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Le Touquet – Paris-Plage, France

Rivain M.,CryptoExperts | Roche T.,ANSSI
Lecture Notes in Computer Science (including subseries Lecture Notes in Artificial Intelligence and Lecture Notes in Bioinformatics) | Year: 2013

Side-Channel Analysis (SCA) is commonly used to recover secret keys involved in the implementation of publicly known cryptographic algorithms. On the other hand, Side-Channel Analysis for Reverse Engineering (SCARE) considers an adversary who aims at recovering the secret design of some cryptographic algorithm from its implementation. Most of previously published SCARE attacks enable the recovery of some secret parts of a cipher design -e.g. the substitution box(es)- assuming that the rest of the cipher is known. Moreover, these attacks are often based on idealized leakage assumption where the adversary recovers noise-free side-channel information. In this paper, we address these limitations and describe a generic SCARE attack that can recover the full secret design of any iterated block cipher with common structure. Specifically we consider the family of Substitution-Permutation Networks with either a classical structure (as the AES) or with a Feistel structure. Based on a simple and usual assumption on the side-channel leakage we show how to recover all parts of the design of such ciphers. We then relax our assumption and describe a practical SCARE attack that deals with noisy side-channel leakages. © 2013 Springer-Verlag. Source

Coron J.-S.,University of Luxembourg | Lepoint T.,CryptoExperts | Lepoint T.,Mohammed V University | Tibouchi M.,Nippon Telegraph and Telephone
Lecture Notes in Computer Science (including subseries Lecture Notes in Artificial Intelligence and Lecture Notes in Bioinformatics) | Year: 2013

Extending bilinear elliptic curve pairings to multilinear maps is a long-standing open problem. The first plausible construction of such multilinear maps has recently been described by Garg, Gentry and Halevi, based on ideal lattices. In this paper we describe a different construction that works over the integers instead of ideal lattices, similar to the DGHV fully homomorphic encryption scheme. We also describe a different technique for proving the full randomization of encodings: instead of Gaussian linear sums, we apply the classical leftover hash lemma over a quotient lattice. We show that our construction is relatively practical: for reasonable security parameters a one-round 7-party Diffie-Hellman key exchange requires less than 40 seconds per party. Moreover, in contrast with previous work, multilinear analogues of useful, base group assumptions like DLIN appear to hold in our setting. © 2013 International Association for Cryptologic Research. Source

Augot D.,French Institute for Research in Computer Science and Automation | Finiasz M.,CryptoExperts
IEEE International Symposium on Information Theory - Proceedings | Year: 2013

This article presents a new algorithm to find MDS matrices that are well suited for use as a diffusion layer in lightweight block ciphers. Using an recursive construction, it is possible to obtain matrices with a very compact description. Classical field multiplications can also be replaced by simple F2-linear transformations (combinations of XORs and shifts) which are much lighter. Using this algorithm, it was possible to design a 16×16 matrix on a 5-bit alphabet, yielding an efficient 80-bit diffusion layer with maximal branch number. © 2013 IEEE. Source

Ducas L.,ENS Paris | Durmus A.,Ecole Normale Superieure de Cachan | Lepoint T.,CryptoExperts | Lyubashevsky V.,French Institute for Research in Computer Science and Automation
Lecture Notes in Computer Science (including subseries Lecture Notes in Artificial Intelligence and Lecture Notes in Bioinformatics) | Year: 2013

Our main result is a construction of a lattice-based digital signature scheme that represents an improvement, both in theory and in practice, over today's most efficient lattice schemes. The novel scheme is obtained as a result of a modification of the rejection sampling algorithm that is at the heart of Lyubashevsky's signature scheme (Eurocrypt, 2012) and several other lattice primitives. Our new rejection sampling algorithm which samples from a bimodal Gaussian distribution, combined with a modified scheme instantiation, ends up reducing the standard deviation of the resulting signatures by a factor that is asymptotically square root in the security parameter. The implementations of our signature scheme for security levels of 128, 160, and 192 bits compare very favorably to existing schemes such as RSA and ECDSA in terms of efficiency. In addition, the new scheme has shorter signature and public key sizes than all previously proposed lattice signature schemes. As part of our implementation, we also designed several novel algorithms which could be of independent interest. Of particular note, is a new algorithm for efficiently generating discrete Gaussian samples over ℤn. Current algorithms either require many high-precision floating point exponentiations or the storage of very large pre-computed tables, which makes them completely inappropriate for usage in constrained devices. Our sampling algorithm reduces the hard-coded table sizes from linear to logarithmic as compared to the time-optimal implementations, at the cost of being only a small factor slower. © 2013 International Association for Cryptologic Research. Source

Batina L.,Catholic University of Leuven | Batina L.,Radboud University Nijmegen | Gierlichs B.,Catholic University of Leuven | Prouff E.,Oberthur Technologies | And 3 more authors.
Journal of Cryptology | Year: 2011

Mutual Information Analysis is a generic side-channel distinguisher that has been introduced at CHES 2008. It aims to allow successful attacks requiring minimum assumptions and knowledge of the target device by the adversary. In this paper, we compile recent contributions and applications of MIA in a comprehensive study. From a theoretical point of view, we carefully discuss its statistical properties and relationship with probability density estimation tools. From a practical point of view, we apply MIA in two of the most investigated contexts for side-channel attacks. Namely, we consider first-order attacks against an unprotected implementation of the DES in a full custom IC and second-order attacks against a masked implementation of the DES in an 8-bit microcontroller. These experiments allow to put forward the strengths and weaknesses of this new distinguisher and to compare it with standard power analysis attacks using the correlation coefficient. © International Association for Cryptologic Research 2010. Source

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