Time filter

Source Type

Berlin, Germany

ESMT European School of Management and Technology is a private university located in Berlin, Germany.ESMT European School of Management and Technology is an international non-profit business school based in Berlin with an additional location in Schloss Gracht near Cologne. The School was founded by 25 global companies and institutions. ESMT offers a Master's in Management, a Full-time MBA, an Executive MBA, as well as executive education in the form of open enrollment and customized programs.ESMT is accredited by Association of MBAs , AACSB, and Foundation for International Business Administration Accreditation .In December 2013 ESMT has received the right to award PhDs from Berlin for the length of five years. At the same time, Berlin has extended the international business school’s status as a state recognized institution of higher education in Germany for another ten years, the longest possible period. Wikipedia.

Liegsalz J.,Ludwig Maximilians University of Munich | Liegsalz J.,BMW AG | Wagner S.,European School of Management and Technology
Research Policy | Year: 2013

This paper provides an overview of the institutional background of patent examination and its duration in China. The number of patent applications filed at the Chinese State Intellectual Property Office (SIPO) has grown tremendously in recent decades; by 2009, SIPO had become the world's third largest patent office. We find that the average grant lag in 1990-2002 was 4.71 years, with considerable variation across 30 different technology areas. We also empirically analyze the determinants of the grant lags at the SIPO. Using a multivariate duration analysis of the population of 443,533 SIPO patent applications from 1990 to 2002, we find that, even after controlling for other important determinants of grant lags, Chinese applicants achieved faster patent grants than their non-Chinese counterparts. © 2012 Elsevier B.V. Source

Dahlander L.,European School of Management and Technology | Piezunka H.,Stanford University
Research Policy | Year: 2014

This paper analyzes organizations' attempts to entice external contributors to submit suggestions for future organizational action. While earlier work has elaborated on the advantages of leveraging the knowledge of external contributors, our findings show that organizational attempts to attract such involvement are likely to wither and die. We develop arguments about what increases the likelihood of getting suggestions from externals in the future, namely through (1) proactive attention (submitting internally developed suggestions to externals to stimulate debate) and (2) reactive attention (paying attention to suggestions from externals to signal they are being listened to), particularly when those suggestions are submitted by newcomers. Findings from an analysis of about 24,000 initiatives by organizations to involve external contributors suggest these actions are crucial for receiving suggestions from external contributors. Our results are contingent upon the stage of the initiative because organizations' actions exert more influence in initiatives that lack a history of prior suggestions. Our work has implications for scholars of open innovation because it highlights the importance of considering failures as well successes: focusing exclusively on initiatives that reach a certain stage can lead to partial or erroneous conclusions about why some organizations engage external contributors while others fail. © 2013 Elsevier B.V. Source

Grajek M.,European School of Management and Technology | Kretschmer T.,Performance Technology
International Journal of Industrial Organization | Year: 2012

Technology diffusion processes are often said to have critical mass phenomena. We apply a model of demand with installed base effects to provide theoretically grounded empirical insights about critical mass. Our model allows us to rigorously identify and quantify critical mass as a function of installed base and price. Using data from the digital cellular telephony market, which is commonly assumed to have installed base effects, we apply our model and find that installed base effects were generally not strong enough to generate critical mass phenomena, except in the first cellular markets to introduce the technology. © 2012 Elsevier B.V. Source

Bedre-Defolie O.,European School of Management and Technology
International Journal of Industrial Organization | Year: 2012

This paper analyzes the strategic use of bilateral supply contracts in sequential negotiations between one manufacturer and two differentiated retailers. The first main result is that, despite the feasibility of general supply contracts which are functions of own quantity (but cannot be contingent on the rival's quantity), the first contracting parties have incentives to manipulate their contract to shift rent from the second contracting retailer and these incentives distort the industry profit away from the fully-integrated monopoly outcome. The second main result is that if the contract terms between the manufacturer and the first retailer can be renegotiated from scratch in the event that the second retailer has no agreement, then the monopoly outcome can be achieved, often with full rent extraction from the second retailer. Moreover, there are conditions under which renegotiation from scratch yields higher joint profit for the firstly contracting parties than no renegotiation. These results do not depend on the type of retail competition, the level of differentiation between the retailers, the order of sequential negotiations, the level of asymmetry between the retailers in terms of their bargaining power vis-à-vis the manufacturer, or their profitability from being the monopoly retailer. © 2012 Elsevier B.V. Source

Grajek M.,European School of Management and Technology
Information Economics and Policy | Year: 2010

I develop a structural demand model for mobile telephony that facilitates the identification of network effects and inter-network compatibility. Network effects are measured as the dependence of consumer willingness to pay on the installed base of subscribers, compatibility as the relative extent of cross- and own-network effects. Estimating the model using quarterly panel data from the Polish mobile telephone market for the period 1996-2001, I find strong network effects and, despite full interconnection of the mobile telephone networks, low compatibility. I also show that ignoring network effects leads to overestimation of demand elasticity. © 2009 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved. Source

Discover hidden collaborations