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Jouy-en-Josas, France

Silberzahn R.,University of Cambridge | Uhlmann E.L.,HEC Paris
Psychological Science | Year: 2013

In the field study reported here (N = 222,924), we found that Germans with noble-sounding surnames, such as Kaiser ("emperor"), König ("king"), and Fürst ("prince"), more frequently hold managerial positions than Germans with last names that either refer to common everyday occupations, such as Koch ("cook"), Bauer ("farmer"), and Becker/Bäcker ("baker"), or do not refer to any social role. This phenomenon occurs despite the fact that noble-sounding surnames never indicated that the person actually held a noble title. Because of basic properties of associative cognition, the status linked to a name may spill over to its bearer and influence his or her occupational outcomes. © The Author(s) 2013. Source

Tomala T.,HEC Paris
Operations Research | Year: 2011

We consider a group of players who perform tasks repeatedly. The players are nodes of a communication network and observe their neighbors' actions. Players have partial knowledge of the network and only know their set of neighbors. We study the existence of protocols for fault reporting: whenever a player chooses a faulty action, the communication protocol starts and the output publicly reveals the identity of the faulty player. We consider two setups. In the first one, players do not share authentication keys. We show that existence of a protocol for fault reporting is equivalent to the 2-vertexconnectedness of the network: no single vertex deletion disconnects the graph. In the second setup, we allow players to share authentication keys. We show that existence of a distribution of the keys and of a protocol for fault reporting is equivalent to the 2-edge-connectedness of the network: no single edge deletion disconnects the graph. We give applications to the implementation of socially optimal outcomes in repeated games. © 2011 INFORMS. Source

Dubois D.,HEC Paris | Rucker D.D.,Northwestern University | Galinsky A.D.,Northwestern University
Journal of Consumer Research | Year: 2012

This research proposes that consumers' preference for supersized food and drinks may have roots in the status-signaling value of larger options. An initial experiment found that consumers view larger-sized options within a set as having greater status. Because low-power consumers desire status, we manipulated power to test our core propositions. Whether induced in the lab or in the field, states of powerlessness led individuals to disproportionately choose larger food options from an assortment. Furthermore, this preference for larger-sized options was enhanced when consumption was public, reversed when the size-to-status relationship was negative (i.e., smaller was equated with greater status), and mediated by consumers' need for status. This research demonstrates that choosing a product on the basis of its relative size allows consumers to signal status, illustrates the consequences of such a choice for consumers' food consumption, and highlights the central role of a product category's size-to-status relationship in driving consumer choice. © 2011 by JOURNAL OF CONSUMER RESEARCH, Inc. All rights reserved. Source

Srivastava S.C.,HEC Paris | Shainesh G.,Indian Institute of Management Bangalore
MIS Quarterly: Management Information Systems | Year: 2015

The digital divide is usually conceptualized through goods-dominant logic, where bridging the divide entails providing digital goods to disadvantaged segments of the population. This is expected to enhance their digital capabilities and thus to have a positive influence on the digital outcomes (or services) experienced. In contrast, this study is anchored in an alternative service-dominant logic and posits that viewing the divide from a service perspective might be better suited to the context of developing countries, where there is a huge divide across societal segments in accessing basic services such as healthcare and education. This research views the prevailing differences in the level of services consumed by different population segments (service divide) as the key issue to be addressed by innovative digital tools in developing countries. The study posits that information and communication technologies (ICTs) can be leveraged to bridge the service divide to enhance the capabilities of service-disadvantaged segments of society. But such service delivery requires an innovative assembly of ICT as well as non-ICT resources. Building on concepts from service-dominant logic and service science, this paper aims to understand how such service innovation efforts can be orchestrated. Specifically, adopting a process view, two Indian enterprises that have developed sustainable telemedicine healthcare service delivery models for the rural population in India are examined. The study traces the configurations of three interactional resources-knowledge, technology, and institutions-through which value-creating usercentric objectives of increasing geographical access and reducing cost are achieved. The theoretical contributions are largely associated with unearthing and understanding how the three interactional resources were orchestrated for service-centric value creation in different combinative patterns as resource exploitation, resource combination, and value reinforcement. The analysis also reveals the three distinct stages of service innovation evolution (idea and launch, infancy and early growth, and late growth and expansion), with a distinct shift in the dominant resource for each stage. Through an inductive process, the study also identifies four key enablers for successfully implementing these ICT-enabled service innovations: obsessive customer empathy, belief in the transformational power of ICT, continuous recursive learning, and efficient network orchestration. Source

Tomala T.,HEC Paris
Mathematics of Operations Research | Year: 2013

This paper considers a general model of repeated games with incomplete information and imperfect monitoring. We study belief-free communication equilibria (BFCE) defined as follows. Players communicate with a mediator who receives types and signals and recommends actions. A BFCE is a communication device such that all players have an incentive to play faithfully, irrespectively of their belief about the state. We characterize BFCE payoffs for any repeated game with incomplete information in terms of one-shot payoff functions, information, and signaling structure. © 2013 INFORMS. Source

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