IBAMA

Rio de Janeiro, Brazil
Rio de Janeiro, Brazil

Time filter

Source Type

News Article | December 2, 2016
Site: www.washingtonpost.com

Brazil’s National Institute for Space Research, or INPE, released new data on the ongoing deforestation of the country’s portion of the Amazon rainforest this week, based on satellite measurements. And the news is very bad. From August of 2015 through July of this year, the enormous forest lost nearly 8,000 square kilometers of area to clear cutting, representing a 29 percent increase over a year earlier (when 6,207 square kilometers were lost). That’s an area considerably larger than the state of Delaware. This means that since 2012, when deforestation hit a historic low after many years at high rates, it is now bouncing back again — and doing so at a time when researchers say protecting tropical forests, and allowing them to regrow, is one of the most effective short-term ways of fighting climate change. “This is a big deal,” said Daniel Nepstad, an Amazon expert and senior scientist at the Earth Innovation Institute. “It is the highest deforestation number since 2008. Compared to the lowest deforestation number, in 2012, it means an extra 150 million tons of CO2 went up into the air through forest destruction.” “It seems that we are facing a new trend of deforestation,” added André Guimarães, the executive director of Brazil’s Amazon Environmental Research Institute (IPAM). “It has increased two years, it’s now close to 8,000 square kilometers. We left behind the level of 5,000 square kilometers, which was stable for three years.” The loss of tropical forests is a crucial factor in the warming of the planet. Deforestation and the degradation of forests accounts for between 8 and 15 percent of the globe’s total emissions. [The solution to climate change that has nothing to do with cars or coal] The causes of the uptick in deforestation in the Brazilian Amazon aren’t fully clear, but experts like Nepstad suggest that it represents a decrease in enforcement on the part of the Brazilian government, which was not only in a state of political upheaval in 2016 but also has been facing a severe recession. “Suppression of Amazon deforestation is still highly dependent upon command-and-control measures–namely, law enforcement,” he said. “The cost to the government–to Brazilian taxpayers–of catching and penalizing people who are clearing forests illegally is huge and Brazil’s economic crisis has cut into the budgets of the federal environmental enforcement agency (IBAMA) and the state level enforcement agencies. In addition to a weakened enforcement effort, beef prices have increased, making it more lucrative to convert forests into cattle pastures.” Nepstad says the use of economic incentives to reduce deforestation is what’s currently missing, and that enforcement measures alone won’t be enough. In its pledge to the world under the Paris climate agreement, the government of Brazil laid out plans to halt all illegal deforestation in the Amazon by 2030 and to restore 12 million hectares (120,000 square kilometers) of forests by that year. It’s clearly moving in the wrong direction if it wants to achieve this goal. Moreover, the idea of waiting until 2030 to stop illegal actions is itself a way of sending “mixed signals,” said Guimarães. “The central government tells, ‘Look, we are going to stop illegal deforestation in 15 years.’ That means, keep on going with your illegal activities, because we’ll deal with that 15 years from now.” At least until fairly recently, Brazil was seen as a success story when it came to cutting back on deforestation of the Amazon. Deforestation totals in the 1990s and early 2000s were astronomical — averaging 19,500 square kilometers per year between 1995 and 2005. Yet with tougher law enforcement and other measures such as an international soy moratorium, it had plunged to a low of 4,571  square kilometers by 2012. The problem is that it is now clearly going up again. “The increase in deforestation rates can be linked to signals from Brazil’s government that it will tolerate the destruction of the Amazon. In recent years, public environmental protection policies in Brazil have weakened. For example, very few protected areas and Indigenous Lands have been created, and a new Forest Code was approved in 2012 that gives amnesty to those who committed illegal deforestation,” said Cristiane Mazzetti, Amazon campaigner with Greenpeace, in a statement. George Mason University professor Thomas Lovejoy, who operates a research project in a completely undisturbed part of the Amazon near Manaus, in collaboration with the Brazilian government, saw a recently deforested plot along a road close to the research area last December. He now says it was a “first indication” of the deforestation increase. “For our immediate situation we are cutting down road access,” he said by email from Manaus.


LONDON, UK / ACCESSWIRE / November 14, 2016 / Active Wall St. blog coverage looks at the headline from Vale S.A. (NYSE: VALE) and BHP Billiton Ltd (NYSE: BHP). Brazilian Federal Court ruled on November 11, 2016, that Vale, BHP Billiton Ltd, and joint venture Samarco Mineração S.A., should deposit $354 million to fund the clean-up of the waste due to the dam disaster. The court has given the companies 30 days to make the deposit and another 90 days to prove that the Mariana dam burst has been fully contained. The court has also asked the companies to submit an action plan report giving details of how they intend to go about the clean-up of the remaining waste that has emanated from the Samarco mines. The companies must share their plans over the next six months. Register with us now for your free membership and blog access at: http://www.activewallst.com/register/. Today, AWS is promoting its blog coverage on VALE and BHP. Get all of our free blog coverage and more by clicking on the links below: Apart from this, on November 04, 2016, Brazil's environmental protection agency IBAMA had said that it was imposing a fine on Samarco Mineração of $154,693 for each day. This fine was for not complying with its directives for the dam spill and effective treatment of the mining waste. The agency fears that the coming raining season could lead to more mining waste to overflow and run into the river and surrounding areas. On November 5, 2016, the tailings dam operated by Samarco Mineração collapsed in Brazilian state of Minas Gerais. This resulted in 50 million cubic meters of toxic iron-ore residue being released into the river Rio Doce. The residue destroyed the nearby town of Bento Rodrigues killing 19 people. The water supply of the river was completely polluted, making it undrinkable for thousands of people as well as killing fish and aquatic life across hundreds of kilometres. The disaster was cited to be one of the worst environmental disasters in the history of mining in Brazil. Even after a year of the disaster, the river is still tainted a rusty red from sediment, its washed-out banks are visible from the cruising altitude of commercial airliners. The Minas Gerais mine produced more than 5% of BHP Billiton's iron ore output and about 3% of the group's earnings. On November 11, 2015, the Chief Executives of BHP Billiton, Andrew Mackenzie, and Vale, Murilo Ferreira, held a press conference and offered apologies for the disaster. Samarco Mineração was stripped of its mining license. IBAMA announced an initial fine of $66 million on November 12, 2015, but did not include the cost of the clean-up operation, lawsuits and compensation payments. On November 18, 2015, Samarco signed a $262 million agreement with the Brazilian Government to fund mitigation and remedial measures for the environmental disaster. On November 29, 2015, Brazil's government decides to sue Samarco Mineração for $5.2 billion in regards to the disaster. Vale confirmed that it has used the dam to deposit iron ore waste from the treatment plants at the Alegria mine, in Mariana but it was less than 5% of its total waste. In March 2016, Samarco Mineração and its owners Vale S.A., BHP Billiton (Brazil), had entered a $6 billion agreement with the Federal Attorney General of Brazil and other authorities for supporting the long-term recovery of the affected communities and the environment. However, Brazilian prosecutors criticized the deal and felt that the agreement was more in favour of the miners than the community affected by the disaster. In May 2016, they filed a countersuit seeking $44 billion from the mining companies and asked them to pay an initial amount of $2.2 billion within 30 days. They also filed a petition to block restarting Samarco until the mine can prove that the failed tailings dam is no longer polluting waterways. Responding to this, Samarco Mineração had said that the leakage was contained and their stand was substantiated by studies conducted by IBAMA. In July 2016, BHP's Chief Commercial Officer, Dean Dalla Valle, while sharing the latest updates on the legal development of the case, had admitted that the Brazilian federal prosecutors had opened an investigation into alleged environmental crimes by Roberto Carvalho, Chief Executive of BHP Billiton. Dalla also had hinted that the operations at Samarco would not resume before mid-2017. The prosecutors claim that Samarco Mineração had failed to implement all the 11 emergency precautionary measures as directed by IBAMA. On October 20, 2016, the federal prosecutors in Brazil filed homicide charges against 21 people, including current and former executives of Samarco and its owners Vale S.A. and BHP Billiton. The people named in the charge include former Samarco Mineração Chief Executive Ricardo Vescovi, Vale's current Iron-ore Director Peter Poppinga, and eight other Vale and BHP representatives at Samarco Mineração. The executives were also charge with 12 other environmental crimes and if convicted they could face a jail time of 12 – 30 years. The prosecutors' case is based on the alleged evidence that Samarco Mineração and its executives were aware of the structural problems as early as April 2009, and the Board had been made aware of consequences of the dam's failure. The disaster could have been prevented had they acted in time, but they failed to do so. The Companies involved, though sympathetic and committed to the rebuilding of the area, have not taken any blame for the disaster. They commissioned Clearly Gottlieb Steen & Hamilton to undertake an investigation into the immediate cause of the dam failure. The findings of the same were shared with the public in August 2016. Vale and BHP have since then had differences on the matter of waste disposal and the mounting debt in Samarco. In October 2016, Vale CEO, Murilo Ferreira, had stated to the Wall Street Journal, that the company had differences with BHP and Samarco Mineração over Samarco's waste handling methods. Dean Dalla Valle, Chief Commercial Officer of BHP and who was entrusted with the handling of the Samarco disaster fallout, will leave the company at the end of March 2017. BHP Chairman Jac Nasser is also planning to retire and leave the company in 2017. Samarco Mineração missed making interest payments for the second time (due in September and October 2016) on its $700 million senior unsecured notes. Since the mining operations have stopped following the disaster, Samarco Mineração has been struggling to keep afloat. Vale and BHP have not guaranteed Samarco's debt and hence have no obligation to Samarco's shareholders. Last Friday, the stock closed the trading session at $7.69, declining by 3.87% from its previous closing price of $8.00. A total volume of 59.28 million shares have exchanged hands, which was higher than the 3-month average volume of 26.10 million shares. Vale's stock has been performing well and has been moving upwards as evidenced by the surge of 39.06% in the last month, 32.59% in the past three months, and 81.80% in the previous six months. Furthermore, on a year-to-date basis, the stock rallied 133.74%. BHP Billiton's share price finished yesterday's trading session at $37.50, slipping 1.65%. A total volume of 4.10 million shares exchanged hands, which was higher than the 3 months average volume of 3.56 million shares. Overall, the company's share has been performing well as the stock has advanced 21.27% and 37.74% in the last three months and past six months, respectively. Furthermore, since the start of the year, shares of the company have surged 48.67%. The stock has a dividend yield of 1.60%. Active Wall Street (AWS) produces regular sponsored and non-sponsored reports, articles, stock market blogs, and popular investment newsletters covering equities listed on NYSE and NASDAQ and micro-cap stocks. AWS has two distinct and independent departments. One department produces non-sponsored analyst certified content generally in the form of press releases, articles and reports covering equities listed on NYSE and NASDAQ and the other produces sponsored content (in most cases not reviewed by a registered analyst), which typically consists of compensated investment newsletters, articles and reports covering listed stocks and micro-caps. Such sponsored content is outside the scope of procedures detailed below. AWS has not been compensated; directly or indirectly; for producing or publishing this document. The non-sponsored content contained herein has been prepared by a writer (the "Author") and is fact checked and reviewed by a third party research service company (the "Reviewer") represented by a credentialed financial analyst, for further information on analyst credentials, please email info@activewallst.com. Rohit Tuli, a CFA® charterholder (the "Sponsor"), provides necessary guidance in preparing the document templates. The Reviewer has reviewed and revised the content, as necessary, based on publicly available information which is believed to be reliable. Content is researched, written and reviewed on a reasonable-effort basis. The Reviewer has not performed any independent investigations or forensic audits to validate the information herein. The Reviewer has only independently reviewed the information provided by the Author according to the procedures outlined by AWS. AWS is not entitled to veto or interfere in the application of such procedures by the third-party research service company to the articles, documents or reports, as the case may be. Unless otherwise noted, any content outside of this document has no association with the Author or the Reviewer in any way. AWS, the Author, and the Reviewer are not responsible for any error which may be occasioned at the time of printing of this document or any error, mistake or shortcoming. No liability is accepted whatsoever for any direct, indirect or consequential loss arising from the use of this document. AWS, the Author, and the Reviewer expressly disclaim any fiduciary responsibility or liability for any consequences, financial or otherwise arising from any reliance placed on the information in this document. Additionally, AWS, the Author, and the Reviewer do not (1) guarantee the accuracy, timeliness, completeness or correct sequencing of the information, or (2) warrant any results from use of the information. The included information is subject to change without notice. This document is not intended as an offering, recommendation, or a solicitation of an offer to buy or sell the securities mentioned or discussed, and is to be used for informational purposes only. Please read all associated disclosures and disclaimers in full before investing. Neither AWS nor any party affiliated with us is a registered investment adviser or broker-dealer with any agency or in any jurisdiction whatsoever. To download our report(s), read our disclosures, or for more information, visit http://www.activewallst.com/disclaimer/. For any questions, inquiries, or comments reach out to us directly. If you're a company we are covering and wish to no longer feature on our coverage list contact us via email and/or phone between 09:30 EDT to 16:00 EDT from Monday to Friday at: CFA® and Chartered Financial Analyst® are registered trademarks owned by CFA Institute. LONDON, UK / ACCESSWIRE / November 14, 2016 / Active Wall St. blog coverage looks at the headline from Vale S.A. (NYSE: VALE) and BHP Billiton Ltd (NYSE: BHP). Brazilian Federal Court ruled on November 11, 2016, that Vale, BHP Billiton Ltd, and joint venture Samarco Mineração S.A., should deposit $354 million to fund the clean-up of the waste due to the dam disaster. The court has given the companies 30 days to make the deposit and another 90 days to prove that the Mariana dam burst has been fully contained. The court has also asked the companies to submit an action plan report giving details of how they intend to go about the clean-up of the remaining waste that has emanated from the Samarco mines. The companies must share their plans over the next six months. Register with us now for your free membership and blog access at: http://www.activewallst.com/register/. Today, AWS is promoting its blog coverage on VALE and BHP. Get all of our free blog coverage and more by clicking on the links below: Apart from this, on November 04, 2016, Brazil's environmental protection agency IBAMA had said that it was imposing a fine on Samarco Mineração of $154,693 for each day. This fine was for not complying with its directives for the dam spill and effective treatment of the mining waste. The agency fears that the coming raining season could lead to more mining waste to overflow and run into the river and surrounding areas. On November 5, 2016, the tailings dam operated by Samarco Mineração collapsed in Brazilian state of Minas Gerais. This resulted in 50 million cubic meters of toxic iron-ore residue being released into the river Rio Doce. The residue destroyed the nearby town of Bento Rodrigues killing 19 people. The water supply of the river was completely polluted, making it undrinkable for thousands of people as well as killing fish and aquatic life across hundreds of kilometres. The disaster was cited to be one of the worst environmental disasters in the history of mining in Brazil. Even after a year of the disaster, the river is still tainted a rusty red from sediment, its washed-out banks are visible from the cruising altitude of commercial airliners. The Minas Gerais mine produced more than 5% of BHP Billiton's iron ore output and about 3% of the group's earnings. On November 11, 2015, the Chief Executives of BHP Billiton, Andrew Mackenzie, and Vale, Murilo Ferreira, held a press conference and offered apologies for the disaster. Samarco Mineração was stripped of its mining license. IBAMA announced an initial fine of $66 million on November 12, 2015, but did not include the cost of the clean-up operation, lawsuits and compensation payments. On November 18, 2015, Samarco signed a $262 million agreement with the Brazilian Government to fund mitigation and remedial measures for the environmental disaster. On November 29, 2015, Brazil's government decides to sue Samarco Mineração for $5.2 billion in regards to the disaster. Vale confirmed that it has used the dam to deposit iron ore waste from the treatment plants at the Alegria mine, in Mariana but it was less than 5% of its total waste. In March 2016, Samarco Mineração and its owners Vale S.A., BHP Billiton (Brazil), had entered a $6 billion agreement with the Federal Attorney General of Brazil and other authorities for supporting the long-term recovery of the affected communities and the environment. However, Brazilian prosecutors criticized the deal and felt that the agreement was more in favour of the miners than the community affected by the disaster. In May 2016, they filed a countersuit seeking $44 billion from the mining companies and asked them to pay an initial amount of $2.2 billion within 30 days. They also filed a petition to block restarting Samarco until the mine can prove that the failed tailings dam is no longer polluting waterways. Responding to this, Samarco Mineração had said that the leakage was contained and their stand was substantiated by studies conducted by IBAMA. In July 2016, BHP's Chief Commercial Officer, Dean Dalla Valle, while sharing the latest updates on the legal development of the case, had admitted that the Brazilian federal prosecutors had opened an investigation into alleged environmental crimes by Roberto Carvalho, Chief Executive of BHP Billiton. Dalla also had hinted that the operations at Samarco would not resume before mid-2017. The prosecutors claim that Samarco Mineração had failed to implement all the 11 emergency precautionary measures as directed by IBAMA. On October 20, 2016, the federal prosecutors in Brazil filed homicide charges against 21 people, including current and former executives of Samarco and its owners Vale S.A. and BHP Billiton. The people named in the charge include former Samarco Mineração Chief Executive Ricardo Vescovi, Vale's current Iron-ore Director Peter Poppinga, and eight other Vale and BHP representatives at Samarco Mineração. The executives were also charge with 12 other environmental crimes and if convicted they could face a jail time of 12 – 30 years. The prosecutors' case is based on the alleged evidence that Samarco Mineração and its executives were aware of the structural problems as early as April 2009, and the Board had been made aware of consequences of the dam's failure. The disaster could have been prevented had they acted in time, but they failed to do so. The Companies involved, though sympathetic and committed to the rebuilding of the area, have not taken any blame for the disaster. They commissioned Clearly Gottlieb Steen & Hamilton to undertake an investigation into the immediate cause of the dam failure. The findings of the same were shared with the public in August 2016. Vale and BHP have since then had differences on the matter of waste disposal and the mounting debt in Samarco. In October 2016, Vale CEO, Murilo Ferreira, had stated to the Wall Street Journal, that the company had differences with BHP and Samarco Mineração over Samarco's waste handling methods. Dean Dalla Valle, Chief Commercial Officer of BHP and who was entrusted with the handling of the Samarco disaster fallout, will leave the company at the end of March 2017. BHP Chairman Jac Nasser is also planning to retire and leave the company in 2017. Samarco Mineração missed making interest payments for the second time (due in September and October 2016) on its $700 million senior unsecured notes. Since the mining operations have stopped following the disaster, Samarco Mineração has been struggling to keep afloat. Vale and BHP have not guaranteed Samarco's debt and hence have no obligation to Samarco's shareholders. Last Friday, the stock closed the trading session at $7.69, declining by 3.87% from its previous closing price of $8.00. A total volume of 59.28 million shares have exchanged hands, which was higher than the 3-month average volume of 26.10 million shares. Vale's stock has been performing well and has been moving upwards as evidenced by the surge of 39.06% in the last month, 32.59% in the past three months, and 81.80% in the previous six months. Furthermore, on a year-to-date basis, the stock rallied 133.74%. BHP Billiton's share price finished yesterday's trading session at $37.50, slipping 1.65%. A total volume of 4.10 million shares exchanged hands, which was higher than the 3 months average volume of 3.56 million shares. Overall, the company's share has been performing well as the stock has advanced 21.27% and 37.74% in the last three months and past six months, respectively. Furthermore, since the start of the year, shares of the company have surged 48.67%. The stock has a dividend yield of 1.60%. Active Wall Street (AWS) produces regular sponsored and non-sponsored reports, articles, stock market blogs, and popular investment newsletters covering equities listed on NYSE and NASDAQ and micro-cap stocks. AWS has two distinct and independent departments. One department produces non-sponsored analyst certified content generally in the form of press releases, articles and reports covering equities listed on NYSE and NASDAQ and the other produces sponsored content (in most cases not reviewed by a registered analyst), which typically consists of compensated investment newsletters, articles and reports covering listed stocks and micro-caps. Such sponsored content is outside the scope of procedures detailed below. AWS has not been compensated; directly or indirectly; for producing or publishing this document. The non-sponsored content contained herein has been prepared by a writer (the "Author") and is fact checked and reviewed by a third party research service company (the "Reviewer") represented by a credentialed financial analyst, for further information on analyst credentials, please email info@activewallst.com. Rohit Tuli, a CFA® charterholder (the "Sponsor"), provides necessary guidance in preparing the document templates. The Reviewer has reviewed and revised the content, as necessary, based on publicly available information which is believed to be reliable. Content is researched, written and reviewed on a reasonable-effort basis. The Reviewer has not performed any independent investigations or forensic audits to validate the information herein. The Reviewer has only independently reviewed the information provided by the Author according to the procedures outlined by AWS. AWS is not entitled to veto or interfere in the application of such procedures by the third-party research service company to the articles, documents or reports, as the case may be. Unless otherwise noted, any content outside of this document has no association with the Author or the Reviewer in any way. AWS, the Author, and the Reviewer are not responsible for any error which may be occasioned at the time of printing of this document or any error, mistake or shortcoming. No liability is accepted whatsoever for any direct, indirect or consequential loss arising from the use of this document. AWS, the Author, and the Reviewer expressly disclaim any fiduciary responsibility or liability for any consequences, financial or otherwise arising from any reliance placed on the information in this document. Additionally, AWS, the Author, and the Reviewer do not (1) guarantee the accuracy, timeliness, completeness or correct sequencing of the information, or (2) warrant any results from use of the information. The included information is subject to change without notice. This document is not intended as an offering, recommendation, or a solicitation of an offer to buy or sell the securities mentioned or discussed, and is to be used for informational purposes only. Please read all associated disclosures and disclaimers in full before investing. Neither AWS nor any party affiliated with us is a registered investment adviser or broker-dealer with any agency or in any jurisdiction whatsoever. To download our report(s), read our disclosures, or for more information, visit http://www.activewallst.com/disclaimer/. For any questions, inquiries, or comments reach out to us directly. If you're a company we are covering and wish to no longer feature on our coverage list contact us via email and/or phone between 09:30 EDT to 16:00 EDT from Monday to Friday at: CFA® and Chartered Financial Analyst® are registered trademarks owned by CFA Institute.


Colpini C.,Servico Florestal Brasileiro | e Silva V.S.M.,Federal University of Mato Grosso | Soares T.S.,Federal University of Goais | Higuchi N.,National Institute of Amazonian Research | And 2 more authors.
Acta Amazonica | Year: 2010

This research aimed to study the increase in diameter, basal area, volume, the entry, and the mortality of an open/seasonal ombrophilous forest in the city of Marcelândia. Data were collected in 69 permanent plots established in 2001 and remeasured in 2003 and 2007. The number of individuals and the increases in diameter, basal area, and volume for the period 2001 to 2007 were evaluated. The entry was determined by the trees that have reached or exceeded a diameter of 17 cm. Mortality was calculated as the sum of all found dead trees in each measurement with a diameter equal or more than 17 cm. In the considered period of six years, the results to the increase in diameter, basal area, and volume were respectively, 0.34 cm, 0.22 m2.ha-1, and 2.11 m3.ha-1. The average values for the mortality rates and entry respectively were 0.78% and 0.30%.


Sablayrolles P.,Gret Rua Antonio Barreto 983 | Cruz H.,IBAMA | Melo M.S.,SFB | Drigo I.G.,University of Sao Paulo | Sist P.,CIRAD - Agricultural Research for Development
Bois et Forets des Tropiques | Year: 2013

In Brazil's Pará State, 60% of potentially managed forests are on community lands, while commercial timber concessions cannot cover more than half of current demand. With a few exceptions, traditional communities and smallholder families have neither the technical knowhow nor the economic capacity to conduct commercial logging operations: these are undertaken through agreements with a company under varying arrangements. Given this context, contracts between communities and companies are highly variable and always lead to the company exercising complete control over all operations, from management plans through to production. Public policies and land tenure regulations are now seeking to improve local community capacities for protecting their interests in partnerships of this kind. This study analyses how the financial business framework compares with smallholder organisation in the execution of these contracts, and addresses the key factors that could ensure better control: pre-logging inventories, diversification of production to include non-timber forest products as well as timber, marketing, monitoring and inspections of logging operations. Some possibilities of public policies are put forward to help disseminate the smallholder development under different land tenure regimes, such as conservation units in production forests or agricultural production boundaries. The article discusses ways in which a public service for technical and financial assistance to farmers and communities could act and become established. The potential for integrating forest management into small-scale farming systems is discussed in the light of the current debate on reform of the forest code.


Brand M.A.,Santa Catarina State University | de Muniz G.I.B.,Federal University of Paraná | Quirino W.F.,IBAMA | Brito J.O.,Federal University of São Paulo
Cerne | Year: 2010

This work aims to determine an optimal storage time of forest biomass for use in energy production, through analysis of variations in physical and chemical properties of with bark timber over the storage period. The study was conducted in the municipality of Lages, SC, over a span of 18 months. The experiment used with bark logs of Pinus taeda and Eucalyptus dunnii, with varying diameters, and slabs of Pinus spp., stored in piles. The material was sampled freshly harvested (control), after two, after four and after six months of storage. Four lots were used, harvested and stored at the spring, summer, autumn and winter seasons. Properties being assessed included moisture content (wet basis), gross calorific value, net calorific value and ash content. Results demonstrated that storage time influenced moisture content and net calorific value, yet it had no influence on gross calorific value and ash content. Optimal storage time ranged from two to four months, depending on the species, form of biomass and storage season. The best behavior regarding quality after storage was from Pinus slabs, followed by Eucalyptus logs and Pinus logs, the latter showing the worst behavior.


News Article | September 28, 2016
Site: news.yahoo.com

A Seringueira rubber tree, which is native to the Amazon rainforest, stands in Chico Mendes Extraction Reserve in Xapuri, Acre state, Brazil, June 24, 2016. REUTERS/Ricardo Moraes BRASILIA (Thomson Reuters Foundation) - When George Porto joined Brazil's environment agency 13 years ago, the country didn't have access to satellite data on illegal logging -- let alone heat maps tracking deforestation patterns or gun-toting agents dedicated to stopping ecological crimes. Today, IBAMA, as the agency is known, has access to four satellite feeds monitoring illegal activities in the Amazon, the world's biggest rainforest. It also boasts a network of indigenous watchmen in remote regions and a 1,000-strong commando force. Environmentalists say the agency's control center in Brasilia, a collection of low-slung concrete buildings from the 1970s, is one of the world's most important hubs for protecting rainforests and the land rights of people who depend on them. "When I joined there was no GPS or satellite images, it wasn't a strategic way to tackle deforestation," said Porto, IBAMA's environmental monitoring coordinator, as he examined maps showing changes in forest cover at the agency's headquarters. "Today, the rate (of deforestation) is coming down because of our technology and intelligence gathering," he told the Thomson Reuters Foundation. For years, Brazil has sought to balance a desire to lift millions out of poverty by making use of the country's greatest natural resource -- the Amazon's trees, land and minerals -- and the need to protect one of the world's most biodiverse regions. Mounting pressure to save the Amazon, known as the "lungs of the planet" for its role sucking climate-changing carbon dioxide out of the atmosphere, prompted former president Luiz Inacio "Lula" da Silva to unveil plans to halt the Amazon's destruction. And in the decade following the start of his first term in office in 2003, Brazil reduced its deforestation rate by more than 70 percent, some of the fastest improvement anywhere. But the rate increased again last year by 24 percent compared to 2013, Brazil's National Space Research Institute (INPE) said in September, citing the latest satellite images. Brazil is still losing the equivalent of two football fields of rainforest every minute as illegal loggers and ranchers exploit the Amazon's unspoiled reaches, according to the National Forest Commission's former director, Tasso Azevedo. Satellites used by IBAMA recorded about 100,000 incursions into the forest last year. In a renewed push against the problem, Brazil has pledged to reduce net new deforestation to zero by 2030, down from more than 6,200 square kilometers (2,394 sq miles) today. Meeting this goal will require enforcement agencies leveraging new technologies to detect problems, and a sustained push for formal land rights, analysts said. IBAMA officials are also using a "carrot and stick" strategy to reduce illegal land clearing by both large agribusiness operators and small farmers. About 90 percent of Brazil's deforestation is illegal, much of it carried out by organized groups clearing land for agriculture, IBAMA officials said. Reducing the problem hinges on law enforcement targeting large operators who destroy the forest while providing peasant farmers with alternative livelihoods and title deeds to land, environmental experts say. To tackle the lucrative criminal enterprise, environment officials are fighting deforestation based on the logic of counter-insurgency. "It's a war," said Luciano Evaristo, IBAMA's enforcement director, slamming a fist into his office desk. When satellites detect large-scale forest clearing, Evaristo's agents, armed with automatic weapons, are deployed to hard-to-reach sites via helicopters. Before 2002, IBAMA didn't have its own field operatives. The agency monitored the situation and turned information over to other branches of the security services to conduct raids. "We decided we needed autonomy from the police, as they have corruption problems," Evaristo told the Thomson Reuters Foundation. "With the rise of pressure around deforestation, the government put us on the frontline." But in an area as vast and remote as the Amazon, it's logistically impossible for the state to be all-seeing, he said. Instead of long-term boots on the ground, officials rely on field intelligence from the people who know the region best: indigenous Brazilians. "The indigenous people are the eyes and ears of IBAMA," Evaristo said. Across the Amazon, networks of indigenous people gather information about illegal loggers that satellites can't access. They coordinate intelligence gathering in Quyapo or other local languages on radios provided by IBAMA. When unlawful activity is detected, they send GPS coordinates of the location back to Brasilia. Evaristo can then deploy a team to destroy illicit logging camps and torch their machinery. In the last year, Evaristo said his team has made more than 4,000 arrests, seizing 91 trucks, 115 chainsaws and the equivalent of 2,000 truckloads of wood. It is not only in intelligence gathering that indigenous groups have proven valuable. Lands formally recognized as belonging to indigenous people have far better forest protection rates than state or private lands. One study by U.S. and Brazilian environmentalists in 2015 showed that more than 98 percent of forests on indigenous lands were intact. These lands, however, are regularly threatened by "grileros" – a Brazilian term for businessmen fraudulently obtaining or selling properties by bribing local land registry workers, doctoring ownership certificates and other dubious practices. "In this war, it's the indigenous people versus the grileros," said Evaristo, who keeps a loaded pistol in his briefcase beside policy papers prepared for lawmakers. To combat land theft by powerful agricultural interests, IBAMA began naming and shaming businessmen involved in deforestation in 2008. The publicly available blacklist now has 50,000 names, including 2,000 added last year. Blacklisted individuals face financial penalties, lose access to bank credit and rural land registries so they cannot buy new territory, making it harder for them to do business, officials said. IBAMA levied millions of dollars in fines for environmental crimes last year, but expects to collect less than 10 percent of the money due to Brazil's cumbersome legal system, Evaristo said. IBAMA officials say enforcement or "the stick" has worked well in reducing illegal cutting down of trees by large agriculture operations that are behind 70 percent of the Brazil's deforestation. But small farmers still account for about 30 percent of the deforestation and their share has been growing, said Avecita Chicchon of the San Francisco-based Gordon and Betty Moore Foundation, which has contributed hundreds of millions of dollars to protect the Amazon. "Poor people are moving into the Amazon for economic reasons and cutting the forest for agriculture," Chicchon said. Across Brazil, about five million families have no access to land, according to a 2016 study from Canada's University of Windsor. Landless farmers have few options to feed themselves other than clearing territory. Cutting by small farmers is harder to detect on satellite maps, according to IBAMA officials who hope "carrots" including formal land title deeds and access to credit for growers who do not cut down trees will help. The government has provided formal land title deeds to 20,000 farmers since 2009. For small farmers who own land, it's more profitable to work within the law and not deforest new areas in order to access credit and other government supports, officials said. By distributing land to small farmers while cracking down on large-scale illegal cutting, Brazilian officials say they can reduce net deforestation to zero by 2030. "Every act of deforestation has an economic purpose behind it," IBAMA official Jair Schmitt told the Thomson Reuters Foundation. "If you motivate people to follow the law, you can kill the business model."


Andrade A.D.L.,IBAMA | Andrade A.D.L.,Federal University of Rio de Janeiro | Dos Santos M.A.,Brazilian National Council for Scientific and Technological Development | Dos Santos M.A.,Federal University of Rio de Janeiro
Renewable and Sustainable Energy Reviews | Year: 2015

Brazil has a predominantly renewable origin electricity generation matrix, with hydro generation accounting for about 69% of the supply. This paper promotes hydropower projects in Brazil environmental licensing procedure critical assessment, with the aim of identifying and assessing possible solutions to enhance the process, especially through Strategic Environmental Assessment (SEA) application to hydroelectric generation expansion planning processes. It was concluded that impact assessment has led to significant environmental improvements, as it is capable of preventing, controlling and compensating significant - and very often irreversible - environmental impacts, especially through projects optimization and environmental programs that were not initially foreseen in the EIA inclusion. However, as has been expounded throughout this study, there are still several gaps and limitations in the current process, both in power generation expansion planning aspect and project environmental impact assessment aspect. SEA application in the planning phase could contribute to facilitate and simplify hydroelectric plants licensing. Many currently compulsory stages that are carried out after the request for a prior license, such as the consultation made to involved entities and the area environmental diagnosis could already be commenced in the planning phase. © 2015 Elsevier Ltd.


News Article | December 22, 2016
Site: news.yahoo.com

RIO DE JANEIRO (Thomson Reuters Foundation) - Companies that want to buy Brazilian timber without contributing to illegal deforestation have a new tool to help them ensure stolen wood does not appear in their supply chains - a digital platform tracing the origins of wood, environmentalists said. The Responsible Timber Exchange created by conservation group BVRio draws on government data and satellite maps to help buyers and sellers check the origins and certifications of wood. "The platform is able to identify risks of illegality across the supply chain," Mauricio de Moura Costa, director of operations for BVRio, told the Thomson Reuters Foundation. "We want to create a marketplace that helps buyers purchase legal timber in an easier way ... due diligence is very difficult," he said in a recent interview. Illegal logging is responsible for about 90 percent of the deforestation in Brazil, home to the world's largest tropical forests, according to the country's environmental enforcement agency (IBAMA). More than half of the tropical timber traded globally is thought to come from illegal logging, Costa said. Companies that steal wood are often involved in other crimes, such as forced labor or illegal land seizures, which are known for displacing indigenous people and causing harm to the environment, officials say. The BVRio platform cross references individuals and companies selling wood with official data to check if they have been sanctioned by state or federal government departments for using slave labor, not paying taxes or other environmental infractions. To harvest wood legally in Brazil, loggers must submit a management plan to authorities indicating roughly how much timber will be cut and the status of the land it is coming from. The platform, launched last month, analyses these management plans and other data to make sure companies using the exchange have the correct permits for extracting wood, Costa said. The aim is to follow the timber from forests to sawmills and export markets, he said. So far, more than 200 offers have been posted on the platform, with companies looking to buy or sell specific loads of legal timber, Costa said. One of those firms is Amata, a Brazilian forestry company selling wood to customers in the United States and Europe. "Amata's interest in the BVRio platform is clear: finding the best buyers for our certified wood," Dario Guarita Neto, Amata's CEO wrote in an email to the Thomson Reuters Foundation. Amata exports 90 percent of its products because the domestic market in Brazil is saturated with cheaper, illicit wood, Neto said. Companies that steal trees from public land or protected forests have lower costs because they do not have to deal with environmental assessments, taxes or the bureaucracy of certifying their forest products. "It is impossible to compete on the domestic market against illegal wood," Neto said. The relative ease of illegal logging and the profits to be made from it are partially responsible for a 29 percent increase in deforestation in Brazil in 2015 after years of declining deforestation rates, experts say. While some companies have high hopes for the new platform, campaigners say BVRio relies too heavily on government data that can be manipulated by sophisticated criminals. "BVRio might be confirming the paperwork, but the problem is whether the paperwork itself is accurate," said Daniel Brindis, senior forest campaigner with environmental group Greenpeace. In Brazil, wood is frequently laundered the way dirty money in other countries is cleaned - by running it through legitimate businesses, Brindis said. Woodlot owners frequently inflate the amount of timber they can harvest from their land, which allows stolen wood to enter the system and be sold to sawmills, he said. Because of the paperwork, this wood becomes legal even if it was stolen from a protected area, said Brindis, underlining what he sees as a limit in the new platform. "On one hand, companies using this platform are going to be better off than buying blindly from the market place," he said. "On the other hand ... the paperwork system doesn't provide tractability from the stump to the mill."


News Article | November 3, 2015
Site: www.sej.org

"SAO LUIS, Maranhao, Brazil – A stubborn forest fire in the Brazilian Amazon is threatening to consume the forest home of one of the last remaining uncontacted tribes on Earth – the awá-Awá. Despite the efforts of 200 volunteers from the Brazilian Institute of Environment and Renewable Natural Resources, IBAMA, the flames have devastated at least 35 percent of the 1,594 square mile area in Brazil’s northeastern state of Maranhao. About 12,000 ethnic indigenous Guajajara and some 80 awá-Awá, also known as Awá-Guaja, call the area home."


Angelo H.,University of Brasilia | da Silva J.C.,IBAMA | de Almeida A.N.,Faculdade UnB de Planaltina | Pompermayer R.S.,Federal University of Vales do Jequitinhonha and Mucuri
Floresta | Year: 2014

This research develops a strategic analysis of supported timber production in the Brazilian Amazonia, with focus in the sustainable forest management plans in the region. The methodology is based on the use of SWOT Analysis to determine the strengths and weaknesses, opportunities and threats of forest in the Amazon. Therefore, we interviewed 40 professionals who work with forest management. As result, we identified as the main positive point the management as way of maintenance of the forest covering. On the other hand, the main weake point is the lack of control of illegal wooden extraction. The main opportunity is the great amount of available areas for the forest management. Finally, the main threat is the unfair competition with the illegal wood.

Loading IBAMA collaborators
Loading IBAMA collaborators