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Atmanspacher H.,Institute for Frontier Areas of Psychology | Filk T.,Institute for Frontier Areas of Psychology | Filk T.,Albert Ludwigs University of Freiburg | Filk T.,Parmenides Center for the Study of Thinking
Journal of Consciousness Studies | Year: 2012

This contribution addresses major distinctions between the notions of determinism, causation, and prediction, as they are typically used in the sciences. Formally, this can be elegantly achieved by two ingredients: (i) the distinction of ontic and epistemic states of a system, and (ii) temporal symmetry breakings based on the mathematical concept of the affine time group. Key aspects of the theory of deterministically chaotic systems together with historical quotations from Laplace, Maxwell, and Poincaré provide significant illustrations. An important point of various discussions in consciousness studies (notably about 'mental causation' and 'free agency'), the alleged 'causal closure of the physical', will be analyzed on the basis of the affine time group and the breakdown of its symmetries. © Imprint Academic 2011.


Atmanspacher H.,Institute for Frontier Areas of Psychology | Filk T.,Institute for Frontier Areas of Psychology | Filk T.,Albert Ludwigs University of Freiburg | Filk T.,Parmenides Center for the Study of Thinking
Journal of Consciousness Studies | Year: 2012

Temporally non-local measurements - single measurements yielding information about the state of a system at different instances - may provide a way to observe non-classical Behaviour in mental systems. The signature for such Behaviour is a violation of temporal Bell inequalities. We present such inequalities applicable to scenarios with two alternating mental states, such as in the perception of ambiguous figures. We indicate empirical options for testing temporal Bell inequalities, and speculate about possible explanations in case these inequalities are indeed violated. © Imprint Academic 2011.


Atmanspacher H.,Institute for Frontier Areas of Psychology | Filk T.,Institute for Frontier Areas of Psychology | Filk T.,Parmenides Foundation for the Study of Thinking | Filk T.,Albert Ludwigs University of Freiburg
Topics in Cognitive Science | Year: 2013

A novel conceptual framework for theoretical psychology is presented and illustrated for the example of bistable perception. A basic formal feature of this framework is the non-commutativity of operations acting on mental states. A corresponding model for the bistable perception of ambiguous stimuli, the Necker-Zeno model, is sketched and some empirical evidence for it so far is described. It is discussed how a temporal non-locality of mental states, predicted by the model, can be understood and tested. © 2013 Cognitive Science Society, Inc.


Atmanspacher H.,Institute for Frontier Areas of Psychology | Filk T.,Albert Ludwigs University of Freiburg
AIP Conference Proceedings | Year: 2012

A novel conceptual framework for theoretical psychology is presented and illustrated for the example of bistable perception. A basic formal feature of this framework is the non-commutativity of operations acting on mental states. A corresponding model for the bistable perception of ambiguous stimuli, the Necker-Zeno model, is sketched and some empirical evidence for it so far is described. It is discussed how a temporal nonlocality of mental states, predicted by the model, can be understood and tested. © 2012 American Institute of Physics.


Wang Z.,Ohio State University | Busemeyer J.R.,Indiana University | Atmanspacher H.,Institute for Frontier Areas of Psychology | Pothos E.M.,City University London
Topics in Cognitive Science | Year: 2013

Quantum cognition research applies abstract, mathematical principles of quantum theory to inquiries in cognitive science. It differs fundamentally from alternative speculations about quantum brain processes. This topic presents new developments within this research program. In the introduction to this topic, we try to answer three questions: Why apply quantum concepts to human cognition? How is quantum cognitive modeling different from traditional cognitive modeling? What cognitive processes have been modeled using a quantum account? In addition, a brief introduction to quantum probability theory and a concrete example is provided to illustrate how a quantum cognitive model can be developed to explain paradoxical empirical findings in psychological literature. © 2013 Cognitive Science Society, Inc.


Atmanspacher H.,Collegium Helveticum | Atmanspacher H.,Institute for Frontier Areas of Psychology | Bezzola Lambert L.,Collegium Helveticum | Bezzola Lambert L.,University of Basel | And 2 more authors.
Journal of the Royal Society Interface | Year: 2014

The concept of reproducibility is widely considered a cornerstone of scientific methodology. However, recent problems with the reproducibility of empirical results in large-scale systems and in biomedical research have cast doubts on its universal and rigid applicability beyond the so-called basic sciences. Reproducibility is a particularly difficult issue in interdisciplinary work where the results to be reproduced typically refer to different levels of description of the system considered. In such cases, it is mandatory to distinguish between more and less relevant features, attributes or observables of the system, depending on the level atwhich they are described. For this reason,we propose a scheme for a general 'relation of relevance' between the level of complexity at which a system is considered and the granularity of its description. This relation implies relevance criteria for particular selected aspects of a system and its description, which can be operationally implemented by an interlevel relation called 'contextual emergence'. It yields a formally sound and empirically applicable procedure to translate between descriptive levels and thus construct level-specific criteria for reproducibility in an overall consistent fashion. Relevance relations merged with contextual emergence challenge the old idea of one fundamental ontology from which everything else derives. At the same time, our proposal is specific enough to resist the backlash into a relativist patchwork of unconnected model fragments. © 2014 The Authors.


Atmanspacher H.,Institute for Frontier Areas of Psychology
Behavioral and Brain Sciences | Year: 2013

One among many misleading quotations about the alleged mysteries of quantum theory is from Feynman (1965): I think I can safely say that nobody understands quantum mechanics. Today we know that quantum theory describes many aspects of our world in a fully intelligible fashion. Pothos & Busemeyer (P&B) propose ways in which this may include psychology and cognitive science. © 2013 Cambridge University Press.


Atmanspacher H.,Institute for Frontier Areas of Psychology
Journal of Consciousness Studies | Year: 2012

Dual-aspect monism and neutral monism offer interesting alternatives to mainstream positions concerning the mind-matter problem. Both assume a domain underlying the mind-matter distinction, but they also differ in definitive ways. In the twentieth century, variants of both positions have been advanced by a number of protagonists. One of these variants, the dual-aspect monism due to Wolfgang Pauli and Carl Gustav Jung, will be described and commented on in detail. As a unique feature in the Pauli-Jung conception, the duality of mental and material aspects is specified in terms of a complementarity. This sounds innocent, but entails a number of peculiarities distinguishing their conjecture from other approaches. © Imprint Academic 2011.


Atmanspacher H.,Institute for Frontier Areas of Psychology
Interface Focus | Year: 2012

This article emphasizes how the recently proposed interlevel relation of contextual emergence for scientific descriptions combines 'bottom-up' and 'top-down' kinds of influence. As emergent behaviour arises from features pertaining to lower level descriptions, there is a clear bottom-up component. But, in general, this is not sufficient to formulate interlevel relations stringently. Higher level contextual constraints are needed to equip the lower level description with those details appropriate for the desired higher level description to emerge. These contextual constraints yield some kind of 'downward confinement', a term that avoids the sometimes misleading notion of 'downward causation'. This will be illustrated for the example of relations between (lower level) neural states and (higher level) mental states. © 2011 The Royal Society.


Atmanspacher H.,Institute for Frontier Areas of Psychology
AIP Conference Proceedings | Year: 2012

In the mid 19th century, the physicist Wolfgang Pauli and the psychologist Carl Gustav Jung developed a philosophical position for the mind-matter problem that is today called dual-aspect monism. They conjectured a picture in which the mental and the material arise as two complementary aspects of one underlying psychophysically neutral reality to which they cannot be reduced and to which direct empirical access is impossible. This picture suggests structural, persistent,re-producible mind-matter correlations by splitting the underlying reality into aspects. In addition, it suggests induced, occasional, evasive mind-matter correlations above and below, respectively, those stable baseline correlations. These correlations, and the way they arise, suggest that the domain of the physical is not completely independent of the domain of the mental, and both are not independent from the assumed reality underlying them. Some ideas are presented of how these relationships might be conceived. © 2012 American Institute of Physics.

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