology participated in the research. The model has to provide the overall probability of an explosion per year and a prioritization of pipes in terms of their potential contribution to the probability of explosion, which can help DSO's to prioritize their replacements. © 2013 Elsevier Ltd. Source

Agency: Cordis | Branch: FP7 | Program: CP-FP | Phase: SEC-2013.2.2-3 | Award Amount: 4.54M | Year: 2014

SEGRIDs main objective is to enhance the protection of smart grids against cyber-attacks. We do this by applying a risk management analysis approach to a number of smart grid use cases (the SEGRID use cases), which will define security requirements and determine gaps in current security technologies, standards and regulations. The identified gaps and the analysis itself will give input to the enhancement of risk assessment methodologies and the development of novel security measures for smart grids. We are convinced that SEGRID will deliver a major contribution to the protection of smart grids of 2020 against cyber-attacks by: Identifying threats and potential future cyber-attack pathways, for the SEGRID use cases; Determining the gap between currently available security standards, methods and measures for smart grids in order to derive which additional security methods and measures are required for the SEGRID use cases; Developing the necessary new security methods and measures for privacy, communication and system security in smart grids, to mitigate the threats found in the SEGRID use cases, evaluate and test them; Building up a realistic test environment (Security Integration Test Environment, SITE) to test and verify new security methods and measures; Evaluating and improving current risk management methodologies in order to make them optimally suited to identify and address the key risk factors of smart grids of 2020; Feeding the established results from the SEGRID project into European and global standardisation bodies, industry groups and smart grid suppliers and make sure that the project results fit the needs of those communities and raise awareness among stakeholders.

Agency: Cordis | Branch: FP7 | Program: CP | Phase: ENERGY.2013.7.1.1 | Award Amount: 4.33M | Year: 2013

The significant rise in distributed renewable energy sources has placed an enormous burden on the secure operation of the electrical grid, impacting both the transmission system operators (TSOs) and distribution system operators (DSOs). The massive increase of the intermittent DRES in low (LV) and medium (MV) networks has led to a bidirectional power flow which raises the urgent need for new operational and control strategies in order to maintain the ability of the system to provide the consumers with reliable supply of electricity at an acceptable power quality level. Technically, INCREASE will focus on how to manage renewable energy sources in LV and MV networks, to provide ancillary services (towards DSO, but also TSOs), in particular voltage control and the provision of reserve. INCREASE will investigate the regulatory framework, grid code structure and ancillary market mechanisms, and propose adjustments to facilitate successful provisioning of ancillary services that are necessary for the operation of the electricity grid, including flexible market products. INCREASE will enable DRES and loads to go beyond just exchanging power with the grid which will enable the DSO to evolve from a congestion manager to capacity manager. This will result in a more efficient exploitation of the current grid capacity, thus facilitating higher DRES penetration at reduced cost. Because of the more efficient use of the existing infrastructure, grid tariffs could decrease, potentially resulting in a lower cost for the consumers. The INCREASE simulation platform will enable the validation of the proposed solutions and provides the DSOs with a tool they can use to investigate the influence of DRES on their distribution network. The INCREASE solutions will also be validated (i) by lab tests, as well as (ii) in three field trials in the real-life operational distribution network of Stromnetz Steiermark in Austria, of Elektro Gorenjska in Slovenia and of Liander in the Netherlands.

Agency: Cordis | Branch: FP7 | Program: CP-FP | Phase: SEC-2011.2.5-1 | Award Amount: 5.28M | Year: 2012

The CRISALIS project aims at providing new means to secure critical infrastructure environments from targeted attacks, carried out by resourceful and motivated individuals. The recent discovery of a malware called Stuxnet, show that these threats are already a reality. Their success in infiltrating Critical Infrastructure environments is calling attention on the ineffectiveness of standard security mechanisms at detecting them. Stuxnet is believed to have been operating undetected for almost one year leveraging multiple vulnerabilities that were previously unknown, and has been discovered only as a consequence to an operational anomaly that triggered the attention of the field operators. This fact clearly shows that our methods to find vulnerabilities and detect ongoing or successful attacks in critical infrastructure environments are not sufficient. CRISALIS focuses on these two aspects: detection of vulnerabilities and attacks in critical infrastructure environments. We focus on two different, yet interlinked, use cases that are typical for the power grid infrastructure: control systems based on SCADA protocols and the Advanced Metering Infrastructure. CRISALIS leverages the unique characteristics of critical infrastructure environments to produce novel practical mechanisms and techniques for their security assessment and protection. This is achieved by pursuing three main research objectives: (i) providing new methodologies and techniques to secure critical infrastructure systems; (ii) providing new tools to detect intrusions; (iii) developing new, more effective, techniques to analyze infected systems. Particular attention is paid to ensure the practical implementation of these techniques in real-world environments, and to minimize the impact on operations, goals which are attainable thanks to the direct involvement in the process of end users and device manufacturers who provide expertise and realistic test environments to validate the proposed methodologies.

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