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Trondheim, Norway

Pedersen L.M.,Dovre Safetec AS | Ravdal B.A.,Gassco
Safety and Reliability of Complex Engineered Systems - Proceedings of the 25th European Safety and Reliability Conference, ESREL 2015

The Norwegian gas network is one of the world’s largest integrated gas transports systems. Major disruptions in the gas transportation system will have serious consequences for gas consumers and producers. Business Continuity Plans (BCP’s) have been developed for a selection of scenarios in order to minimise the capacity loss and duration of major interruptions. This paper describes how Gassco together with Safetec has planned business continuity after possible major shutdown events in this system. © 2015 Taylor & Francis Group, London. Source

Kortner T.M.,Aquaculture Protein Center a CoE | Valen E.C.,Aquaculture Protein Center a CoE | Kortner H.,Dovre Safetec AS | Marjara I.S.,Aquaculture Protein Center a CoE | And 2 more authors.

The use of reference genes as internal controls is commonly accepted as the most appropriate normalization strategy in quantitative real-time PCR (qPCR) assays. However, there is increasing evidence that expression of many putative reference genes may be regulated by the experimental conditions, and thereby may result in an inaccurate or incorrect quantification of target gene mRNA expression. The aim of this study was to quantitatively evaluate commonly used reference genes for their suitability as a normalization factor for gene expression analyses in the intestine during development of a soybean meal (SBM)-induced intestinal inflammation (enteropathy) in Atlantic salmon. The software applications geNorm, NormFinder and BestKeeper were used to rank eight reference genes according to their stability across 80 samples from a feeding trial with sequential sampling at 10 time points following initiation of SBM exposure. Additionally, we propose a novel statistical model for estimation and ranking of reference gene stability, based on the coefficient of variation (CV) and the Fisher test. ACTB, EF1A, G6PDH and RPS20 mRNA levels displayed a time-dependent induction during development of the enteropathy. In contrast, 18S, GAPDH, RNAPOLII and HPRTI were more stably expressed during the experiment. Overall, a combination of GAPDH, RNAPOLII and HPRTI is recommended as an internal normalization factor in qPCR assays of the distal intestine of Atlantic salmon with SBM-induced enteropathy. Furthermore, we demonstrate that ignoring underlying assumptions made by normalization software may result in an inaccurate or even completely incorrect conclusion on the selection of the best reference gene(s). © 2011 Elsevier B.V. Source

Bye R.J.,Dovre Safetec AS | Rosness R.,Sintef | Royrvik J.O.D.,NTNU Social Research Ltd.
Safety Science

The 2001 HSE regulations for the Norwegian petroleum sector include a paragraph requiring the promotion of a sound health, safety and environment (HSE) culture. This paper presents an examination of the function of the 'culture' concept in communications from the regulatory authorities to the industry. We discuss implications for organisational and interorganisational learning for safety. The regulatory authorities use 'HSE culture' in different ways depending on the document. No explicit definition of HSE culture is given in the regulations or the guidelines, whereas several diverging definitions are mentioned in an information pamphlet. In accident investigation reports, the HSE-culture concept has typically been used to characterise organisations with numerous violations of the HSE regulations or internal procedures. The concept has also been used to devise simplistic and possibly tautological explanations for frequent rule violations and to argue that numerous rule violations constituted a violation of the regulatory requirement to promote a sound HSE culture. The plasticity of the 'HSE-culture' concept proved to be a two-edged sword. By introducing the HSE-culture concept in the framework regulation, the regulatory authorities explored an unconventional approach to HSE regulation. The 'HSE-culture' concept legitimated a very broad range of HSE approaches in regulated companies, some of which were unexpected by the regulatory authorities. In accident investigations, the use of the 'HSE-culture' concept in an explanatory capacity might lead to the premature closure of a search for the causes of an undesired behaviour or decision. The use of the term 'poor HSE culture' to explain or characterise extensive non-compliance in the investigation reports may have stimulated the regulated companies to prioritise HSE strategies and measures to enforce compliance. © 2015 Elsevier Ltd. Source

Vinnem J.E.,University of Stavanger | Hestad J.A.,Dovre Safetec AS | Kvaloy J.T.,University of Stavanger | Skogdalen J.E.,University of Stavanger
Reliability Engineering and System Safety

The offshore petroleum industry in Norway reports major hazard precursors to the authorities, and data are available for the period 1996 through 2009. Barrier data have been reported since 2002, as have data from an extensive questionnaire survey covering working environment, organizational culture and perceived risk among all employees on offshore installations. Several attempts have been made to analyse different data sources in order to discover relations that may cast some light on possible root causes of major hazard precursors. These previous attempts were inconclusive. The study presented in this paper is the most extensive study performed so far. The data were analysed using linear regression. The conclusion is that there are significant correlations between number of leaks and safety climate indicators. The discussion points to possible root causes of major accidents. © 2010 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved. Source

Thorsen H.K.,Dovre Safetec AS | Nja O.,University of Stavanger
PSAM 2014 - Probabilistic Safety Assessment and Management

In recent years, there has been a growing awareness that major accident risks should be monitored using risk indicators. We distinguish between leading and lagging indicators. The reason is that major accidents are rare events and the underlying causes are often fragmented and difficult to measure. However, it is a demanding task to develop appropriate leading indicators, because accident theories are disputed both in research literature and by practitioners. This paper presents the results from a study of a major oil and gas company's risk management processes and its use of indicators related to offshore installations. The work is based on analyses of accident reports, a literature review and interviews with offshore installation managers and platform integrity personnel. We revealed major differences in attitudes among significant decision makers in relation to the use of risk indicators, spanning from skepticism and no use to in depth registration and analysis. However, all the offshore installation managers addressed the importance of a holistic view on risk and safety. Based on our findings we have developed an indicator set consisting of 16 leading indicators, covering technical, operational and organizational factors influencing major accident risk on offshore installations. Source

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