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Atmanspacher H.,Institute for Frontier Areas of Psychology
Journal of Consciousness Studies | Year: 2012

Dual-aspect monism and neutral monism offer interesting alternatives to mainstream positions concerning the mind-matter problem. Both assume a domain underlying the mind-matter distinction, but they also differ in definitive ways. In the twentieth century, variants of both positions have been advanced by a number of protagonists. One of these variants, the dual-aspect monism due to Wolfgang Pauli and Carl Gustav Jung, will be described and commented on in detail. As a unique feature in the Pauli-Jung conception, the duality of mental and material aspects is specified in terms of a complementarity. This sounds innocent, but entails a number of peculiarities distinguishing their conjecture from other approaches. © Imprint Academic 2011.

Wang Z.,Ohio State University | Busemeyer J.R.,Indiana University | Atmanspacher H.,Institute for Frontier Areas of Psychology | Pothos E.M.,City University London
Topics in Cognitive Science | Year: 2013

Quantum cognition research applies abstract, mathematical principles of quantum theory to inquiries in cognitive science. It differs fundamentally from alternative speculations about quantum brain processes. This topic presents new developments within this research program. In the introduction to this topic, we try to answer three questions: Why apply quantum concepts to human cognition? How is quantum cognitive modeling different from traditional cognitive modeling? What cognitive processes have been modeled using a quantum account? In addition, a brief introduction to quantum probability theory and a concrete example is provided to illustrate how a quantum cognitive model can be developed to explain paradoxical empirical findings in psychological literature. © 2013 Cognitive Science Society, Inc.

Atmanspacher H.,Institute for Frontier Areas of Psychology
Interface Focus | Year: 2012

This article emphasizes how the recently proposed interlevel relation of contextual emergence for scientific descriptions combines 'bottom-up' and 'top-down' kinds of influence. As emergent behaviour arises from features pertaining to lower level descriptions, there is a clear bottom-up component. But, in general, this is not sufficient to formulate interlevel relations stringently. Higher level contextual constraints are needed to equip the lower level description with those details appropriate for the desired higher level description to emerge. These contextual constraints yield some kind of 'downward confinement', a term that avoids the sometimes misleading notion of 'downward causation'. This will be illustrated for the example of relations between (lower level) neural states and (higher level) mental states. © 2011 The Royal Society.

Atmanspacher H.,Institute for Frontier Areas of Psychology | Filk T.,Albert Ludwigs University of Freiburg
AIP Conference Proceedings | Year: 2012

A novel conceptual framework for theoretical psychology is presented and illustrated for the example of bistable perception. A basic formal feature of this framework is the non-commutativity of operations acting on mental states. A corresponding model for the bistable perception of ambiguous stimuli, the Necker-Zeno model, is sketched and some empirical evidence for it so far is described. It is discussed how a temporal nonlocality of mental states, predicted by the model, can be understood and tested. © 2012 American Institute of Physics.

Atmanspacher H.,Institute for Frontier Areas of Psychology
AIP Conference Proceedings | Year: 2012

In the mid 19th century, the physicist Wolfgang Pauli and the psychologist Carl Gustav Jung developed a philosophical position for the mind-matter problem that is today called dual-aspect monism. They conjectured a picture in which the mental and the material arise as two complementary aspects of one underlying psychophysically neutral reality to which they cannot be reduced and to which direct empirical access is impossible. This picture suggests structural, persistent,re-producible mind-matter correlations by splitting the underlying reality into aspects. In addition, it suggests induced, occasional, evasive mind-matter correlations above and below, respectively, those stable baseline correlations. These correlations, and the way they arise, suggest that the domain of the physical is not completely independent of the domain of the mental, and both are not independent from the assumed reality underlying them. Some ideas are presented of how these relationships might be conceived. © 2012 American Institute of Physics.

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