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Andrianesis P.,University of Thessaly | Liberopoulos G.,University of Thessaly | Kozanidis G.,University of Thessaly | Papalexopoulos A.D.,ECCO International
2010 7th International Conference on the European Energy Market, EEM 2010 | Year: 2010

The goal of this paper is to evaluate the incentive compatibility of several cost- and bid-based recovery mechanisms that may be implemented in a wholesale electricity market to make the generation units whole in the presence of non-convexities, which are due to unit commitment costs and capacity constraints. To this end, we simulate the bidding behavior of the participants in a simplified model of the Greek joint energy/reserve day-ahead electricity market, where we assume that the players (units) participate as potential price-makers in a non-cooperative game with complete information that is repeated for many rounds. The results suggest that a mechanism based on bid recovery with a regulated cap is quite promising. © 2010 IEEE. Source


Papalexopoulos A.,ECCO International
IEEE PES General Meeting, PES 2010 | Year: 2010

We examine the impact of the friction that exists between wholesale energy markets and system operations on the efficiency of the market outcomes. We elaborate on some basic implications of system operation practices on the design of wholesale energy markets. This analysis is intended to provide a basis for enhancements to existing principles of system operation and bridge the gap between energy market design and system operations. ©2010 IEEE. Source


Andrianesis P.,University of Thessaly | Liberopoulos G.,University of Thessaly | Kozanidis G.,University of Thessaly | Papalexopoulos A.D.,ECCO International
IEEE Transactions on Power Systems | Year: 2013

In centralized day-ahead electricity markets with marginal pricing, unit commitment costs and capacity constraints give rise to non-convexities which may result in losses to some of the participating generating units. Therefore, a recovery mechanism is required to compensate them. In this paper, we present and analyze several recovery mechanisms that result in recovery payments after the market is cleared. Each of these mechanisms results in a different type and/or amount of payments for each participating unit that exhibits losses. We also propose a methodology for evaluating the bidding strategy behavior of the participating units for each mechanism. This methodology is based on the execution of a numerical procedure aimed at finding joint optimal bidding strategies of the profit-maximizing units. In a companion follow-up paper (Part II), we apply this methodology to evaluate the performance and incentive compatibility of the suggested recovery mechanisms on a simplified test case model of the Greek electricity market. © 2012 IEEE. Source


Andrianesis P.,University of Thessaly | Liberopoulos G.,University of Thessaly | Kozanidis G.,University of Thessaly | Papalexopoulos A.D.,ECCO International
IEEE Transactions on Power Systems | Year: 2013

In centralized day-ahead electricity markets with marginal pricing, unit commitment costs and capacity constraints give rise to non-convexities which may result in losses to some of the participating generating units. To compensate them for these losses, a recovery mechanism is required. In Part I of this two-part paper, we present certain recovery mechanisms that result in recovery payments after the market is cleared. We also propose a methodology for evaluating the bidding strategy behavior of the participating units for each mechanism. In this paper (Part II), we apply this methodology to evaluate the performance and incentive compatibility properties of each recovery mechanism on a test case model representing the Greek joint energy/reserve day-ahead electricity market. Lastly, we perform sensitivity analysis with respect to key parameters and assumptions and we provide directions for further research. © 2012 IEEE. Source


Papalexopoulos A.D.,ECCO International | Andrianesis P.E.,ECCO International | Andrianesis P.E.,University of Thessaly
IEEE Transactions on Power Systems | Year: 2014

The emergence of high penetration of renewable energy sources in the energy mix of power systems has substantially increased the need for faster-ramping resources participating in the frequency regulation service procured via market mechanisms by the system operators. However, current market mechanisms do not properly align the incentives for participation since resources are not compensated for the actual frequency regulation they provide nor for the accuracy with which they follow the automatic generation control (AGC) dispatch signal. In this paper, we evaluate the current mechanisms for procuring, dispatching and compensating resources for the frequency regulation service. We also propose a comprehensive approach for calculating the performance payment that includes the actual service they provide and the accuracy with which they follow the AGC signal. Finally, we perform a study by deploying actual operational AGC data for analyzing the proposed methodology. © 2013 IEEE. Source

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