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Yang Z.,Shanghai University of Finance and Economics | Yang Z.,Key Laboratory of Mathematical Economics SUFE
Journal of Systems Science and Complexity | Year: 2016

By the inductive relations, this paper first obtains some existence theorems of solutions for generalized quasi-variational relation problems, which are different from other papers. As applications, some existence theorems of solutions for generalized quasi-equilibrium problems and NS-equilibria for noncooperative games under uncertainty are obtained. © 2016, Institute of Systems Science, Academy of Mathematics and Systems Science, CAS and Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg. Source


Yang Z.,Shanghai University of Finance and Economics | Yang Z.,Key Laboratory of Mathematical Economics SUFE | Ju Y.,Shanghai University of Finance and Economics
Journal of Global Optimization | Year: 2015

In this paper, we first introduce the notion of cooperative equilibria in multi-leader-multi-follower games, and then establish an existence theorem. Next, we shift out attention to the generic stability of these cooperative equilibria. After studying the class of games satisfying the sufficient conditions of the existence theorem, we identify a dense residual subset of these games whose cooperative equilibria are all essential. © 2015 Springer Science+Business Media New York Source


Du N.,Shanghai University of Finance and Economics | Du N.,Key Laboratory of Mathematical Economics SUFE | Huang H.,Shanghai Key Laboratory of Financial Information Technology | Li L.,Shanghai University of Finance and Economics | Li L.,Key Laboratory of Mathematical Economics SUFE
Decision Support Systems | Year: 2013

Consumer ratings are crucial in creating and sustaining trust and trustworthiness in e-commerce markets. Thus, it is important to know whether online trading can survive bad mouthing among participants. We use controlled lab experiments to test whether market efficiency (measured by the percentage of successful trades) is affected by unfair negative ratings, and whether announcing the percentage of unfair ratings in the market makes any difference. We find that market efficiency is higher when rating information is provided than when no rating information is provided, even when unfair and ambiguous ratings are present. We also find that buyers behave differently when unfair rating information exists; however, no matter whether the percentage of unfair ratings is known, market efficiency is not significantly different from that in the market without unfair ratings. © 2012 Elsevier B.V. Source

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