Global Public Policy Institute
Global Public Policy Institute
Maurer T.,Washington Technology |
Morgus R.,Washington Technology |
Skierka I.,Global Public Policy Institute |
Hohmann M.,Global Public Policy Institute
International Conference on Cyber Conflict, CYCON | Year: 2015
Following reports of foreign government surveillance starting in June 2013, senior officials and public figures in Europe have promoted proposals to achieve "technological sovereignty". This paper provides a comprehensive mapping and impact assessment of these proposals, ranging from technical ones, such as new undersea cables, encryption, and localized data storage, to non-technical ones, such as domestic industry support, international codes of conduct, and data protection laws. The analysis focused on the technical proposals reveals that most will not effectively protect against foreign surveillance. Ultimately, the security of data depends primarily not on where it is stored and sent but how it is stored and transmitted. In addition, some proposals could negatively affect the open and free Internet or lead to inefficient allocation of resources. Finally, proposals tend to focus on the transatlantic dimension, neglecting the broader challenge of foreign surveillance. © 2015 NATO CCD COE Publications, Tallinn.
Stuenkel O.,Global Public Policy Institute
Global Governance | Year: 2013
The rise of the BRIC grouping (Brazil, Russia, India, China) is one of the most commented on phenomena in international politics of the past years. Yet little is known about how and why institutionalized cooperation between the BRIC countries began. This article makes two arguments. First, an unprecedented combination in 2008-a profound financial crisis among developed countries, paired with relative economic stability among emerging powers-caused a legitimacy crisis of the international financial order, which led to equally unprecedented cooperation between emerging powers in the context of the BRIC grouping. The BRIC countries were able to use their temporarily increased bargaining power to become agenda setters at the time-culminating in the International Monetary Fund quota reforms agreed on in 2010. This shows that even short periods of reduced legitimacy in global governance can quickly lead to the rise of alternative institutions-such as, in the case of the crisis that began in 2008, the BRIC platform-which now forms part of the landscape of global governance. Second, intra-BRIC cooperation in the area of international finance enhanced trust among the BRIC countries and led to a broader type of cooperation in many other areas, suggesting the occurrence of spillover effects. Intra-BRICS cooperation (Brazil, Russia, India, China, South Africa) is therefore likely to continue, even after the conditions that facilitated its genesis-the crisis in the West-have disappeared.
Goldthau A.,Central European University |
Witte J.M.,Global Public Policy Institute
Global Policy | Year: 2011
This article examines OPEC's performance in regulating output and prices in the global oil market during its 50years of existence. In addition, it discusses key trends that are likely to determine OPEC's effectiveness in the years ahead, particularly climate change policies. We find that OPEC's ability to control the oil market singlehandedly has historically been limited, as a result of both internal collective action problems and external factors such as the rise of new producers. Furthermore, we find that climate change policies may negatively impact long-term planning security for investment and hence OPEC's ability to target price bands and smooth the oil market. We argue that OPEC will need to become more proactive in low-carbon policies to remain part of the decision making on future energy demand patterns that affects its main export product. We also submit that OPEC has a great role to play in fighting price volatility, a key concern for both producers and consumers, and that the best platform for enhanced efforts in this regard would probably be the International Energy Forum. © 2011 London School of Economics and Political Science and John Wiley & Sons Ltd.
Brockmeier S.,Global Public Policy Institute |
Stuenkel O.,Getulio Vargas Foundation FGV |
Tourinho M.,Graduate Institute
Global Society | Year: 2016
Resolution 1973, which authorised military intervention in Libya, marked the first time that the United Nations Security Council explicitly mandated the use of force against a functioning state to prevent imminent atrocity crimes. While some hailed the resolution and the subsequent intervention in Libya as a victory for the concept of the international community’s “responsibility to protect” (R2P), others predicted its early death. This article argues for a more nuanced view on the impact of the Libya intervention on the debates on R2P. As we will show, the intervention in Libya demonstrated new areas of agreement and at the same time revealed persisting and new disagreements within the international community on the role of the use of force to protect populations. © 2015 The Author(s).
Kurtz G.,Global Public Policy Institute |
Rotmann P.,Global Public Policy Institute
Global Society | Year: 2016
Global expectations for protecting populations from mass atrocities have significantly expanded. This special issue analyses the debates about a “responsibility to protect” (R2P) that resulted from this normative change. At specific events throughout the past decade (the 2005 World Summit and the 2011 proposal for “responsibility while protecting” as well as crises in Darfur, Kenya, Myanmar, Georgia, Sri Lanka and Libya), the norms of protection have been contested and (re-)shaped. This introduction outlines the ideational origins of R2P, presents conceptual commonalities and summarises the cases’ contributions to a non-linear process of norm evolution. We find that despite expectations that the increased weight of “non-Western” powers would lead to the demise of humanitarian norms, the concern for atrocity prevention has become universal. However, that consensus is tied to a supportive relationship with sovereignty and thus privileges action against non-state actors, not repressive regimes. Effective and responsible means of implementation remain contested. © 2015 The Author(s).
News Article | November 26, 2016
Brexit and Donald Trump’s election as the next president of the United States present clear risks to the system of international humanitarian response. The rise of populism seems bent on politicising aid even more than it is now, putting Dunantist ideals of impartial aid to their greatest test. If humanitarians fail to react early and in earnest, they will jeopardise not only their jobs, but also people in conflict zones who could be left without life-saving assistance. The success of populist parties and their preoccupation with domestic growth through protectionist measures is at odds with international solidarity. The governments of the UK and the US have not yet announced changes to their roles as humanitarian donors – positive or negative – but their populist mandate presents three likely scenarios that threaten the humanitarian system as we know it. Each would have a significant impact on their own, but could also play out in parallel. The first scenario concerns spending. The US and UK governments jointly provide more than 40% (pdf) of global humanitarian contributions. Any decrease in their contributions would widen the already gaping funding shortfall. Critically, less spending by the US and the UK would increase the relative share of contributions from countries that do not uphold the same ideals of impartial aid, and that tend to see humanitarian aid as a function of foreign policy and trade. Of all non-OECD humanitarian donors, only the Organisation of Islamic Cooperation ascribes to the principles of Good Humanitarian Donorship. The management of aid operations by western countries in Afghanistan and Iraq has been far from perfect, but the expected behaviour of some non-OECD governments leaves little room for optimism either. Take Yemen, for example. Saudi Arabia is head of the military intervention and is the second largest humanitarian donor to the country (pdf), after the United Arab Emirates. In February 2016, Saudi Arabia sent a letter to the UN and aid organisations asking that they leave the areas they are bombing alone. Although the UN was able to push back on this occasion, the conduct of Saudi Arabia should be a precautionary tale about the future of impartial aid. Second, even if the US and UK do not decrease aid contributions, there is still a risk that they would allow humanitarian action to fall prey to politics. Although the UN has been accused of being influenced by collaborating with Syrian president Bashar al-Assad there is a difference between working toward high standards and failing, and relativising humanitarian ideals of impartial aid altogether. The established norms that populist governments are undermining at home could be extended abroad, driven by a ruthless business mentality to cut better deals. Trump suggested, for example, that the US should deliberately violate international humanitarian law and “go after” the families of suspected terrorists. A machiavellian turn in US and UK foreign policy could make humanitarian aid a bargaining chip in foreign policy; one that is highly valued by oppressive governments that care too much about who should not receive life-saving assistance and protection in war. The troubling prospect of an alliance between the US, Russia and Syria in the fight against Isis would send waves of horror to people oppressed by their rulers and in dire need of aid. International humanitarian norms have already weathered a number of breaches – such as the attack on a Médecins San Frontières hospital in Kunduz – but the prospect of a new tide of foreign policy opportunism would set a precedent for other countries to follow suit, leading to more civilian suffering worldwide. A third scenario imagines the end of reform in the UN-led humanitarian system. For the first time, in a grand bargain made at the World Humanitarian Summit in May 2016, participants agreed to a comprehensive set of reforms to address problems in aid organisations and donor governments. The two sides have agreed to cut bureaucracy, use more cash and localise aid. Although there is still much to criticise about this progress, populist governments’ lack of trust in international organisations will probably reverse the much-fought-for partnership between international civil servants and their paymasters – who will likely resort to sticks rather than carrots in the future. A broken partnership could increase organisational inertia and resistance to even incremental reforms. Sadly, aid organisations are in no position to influence donor policies at the level necessary to prevent any of these three scenarios unfolding. They are not in the position to speak out against changed donor policies either; this duty will fall primarily on external observers and the media. But aid organisations do have a few resources to brace for changed donor policies and cushion their impact. First, they should forge close alliances with people working in the US and UK aid administrations who are opposed to their political leadership’s new direction. Working together, they can enhance resilience and resistance to changing donor policies. Second, aid organisations should encourage non-OECD government donors to join the Good Humanitarian Donorship initiative, help devise a mechanism to measure the conduct of its members, and support them in meeting those standards. Third, aid organisations should accelerate efforts to increase the share of private sources in their income, which would ward off their dependence on government donors. They should explicitly take advantage of a growing counter-populist movement; reaching out to individuals, foundations, corporations, political parties and other groups that believe in international solidarity. Fourth, aid organisations should take their donors’ demands seriously. As Priti Patel, the UK’s new international development secretary, has warned, aid organisations funded by tax money need to illustrate their impact on the lives of those they serve. This implies change at levels not previously seen. Aid organisations could start by learning from the burgeoning party of initiatives that have identified gaps in core humanitarian functions, and have developed approaches to fill them. Established organisations should seek ways to work with or internalise these new approaches, encouraging an atmosphere of healthy competition. If aid organisations underestimate the threat posed by recent events in the US and the UK, they do more than jeopardise their own future – they will risk undermining the Dunantist humanitarian mission of the UN, the International Committee of the Red Cross and other organisations that are heavily dependent on western government financing. András Derzsi-Horváth is research associate at the Global Public Policy Institute. Join our community of development professionals and humanitarians. Follow @GuardianGDP on Twitter.