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Birkerod, Denmark

The Danish Emergency Management Agency is a Danish governmental agency under the Ministry of Defence. Its principal task is to manage an operational part who work out of six Emergency Management Centres, and administrative and legalizing part, who supervises the national and municipal rescue preparedness and advices the authorities on matters of preparedness. DEMA works in closely structured co-operation with the EU, UN and several neighbouring countries.DEMA is capable of deploying abroad on request from another state or an international organisation. The decision to render assistance is taken in co-counsel with the Danish Foreign Ministry. DEMA can give support in instances of natural disasters and accidents, technological events and crises and civil wars. It is able to react quickly in acute situations and leave its home base within hours on smaller missions, and have the ability to deploy a mobile hospital in only 24 hours. Wikipedia.

Dowdall M.,Norwegian Radiation Protection Authority | Mattila A.,Radiation and Nuclear Safety Authority | Rameback H.,Swedish Defence Research Agency | Aage H.K.,Danish Emergency Management Agency | Palsson S.E.,Icelandic Radiation Safety Authority
Journal of Radioanalytical and Nuclear Chemistry

The capabilities of a number of national reach-back entities in situations involving possible interdiction of nuclear materials was assessed. The assessment was conducted as a training exercise using simulated gamma spectra of a range of materials typical of those that may trigger border alarms, some of which included nuclear materials of various types. Responses indicated that the majority of participants were in a position to highlight the potential presence of such materials even in the presence of shielding or masking materials. Cases where participants had greater difficulty in indicating the presence of nuclear material involved materials with which the majority of participants were unfamiliar. Even though conducted as an exercise, results indicate that national reach-back entities can perform adequately but further enhancement of capabilities through training assessments may increase the efficacy of the expert assistance they provide to first responders. © 2014, Akadémiai Kiadó, Budapest, Hungary. Source

Jacobsen L.H.,Holst Center | Andersson K.G.,Technical University of Denmark | Charnock T.,Public Health England | Kaiser J.C.,Helmholtz Center Munich | And 3 more authors.

The ERMIN model is a new implement developed to enable estimation of the radiological consequences in inhabited areas of accidents in nuclear installations. Similarly, AGRICP is a model developed to enable estimation of the radiological consequences of contamination of agricultural production areas. This paper provides a short overview of the background of the two models and describes the features enabled through their implementation in the ARGOS decision support system. The integration allows calculation of both dose rates and doses in particular areas, and can be used to evaluate the effectiveness and costs of countermeasure strategies. © EDP Sciences, 2010. Source

Lahtinen J.,Radiation and Nuclear Safety Authority | Aage H.K.,Danish Emergency Management Agency | Ammann M.,Radiation and Nuclear Safety Authority | Dyve J.E.,Norwegian Radiation Protection Authority | And 3 more authors.

Decision makers must react in a prompt and appropriate manner in various emergency situations. The bases for decisions are often predictions produced with decision support systems (DSS). Actual radiation measurement data can be used to improve the reliability of the predictions. Data assimilation is an important link between model calculations and measurements and thus decreases the overall uncertainty of the DSS predictions. However, different aspects have to be taken into account for the optimal use of the data assimilation technique: different countries may have differing measurement strategies and systems as well as differing calculation models. The scenario and the amount and composition of radionuclides released may vary. In this paper we analyse the situation during and after an accident and draw up a list of recommendations that can help modellers to take into account the measurements that are best suited for data assimilation. © EDP Sciences, 2010. Source

Hedlund F.H.,Cowi A/S | Hedlund F.H.,Technical University of Denmark | Nielsen M.F.,Danish Emergency Management Agency | Mikkelsen S.H.,Cowi A/S | Kragh E.K.,Cowi A/S
Safety Science

At a brewery in 1997, an operator confused filling nozzles for two commonly used acid cleaning agents and transferred nitric acid into a tank with P3, a proprietary phosphoric acid based cleaner that also contained 5-15% isopropanol. 10-15. min later the mixture exploded violently. The stainless steel tank disintegrated with such force that fragments lodged in walls of concrete. The explosion ravaged the cellar, destroyed equipment, blew out a masonry wall and released large amounts of nitrous oxide fumes. Likely, 62% nitric acid (CAS 7697-37-2) and isopropanol (2-propanol, CAS 67-63-0) reacted to produce isopropyl nitrate (nitric acid 1-methylethyl ester, CAS 1712-64-7), a rocket propellant. It is argued that the accident has broad learning potential because of the widespread usage of the two chemicals across industries, the innocent nature of the human error and the severity of the consequence. A review 15. years later of lessons learned finds that information dissemination has followed a tradition of informal meetings in small industry sector associations but impact is unclear. There is no useful mention of the accident in open sources. Although the Danish Working Environment Authority took the brewery to court for negligence, they did not report or investigate the accident, or attempt to disseminate information available to them. Today, the general literature is silent on the explosion hazards of mixing the two chemicals. The paper argues that without institutional support, learning opportunities are missed and broader cross-sector learning is limited or non-existent. © 2014 Elsevier Ltd. Source

Malmen Y.,VTT Technical Research Center of Finland | Joki H.,VTT Technical Research Center of Finland | Jensen J.S.,Danish Emergency Management Agency
WIT Transactions on Information and Communication Technologies

There are many elements to chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear (CBRN) crisis management (handheld detectors, decontamination methods, personal protective equipment, standard operating procedures, emergency managements systems, training programmes, etc.). In the ongoing CATO project (EU FP7: 'A comprehensive holistic answer centred on an integrated CBRN toolbox'), these different elements are pulled together in an overall approach to CBRN preparedness and resilience. CATO proposes a comprehensive holistic answer to CBRN crisis management centred on an integrated CBRN toolbox. CATO starts from the 'puzzle pieces' of the current situation and works within the existing organisational limitations. In order to complete the 'toolbox puzzle', CATO is also defining and developing new tools. A new risk assessment tool has been developed as part of CATO's Chemical Knowledge Base. This tool tackles one of the key differences between a malicious act and an industrial accident: the unknown identity of the chemical released. The tool allows an unknown chemical agent used in a chemical attack to be categorised based on a limited amount of data. This paper describes the rationale behind the new risk analysis tool and briefly discusses the content given for various chemical groups and how it has been tailored to meet the needs of five user groups: the policy-makers, the incident coordinators, the health care personnel, the responders, and the population. The development work has been carried out by VTT Technical Research Centre of Finland in cooperation with the Danish Emergency Management Agency (DEMA). © 2014 WIT Press. Source

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