News Article | May 4, 2017
Initial criticality for the UAE's model nuclear plant construction project is likely to be delayed by several months. The delay is traceable to a root cause event discovered in Korea in 2013. The four reactor nuclear plant construction project at Barakah in the United Arab Emirates (UAE) is one of the few such projects in the world that have been able to remain close to their original schedule and budget. It is a good-news story that demonstrates the value of a well-capitalized customer choosing to hire a team with recent, directly applicable experience. The construction phase of the project remains on time, with the first unit essentially complete. In January 2016, nuclear fuel was being packaged and shipped to the site from Korea. All indications were that the plant would be starting up as scheduled this month. Earlier today, however, knowledgable sources have informed Reuters that FANR (Federal Authority for Nuclear Regulation), the nuclear regulator in the UAE, is not satisfied that Narah, the plant's operating company, is ready to be issued the license required before it can load fuel into the reactor and begin to operate the plant. Nawah is join venture entity between the UAE and the Korean Electric Power Corporation (KEPCO) formed to own and operate nuclear plants in the UAE. According to the original project plan, Nawah would, by now, have gained several years worth of operating and maintenance experience by rotating people through Shin Kori unit 3. That reactor, the world's first APR1400 was initially scheduled to begin operating in 2013 and to be in commercial service by mid to late 2014. That plan was perturbed when inspectors in Korea found substandard control and safety system cabling installed in a number of Korean nuclear plants. The investigation eventually revealed that Shin Kori unit 3 had out-of-specification cables installed. The complete cycle of discovery, corrective action determination and cable replacement delayed the commercial operation of Shin Kori unit 3 by more than two years. The lead plant of the series of APR1400s now under construction achieved initial criticality in January 2016. As expected, testing required between first criticality and commercial operation for the first of a kind plant took nearly a year; Shin Kori 3 entered commercial service in December 2016. The greater than 2 year delay for that lead plant will not translate into a multi-year delay at Barakah, but it is now clear that the new operating company will need to gain several more months worth of experience before it is able to convince regulators that it is ready to fulfill the responsibilities of owning, operating and maintaining a nuclear power plant. As is often the case in very large projects, decisions involving minor amounts of money can cascade to cause enormous consequences. It's not clear how much, if any, money was saved by choosing to use a lower quality supplier for the initially installed control and safety cabling. According to Nuclear Engineering International, however, Korean Hydro Nuclear Power (KHNP) paid just $13 million to obtain high quality replacement cabling for two APR1400 units on a rush order schedule with air freight delivery from RSCC Nuclear Cable, a Connecticut-based company that has been making manufacturing and supplying nuclear grade cabling around the world since the USS Nautilus project in the early 1950s. On the scale of the many billions of dollars worth of systems, structures, components and labor associated with building large nuclear power plants, it makes sense to check and recheck the quality of a few million dollars worth of critical components before installation. Almost two years ago, Korea IT Times published a story titled UAE Media Outlet Says Shin-Kori Reactors Hinder UAE’s Nuclear Energy Programme. According to that article, the effect of delays at Shin Kori 3 on Barakah 1 were already beginning to be understood. “Barakah is reliant on Shin Kori reactors 3&4 for its operating procedures template, a crucial connection that is reflected in the fact that Kepco faces financial penalties under its Barakah contract if it misses milestones on the Shin Kori programme,” the article pointed out. “The main threat to keeping Barakah on schedule is the fact that a combination of fraud and faulty parts has meant that KEPCO’s Shin-Kori 3&4 have been delayed by more than a year, and a start-up date remains uncertain,” the article unequivocally criticized. There are undoubtedly geopolitical and economic reasons why there has been no official announcement of the delays in starting Barakah even though it is now May 2017, the month during which the plant has been expected to reach initial criticality.
News Article | August 1, 2017
TORONTO, ONTARIO--(Marketwired - Aug. 1, 2017) - Denison Mines Corp. ("Denison" or the "Company") (TSX:DML)(NYSE MKT:DNN)(NYSE American:DNN) is pleased to report a new high-grade uranium intersection in basement rocks from the first hole completed as part of the summer 2017 drilling program at the Waterbury Lake property. Drill hole WAT-17-443 intersected 1.1% eU O over 0.8 metres (from 296.9 to 297.7 metres) approximately 1.5 kilometres to the northeast of the property's J Zone uranium deposit. The high-grade mineralization occurs immediately below a broader 10.3 metre mineralized interval (from 282.8 to 293.1 metres) with an average grade of 0.15% eU O . The mineralization is open in all directions and follow-up drilling is presently underway. Results are reported as preliminary radiometric equivalent grades ("eU O ") derived from a calibrated downhole total gamma probe. The Company subsequently reports definitive assay grades following sampling and chemical analysis of the mineralized drill core. Dale Verran, Denison's Vice President of Exploration, commented, "This is an exciting start to our summer program at Waterbury Lake. This initial mineralized intercept, and the associated alteration and structure, bodes well for this untested trend on the project. Our extensive knowledge from the Gryphon basement-hosted deposit puts our team in good stead to evaluate this prospect and hopefully build upon the initial intercept. We look forward to reporting further results over the next few weeks." Drill hole WAT17-443 was orientated steeply to the southeast (azimuth 157°, dip -73°) and intersected the sub-Athabasca unconformity at a depth of 212 metres, followed by a moderately north dipping package of basement rocks dominated by semi-pelitic gneisses. Mineralization was intersected approximately 70 metres vertically below the unconformity in semi-pelitic gneiss and was associated with strong hematite alteration, bleaching and faulting - features typical of basement-hosted uranium mineralization within the Athabasca Basin. The true thickness of the mineralization is yet to be determined. The drill hole is the first of a planned six-hole program to test an east-west trend which shares interpreted geological similarities with the east-west trend that hosts the J Zone and Roughrider deposits, which are located approximately one kilometer to the south. The location of drill hole WAT17-443 and the J Zone and Roughrider deposits are provided in Figure 1. To view Figure 1 please click the following link: http://media3.marketwire.com/docs/DenisonFigure1.pdf The J Zone deposit, located on the Waterbury Lake property, occurs at the sub-Athabasca unconformity and is estimated to contain indicated resources of 12.8 million pounds U3O8 based on 291,000 tonnes of mineralization at an average grade of 2.0% U3O8. The Roughrider deposit on Rio Tinto's Roughrider property is located immediately along strike to the east of J Zone deposit and occurs at the sub-Athabasca unconformity and below within the basement rocks. Prior to acquisition by Rio Tinto in 2012, the Roughrider deposit was estimated to contain indicated resources of 17.2 million pounds U3O8 based on 394,200 tonnes of mineralization at an average grade of 1.98% U3O8 and inferred resources of 40.7 million pounds U3O8 based on 161,600 tonnes of mineralization at an average grade of 11.43% U3O8. The Waterbury Lake property consists of multiple claims covering 40,256 hectares, and is located in the infrastructure rich eastern portion of the Athabasca Basin region in northern Saskatchewan. The property is jointly owned by Denison (63.63%) and Korea Waterbury Uranium Limited Partnership ("KWULP") (36.37%) through the Waterbury Lake Uranium Limited Partnership ("WLULP"). KWULP consists of a consortium of investors in which Korea Hydro & Nuclear Power ("KHNP") holds a majority position. KWULP has elected not to fund the 2017 exploration program and, as a result, will incur dilution of its ownership interest in the WLULP. KHNP is also a significant shareholder in Denison, holding 58,284,000 common shares of Denison, which represents approximately 10.42% of the Company's issued and outstanding common shares. For more information on the J Zone deposit, please refer to the Technical Report on the Mineral Resource Estimate on the J Zone Uranium Deposit, Waterbury Lake Property dated September 6, 2013 by Allan Armitage, Ph. D., P. Geo, and Alan Sexton, M.Sc., P.Geo, of GeoVector Management Inc. available on Denison's website and under the Company's profile on SEDAR (www.sedar.com). For further details on the Roughrider deposit, prior to acquisition by Rio Tinto in 2012, please refer to the Preliminary Economic Assessment Technical Report for the East and West Zones Roughrider Uranium Project, Saskatchewan dated September 2013, 2011 by SRK Consulting (Canada) Inc. available on SEDAR. Dale Verran, MSc, P.Geo, Pr.Sci.Nat., Denison's Vice President, Exploration, who is a Qualified Person in accordance with the requirements of NI 43-101 has reviewed and approved the technical information contained in this release. The Company currently reports preliminary radiometric equivalent grades ("eU O "), derived from a calibrated downhole total gamma probe, during its exploration programs and subsequently reports definitive assay grades following sampling and chemical analysis of the mineralized drill core. Radiometric equivalent probe results are subject to verification procedures by qualified persons employed by Denison prior to disclosure. For further details on the total gamma downhole probe methods employed by Denison, QAQC procedures and data verification procedures please see Denison's Annual Information Form dated March 23, 2017 filed under the Company's profile on SEDAR. Denison is a uranium exploration and development company with interests focused in the Athabasca Basin region of northern Saskatchewan, Canada. In addition to its 60% owned Wheeler River project, which hosts the high grade Phoenix and Gryphon uranium deposits, Denison's exploration portfolio consists of numerous projects covering approximately 359,000 hectares in the Athabasca Basin region, including 340,000 hectares in the infrastructure rich eastern portion of the Athabasca Basin. Denison's interests in Saskatchewan also include a 22.5% ownership interest in the McClean Lake joint venture ("MLJV"), which includes several uranium deposits and the McClean Lake uranium mill, which is currently processing ore from the Cigar Lake mine under a toll milling agreement, plus a 25.17% interest in the Midwest deposit and a 63.63% interest in the J Zone deposit on the Waterbury Lake property. Both the Midwest and J Zone deposits are located within 20 kilometres of the McClean Lake mill. Denison is also engaged in mine decommissioning and environmental services through its Denison Environmental Services division and is the manager of Uranium Participation Corp., a publicly traded company which invests in uranium oxide and uranium hexafluoride. Certain information contained in this press release constitutes "forward-looking information", within the meaning of the United States Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995 and similar Canadian legislation concerning the business, operations and financial performance and condition of Denison. Generally, these forward-looking statements can be identified by the use of forward-looking terminology such as "plans", "expects", "budget", "scheduled", "estimates", "forecasts", "intends", "anticipates", or "believes", or the negatives and/or variations of such words and phrases, or state that certain actions, events or results "may", "could", "would", "might" or "will be taken", "occur", "be achieved" or "has the potential to". In particular, this press release contains forward-looking information pertaining to the following: exploration (including drilling) and evaluation activities, plans and objectives, and Denison's percentage in its properties and its plans and agreements with its joint venture partners, as applicable. Statements relating to "mineral reserves" or "mineral resources" are deemed to be forward-looking information, as they involve the implied assessment, based on certain estimates and assumptions that the mineral reserves and mineral resources described can be profitably produced in the future. Forward looking statements are based on the opinions and estimates of management as of the date such statements are made, and they are subject to known and unknown risks, uncertainties and other factors that may cause the actual results, level of activity, performance or achievements of Denison to be materially different from those expressed or implied by forward-looking statements. Denison believes that the expectations reflected in this forward-looking information are reasonable but no assurance can be given that these expectations will prove to be accurate and may differ materially from those anticipated in this forward looking information. For a discussion in respect of risks and other factors that could influence forward-looking events, please refer to the factors discussed in Denison's Annual Information Form dated March 23, 2017 under the heading "Risk Factors". These factors are not, and should not be construed as being exhaustive. Accordingly, readers should not place undue reliance on forward-looking statements. The forward-looking information contained in this press release is expressly qualified by this cautionary statement. Any forward-looking information and the assumptions made with respect thereto speaks only as of the date of this press release. Denison does not undertake any obligation to publicly update or revise any forward-looking information after the date of this press release to conform such information to actual results or to changes in Denison's expectations except as otherwise required by applicable legislation. Cautionary Note to United States Investors Concerning Estimates of Measured, Indicated and Inferred Mineral Resources: This press release may use the terms "measured", "indicated" and "inferred" mineral resources. United States investors are advised that while such terms are recognized and required by Canadian regulations, the United States Securities and Exchange Commission does not recognize them. "Inferred mineral resources" have a great amount of uncertainty as to their existence, and as to their economic and legal feasibility. It cannot be assumed that all or any part of an inferred mineral resource will ever be upgraded to a higher category. Under Canadian rules, estimates of inferred mineral resources may not form the basis of feasibility or other economic studies. United States investors are cautioned not to assume that all or any part of measured or indicated mineral resources will ever be converted into mineral reserves. United States investors are also cautioned not to assume that all or any part of an inferred mineral resource exists, or is economically or legally mineable.
Kim J.H.,Korea University |
Kim Y.J.,Korea University |
Lee S.H.,KHNP Co. |
Bae H.Y.,Korea University |
And 7 more authors.
Transactions of the Korean Society of Mechanical Engineers, A | Year: 2011
In pressurized water reactors (PWRs), the reactor pressure vessel (RPV) upper head contains numerous control re drive mechanism (CRDM) nozzles. In the last 10 years, the incidences of cracking in alloy 600 CRDM nozzles and the associated welds has increased significantly. Several axial and circumferential cracks have been found in CRDM nozzles European PWRs and U.S. nuclear power plants. These cracks are caused by primary water stress corrosion crackir (PWSCC) and have been shown to be driven by welding residual stresses and operational stresses in the weld regio Therefore, detailed finite-element (FE) simulations for the Korea Nuclear Reactor Pressure Vessel have been conducted order to predict the magnitudes of the weld residual stresses in the tube materials. In particular, die weld residual stress resul are compared in terms for nozzle location, geometry factor r0/t, geometry of fillet, and adjacent nozzle. © 2011 The Korean Society of Mechanical Engineers.
Kang H.T.,KHNP Co. |
Sung C.H.,KHNP Co. |
Lee J.K.,KHNP Co.
Nuclear Engineering and Design | Year: 2011
This paper presents a standpoint of signal interface for a phased upgrade of instrumentation and control (I&C) systems in a pressurized water reactor (PWR) type nuclear power plant (NPP) in Korea. YongGwang nuclear (YGN) power plant units 3 and 4, which was constructed as a basis model for an optimized power reactor 1000 (OPR1000), is selected as a demonstration model for the presentation. A methodology for building interface requirements is suggested for a phased I&C systems upgrade, maintaining the same functions as those of existing systems, improving functions without violating the compliance requirements, and establishing a safe and economical upgrade schedule. For this, signal interfaces, from the standpoint of safety systems, between I&C cabinets in auxiliary electrical equipment rooms (EER) A and B and the main control room (MCR), the signal interface between the cabinet and the main control board (MCB), and the signal interface between the cabinet and the remote shutdown panel (RSP) are described. This paper focuses on the description of the following interface requirements, reflecting the phased upgrade strategies: system configuration, signal interface, and cabinet configuration. The suggested phased upgrade strategies include the following: non-safety I&C systems should be upgraded in phase 1, safety I&C systems should be upgraded in phase 2, and the MCR should be upgraded in phase 3. The findings presented in the paper can be reliably used to understand upgrade of I&C systems and to implement I&C systems for phased upgrades based on digital technologies. © 2011 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.