China Railway Construction Corporation

Taiyuan, China

China Railway Construction Corporation

Taiyuan, China
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— Synopsis In real terms, the Egyptian construction industry registered positive growth during the review period (2011–2015) and is expected to continue to expand over the forecast period (2016–2020), with investments in residential, infrastructure, and energy and utilities construction projects. Forecast-period growth will be driven by government efforts to develop the country’s rail and road infrastructure and meet its energy targets by 2022. The growing number of public-private partnership (PPP) projects and the increasing pace of foreign investment will also drive industry growth over the forecast period. In July 2016, the government signed 20 economic agreements with the Chinese government. The agreements, worth EGP111.7 billion (US$15.0 billion), will include investments in the country’s housing, transport and energy sectors. Government flagship programs such as the October Oasis, Sustainable Development Strategy 2030, Local Development for Upper Egypt governorates and development of Cairo Metro Line 6 projects, are expected to support industry growth over the forecast period. In real terms, the industry’s output value recorded a compound annual growth rate (CAGR) of 5.32% during the review period, and is expected to register a forecast-period CAGR of 8.24%. Summary Construction in Egypt – Key Trends and Opportunities to 2020 report provides detailed market analysis, information and insights into the Egyptian construction industry including: • The Egyptian construction industry's growth prospects by market, project type and construction activity • Analysis of equipment, material and service costs for each project type in Egypt • Critical insight into the impact of industry trends and issues, and the risks and opportunities they present to participants in the Egyptian construction industry • Profiles of the leading operators in the Egyptian construction industry • Data highlights of the largest construction projects in Egypt Scope This report provides a comprehensive analysis of the construction industry in Egypt. It provides: • Historical (2011-2015) and forecast (2016-2020) valuations of the construction industry in Egypt using construction output and value-add methods • Segmentation by sector (commercial, industrial, infrastructure, energy and utilities, institutional and residential) and by project type • Breakdown of values within each project type, by type of activity (new construction, repair and maintenance, refurbishment and demolition) and by type of cost (materials, equipment and services) • Analysis of key construction industry issues, including regulation, cost management, funding and pricing • Detailed profiles of the leading construction companies in Egypt Reasons to Buy • Identify and evaluate market opportunities using Timetric's standardized valuation and forecasting methodologies. • Assess market growth potential at a micro-level with over 600 time-series data forecasts. • Understand the latest industry and market trends. • Formulate and validate strategy using Timetric's critical and actionable insight. • Assess business risks, including cost, regulatory and competitive pressures. • Evaluate competitive risk and success factors. Key Highlights • In March 2015, the government announced plans to build a new capital city to the east of Cairo near the Red Sea, in an aim to promote economic growth. The project was suspended temporarily following lack of consensus on the project’s tenure and cost. However, the government re-announced the commencement of the project in February 2016. The new capital city will include 1.1 million housing units, 663 healthcare facilities, 700 kindergartens, 40,000 hotel rooms, 1,250 religious buildings, and retail malls on a 1.8 million m2 area, theme parks and an airport. • Egypt’s strategic geographical location and availability of cheap and competitive workforce is increasing the pace of foreign direct investment (FDI) in the country. According to the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD)’s 2015 World Investment Report, the oil sector represented the highest recipient of FDI with a share of 71.7% during 2014–2015, followed by the construction and manufacturing sectors with 2.2% and 2.0% shares respectively. • In a bid to minimize traffic congestion in Cairo, the Egyptian Ministry of Transport announced plans to construct Cairo Metro Line 6. Accordingly, the Ministry of Transport signed a memorandum of understanding (MOU) with the China Railway Construction Corporation worth EGP26.1 billion (US$3.5 billion) in December 2015. The 30km-long metro line project will connect northern Al-Khosos and the southern suburb of Maadi. • In 2015, the government signed a MoU with Rosatom State Atomic Energy Corporation of Russia to construct a nuclear power station in El Dabaa region. With a total investment of EGP186.2 billion (US$25.0 billion), the plant will be developed with a capacity to generate 4,800MW of electricity. The plant is expected to be completed in 2022. • The government is accelerating the pace of investment under the public-private partnership (PPP) model. In February 2016, the Egyptian Ministry of Housing signed four PPP contracts with major real estate companies which include Mountain View-Sisban Holding alliance, Arabia Group and Palm Hills. The total value of these PPP projects is EGP200.0 billion (US$26.8 billion) and includes developments such as the Mountain View iCity residential project in the New Cairo city which will cover a 2.1km2 area with 18,000 housing units, and a resort. For more information, please visit

News Article | December 22, 2016

Addis Ababa has a surprise in store for those who haven’t visited in two years. Cutting through the heart of this booming city, where construction cranes are the most persistent feature of the skyline, is the Addis Ababa Light Rapid Transit (AALRT) network. It rears up suddenly at Meskel Square, which until 2013 gazed out onto an expanse of chaotic traffic. The traffic now bustles beneath the shadow of what is only the second metro ever built south of the Sahara. On the back of the green and white trains that trundle up and down the line are not one, but two logos: the Ethiopian Railways Corporation, and, next to it, the logo of the giant state-owned China Railway Group (CREC). How did China get involved in developing an African metropolis that westerners tend to associate with famine and death? And this is just one project among many across the continent. In 2014 alone, China signed more than £56bn in construction contracts across Africa. Since the turn of the century, Chinese firms have built stadiums, highways, airports, schools, hospitals and, in Angola, an entire city that still stands empty. China has pumped hundreds of billions of dollars into African governments and infrastructure. In return, it has reaped hundreds of billions in commodities. Few in Africa are certain that there is fair quid pro quo at play here. Is this the dawn of a new colonialism, they wonder, a new scramble for Africa in which the continent is once again left in tatters? Or is it the beginning of an era during which Africans shake off old colonial masters and look elsewhere for direct investment and aid? The Light Railway goes some way to answering these questions. The project dates back to December 2011 when the idea for a 34.25km electrified light railway secured funds from Exim Bank of China. Construction for the 39-station project began in 2013 and the metro opened in September 2015, well ahead of schedule. The line has cost $475m, 85% of which was loaned by Chinese policy banks or enterprises. The project was a collaboration between CREC and the Ethiopian Railways Corporation, the junior partner, while the Shenzen Metro Group and CREC will serve as operations managers for the next five years until a planned handover to the local rail authorities. The metro moves about 15,000 people per line per day and costs about six birr (10p) a ride. But describing it as an outright success would be a stretch. The construction often looks slapdash – a standard complaint about Chinese construction projects across the continent. At St Estfanos station, an empty USAID wheat sack serves as a garbage bag. This serves as a neat analogy of the competing interests in Ethiopia, and also of the different approaches. For the West, the country has always been a basket case, or alternatively, a bulwark against Islamist extremism. For the Chinese, it represents a vast, untapped market: a country of almost 100 million people, 90 percent of whom are unbanked, primed to roar through the remainder of the century as a force in Africa, and beyond. In 1971, during the Cultural Revolution, a young Chinese man called Gau “Victor” Hau had just finished a two-year stretch in an agricultural re-education camp. His first assignment from the Chinese Communist Party was in Tanzania as a translator on the most sizeable and important project ever undertaken by the Middle Kingdom on foreign soil. Now Gau is a career railway adviser for the massive state owned entity, China Railway Construction Corporation Limited (CRCC). But in 1971 his ability to speak English was crucial to a huge railway project planned between Tanzania and Zambia. In the late 1960s, Chairman Mao and the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) had entered into an agreement with Tanzanian liberation hero Julius Nyerere and his Zambian contemporary Kenneth Kaunda. They would build a railway line from the Tanzanian port city of Dar es Salaam to Kapiri Mposhi, located in Zambia’s copper belt. For Kuanda, the railway was an existential necessity: surrounded by white supremacist regimes in Rhodesia and South Africa, there was no way for him to export his primary resource to the sea. Hence, the Uhuru (Kiswahili for “freedom”) Railway. For the CCP, the project was no less vital. Prior to rapprochement with the Nixon administration in 1972, and during Mao’s lengthy enmity with the Soviet Union, China was subject to diplomatic purdah. To secure enough votes to become reinstated on the UN Security Council Beijing required allies, and hoped to find the necessary support in Africa. The Tanzania-Zambia Railway Authority (Tazara) line, to be paid for in full by the Chinese, was the beginning of what Beijing promised would be a “win-win relationship”, a kinship based on mutual need to fend off shared antagonisms. But there was a second, perhaps even more pragmatic, reason to build the railway. “We have to rely on importing natural resources from other countries,” Gau said, seated behind a desk in his large Beijing office. “If China was to keep up sustainable development for many years, China has to secure a supply of natural resources and minerals to feed our industries.” Tazara, with a $400m price tag, was blindingly expensive, especially for a country mired in poverty and still reeling from the chaos of Chairman Mao’s revolutionary exertions. Gau says the railway’s real cost was likely $1bn (at least $6bn in today’s money), with a further $1bn in maintenance over the years. It was an immensely difficult engineering challenge. The track cut through 1,860km of bush and mountain ranges, with more than 300 bridges, 22 tunnels, 96 stations, and about 400,000 sq m of support structures. Almost 50,000 Chinese engineers, translators, project managers and labourers were contracted to the project, with a further 100,000 Zambian and Tanzanians filling out the workforce. All of this was funded by China with an interest free loan, to be paid back over 30 years, with a 10-year grace period. Although the project was completed two years ahead of schedule in October 1975, and jump-started a multilateral relationship between the People’s Republic and dozens of African countries, neither Tanzania nor Zambia would pay anything close to their share – this was less a “partnership” than a gift, Gau pointed out. And Tazara’s success, like that of the AALRT, ended up as a mixed bag. According to Gau, China did not train enough local people to maintain the tracks and the equipment, and the railway now operates at a loss, beset by delays and inefficiencies. Indeed, the line is little more than a sop to industrial development: TAZARA’s gauges don’t even match up with that of Tanzanian Railways Limited, meaning that it exists in its own infrastructural universe. But if the project wasn’t a dazzling leap forward for east Africa’s economy, it was brilliant geopolitics. “At that time China was mainly concerned with the political significance of the railway,” says Gau. “Without Tazara, China would not be so easily rehabilitated with a UN seat.” If Tazara represented the first and most significant attempt to forge a lasting south-south engagement, it remained for almost three decades an isolated and anomalous project, its lustre fading as soon as the inaugural trip had been undertaken. This was mainly a result of China deciding to double down on development at home – the recovery from the Cultural Revolution precluded any further costly adventures abroad. But as the 1970s melted into the 1980s, and gave way to a resurgent 1990s under Deng Xiaoping’s mandate of “socialism with Chinese characteristics”, when “some would get rich first”, the single greatest push for growth in the country demanded strong international partnerships if it were to succeed. In order to properly hit the diplomatic reset button, in October 2000 the Chinese hosted the first Forum on China-Africa Cooperation (FOCAC). Four African heads of state made the trip to Beijing, at the invitation of the Chinese, who hoped to build an extensive and lasting multilateral partnership with the continent. By the time of the third FOCAC, six years later, 44 African leaders attended. Billions of dollars of development money was promised, and a new age had begun. Over the course of the commodities super-cycle, the boom market for natural resources such as oil, steel, gold, manganite and platinum, lasting roughly from the turn of the century to 2013, China and sub-Saharan Africa’s economies were effectively coupled: when graphed, they mirrored each other. China purchased raw materials to fuel development at home, while massive state-owned organisations entered the African market, alongside Chinese-made goods and half a million Chinese migrants. Did this epochal encounter between 1.3 billion Chinese, and 1.1 billion Africans – nearly a third of the planet’s population – maintain any of the coherent strands of “win-win” friendship that ballasted the Tazara project? Was the relationship still guided from above by bureaucrats in Beijing’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs who knew exactly what they wanted, and could easily benchmark the outcomes? Not at all. Since Tazara, the Sino-African phenomenon has become much more sophisticated and highly fragmented and is no longer stage-managed by governments. Nowhere is this better shown than by a project announced in Johannesburg in 2013. That year, the South African press began reporting on a vast £4.8bn real estate development in Modderfontein, north-east of the city, continually citing that fact that it would be financed and constructed by “the Chinese”. The press was never clear on what was meant by “the Chinese”. The details were surprising: the Modderfontein New City endeavour was headed by Zendai Group, a Hong Kong-listed company run by an eccentric, goateed entrepreneur named Dai Zhikang. Most of the group’s more successful projects were undertaken in Shanghai. The plan was that the South African community, stretching over tens of thousands of hectares, would include “all the functions of a city, such as finance, trade, logistics, commerce, technology, education, health care and housing”. Modderfontein New City, the company’s website insisted, would become “the New York of Africa,” with twisty postmodern skyscrapers and gigantic retail outlets, all operating on a green grid. Was this a nothing more than an old-school land grab, orchestrated by Beijing in a tidy neo-colonial manoeuvre? That was certainly the implication of the earliest news coverage. But on closer inspection, Modderfontein was just an ambitious real estate play that required big injections of private equity from South Africans. Zendai purchased an initial 1,600 hectares of land for about £57m, and put another £22m into infrastructure. The idea was to attract partnerships and other dealmakers, who would in turn attract others – a growth strategy based largely on the same real estate agent spin encountered anywhere in the world. Setting aside the big numbers, the big ideas and the big anxiety, there was nothing sinister about Modderfontein New City. Indeed, three years after the initial purchase Dai seems to have lost interest in real estate, and has dived into the Chinese art market. His South African arm, Zendai Development SA, is trucking along with the project. Whether the New City becomes a reality is anyone’s guess. This is the way of things in these latter days of the Sino-African encounter. Without question, the Chinese are major players, engaged in hundreds of projects across a continent that desperately needs infrastructure and development. But not all of these projects are government-driven: some are worth only a few thousand pounds, and are negotiated between Africans and Chinese migrants in distant desert communities in remote Chad or Niger. Nonetheless, as American and British populists prepare to close their doors to the outside world, and as Western influence dims across the continent, China may well be the catalyst Africa has required to leap forward into the future. But with the pros come some serious, unanticipated cons. Addis Ababa’s light railway, while it hasn’t quite made beaten up Lada taxis obsolete, has so thoroughly transformed the city that it counts as a work of urban alchemy. But the social cost may yet prove immense: as Addis expands and explodes, the city’s borders push into land belonging to the Oromo people, causing social ruptures and violence. Ethiopia is facing its own muted version of the Arab Spring. The fall of the regime in Ethiopia seems unlikely, but 2016 has taught us the limits of unlikelihood. Would a new government be as amenable to the Chinese, who were themselves so amenable to the previous oppressors? These questions abound in Africa, as certain regimes teeter, others tumble, and still others harden into lengthy runs at the helm. If the Chinese were once hoping for a comprehensive, mandated south-south axis, they have ended up with something more and less than that: an economic, cultural and social encounter that is changing the world, one railway line at a time. Join our community of development professionals and humanitarians. Follow @GuardianGDP on Twitter.

Ma X.,China Railway Construction Corporation | Ma X.,Chinese National Institute for Viral Disease Control and Prevention | Li D.-D.,Chinese National Institute for Viral Disease Control and Prevention | Sun X.-M.,Chinese National Institute for Viral Disease Control and Prevention | And 6 more authors.
PLoS ONE | Year: 2015

Rotaviruses (RVs) are an important cause of severe gastroenteritis in children. It has been found that RV may recognize the histo-blood group antigens (HBGAs) as ligands or receptors and bind HBGAs in a type-dependent manner. In this study, we investigated the binding specificity of VP8∗ proteins from human rotaviruses (RV) that are prevalent in China including genotypes P[4], P[6], and P[8]. Through the saliva- and oligosaccharide-based binding assays, we found that the VP8∗ proteins of P[4] and P[8] RV showed similar reactivity with the Leb and H type 1 antigens, while P[6] RV weakly bound the Leb antigen. These findings may facilitate further research into RV host specificity and vaccine development. Copyright: © 2015 Ma et al.

PubMed | Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, China Railway Construction Corporation and Chinese National Institute for Viral Disease Control and Prevention
Type: Journal Article | Journal: PloS one | Year: 2015

Rotaviruses (RVs) are an important cause of severe gastroenteritis in children. It has been found that RV may recognize the histo-blood group antigens (HBGAs) as ligands or receptors and bind HBGAs in a type-dependent manner. In this study, we investigated the binding specificity of VP8* proteins from human rotaviruses (RV) that are prevalent in China including genotypes P[4], P[6], and P[8]. Through the saliva- and oligosaccharide-based binding assays, we found that the VP8* proteins of P[4] and P[8] RV showed similar reactivity with the Leb and H type 1 antigens, while P[6] RV weakly bound the Leb antigen. These findings may facilitate further research into RV host specificity and vaccine development.

Lin D.-M.,CAS Institute of Geology and Geophysics | Lin D.-M.,University of Chinese Academy of Sciences | Shang Y.-J.,CAS Institute of Geology and Geophysics | Sun F.-J.,China Railway Construction Corporation | And 5 more authors.
Yantu Lixue/Rock and Soil Mechanics | Year: 2011

In-stitu tests can not be broadly used due to time and funds restrictions, so the strength assessment of jointed rock mass is the problem what engineers concern in practical engineering, Because of its complexity at present there is not yet any rock mass failure criterion can meet practical requirements. For the jointed rock mass, the authors refer research results at home and abroad, Combined with large amount of collected-data and amended the empirical formula based on joint density, a relationship between rock elastic wave velocity and rock mass strength is presented; collect number of empirical formulas based on joint density, rock mass classification, elastic wave velocity, the authors apply their three methods to Jiubao and find that the results fit the practical rock mass strength.

Guo X.,Central South University | Guo X.,China Railway Construction Corporation Ltd | Min F.,Hohai University | Zhong X.,Hohai University | Zhu W.,Hohai University
Yanshilixue Yu Gongcheng Xuebao/Chinese Journal of Rock Mechanics and Engineering | Year: 2012

Nanjing Yangtze River tunnel was constructed by slurry shield with diameter of 14.93 m. Along the 3020 m tunnel, a highly permeable gravel stratum under water pressure of 0.65 MPa was passed through successfully. In the project, the most difficult tunnel with giant size across the Yangtze River, several construction difficulties were overcome, such as opening chamber under high pressure and under-passing the section of super shallow cover under the Yangtze River. Based on conditions of the site, difficulties faced with the project were analyzed and key technologies including filter cake formation and opening chamber under pressure were summarized systematically. These achievements would play a significant role in developing the technology of slurry shield with large size in China.

Cheng S.L.,Railway administration of Zhengzhou | Qi X.X.,Beijing Institute of Technology | Jia Q.,China Railway Construction Corporation Ltd
Advanced Materials Research | Year: 2014

The refining process was investigated, it is the refining process about 100t LF refining furnace of an iron and steel group company, the refining effect was researched and systematic analyzed, by Through systematic sampling and detection to composition, slag, gas and inclusion of different refining period on LF furnace, the measures of process improvement have been proposed, to Optimization of production process and improve the quality of products. © (2014) Trans Tech Publications, Switzerland.

Zhang Q.,Beijing University of Technology | Tao T.,Beijing University of Technology | Wang X.,Beijing University of Technology | Zhai Y.,Beijing University of Technology | Zhai Y.,China Railway Construction Corporation
Shuili Xuebao/Journal of Hydraulic Engineering | Year: 2015

The problem of environmental pollution caused by construction waste become more and more serious, it has been attracted extensive attention of the society. To solve the problem of disposal of waste slurry in cast-in-situ bored pile construction, this paper introduces a method of using chemical flocculant to separation of solids from liquid for the waste slurry through the test. The method realizes the fast Solid-Liquid Separation for waste slurry by adding polyacrylamide and CaO. After the treatment, the waste slurry become more loose like dry soil, and this method has advantage in convenient transportation, simple procedure, fast treatment cycle, effectively improves the problem of environmental pollution and reduces the processing cost. It suitable for different consistency of waste slurry caused by constryction. ©, 2015, Shuili Xuebao/Journal of Hydraulic Engineering. All right reserved.

Zhang Y.,North China University of Technology | Liu H.,China Railway Construction Corporation Ltd | Song Z.,North China University of Technology
Applied Mechanics and Materials | Year: 2012

Based on the test, the shear behavior of combined aggregate concrete beams is studied. The results show that combined aggregate concrete beam have similar behavior with ordinary concrete beams, and the shear capacity reduces with the increase of lightweight aggregate. And design formula of the combined aggregate concrete shear capacity is suggested. © (2012) Trans Tech Publications.

Zhang Y.,North China University of Technology | Liu H.,China Railway Construction Corporation Ltd | Zhao S.,North China University of Technology
Applied Mechanics and Materials | Year: 2012

Based on the test of 108 blocks with 150mm × 150mm × 300mm, 54 blocks with 150mm × 150mm × 150mm, elastic modulus of that of combined aggregate concrete is studied, and the influencing factors on it are discussed. The results show that the elastic modulus of combined aggregate concrete are very much affected by the ratio of common aggregate to lightweight aggregate, and it increases with the water-cement ratio decreasing. The calculation equation of combined concrete modulus is suggested. © (2012) Trans Tech Publications.

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