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Mason R.,University of Exeter | Weeds H.,CEPR | Weeds H.,University of Essex
International Journal of Industrial Organization | Year: 2010

This paper examines irreversible investment in a project with uncertain returns, when there is an advantage to being the first to invest and externalities to investing when others also do so. We show that the possibility of pre-emption can have significant qualitative and quantitative effects on the relationship between uncertainty and investment. In a single-agent real options model, the trigger threshold for investment increases without bound as uncertainty grows. In contrast, the investment trigger of a leader faced with pre-emption is bounded above as uncertainty increases. In fact, we show that under certain parameter values, greater uncertainty can lead the leader to invest earlier. These findings reinforce the importance of extending real options analysis to include strategic interactions between players. Applications to industry situations are also discussed. © 2009 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved. Source

Breinlich H.,University of Nottingham | Nocke V.,CEPR | Nocke V.,University of Mannheim | Schutz N.,University of Mannheim
International Journal of Industrial Organization | Year: 2016

This paper surveys the literature on merger policy in open economies. We first adopt a reduced-form approach to derive general insights on the scope for conflict between national antitrust authorities and on the gains from international merger policy coordination. Taking trade costs as given, we use standard oligopoly models to derive conditions on market structure, under which underenforcement or overenforcement of national merger policies can arise. We then study the interactions between merger policy and trade policy, and find that trade liberalization often leads to stricter national merger policies. We conclude by discussing empirical evidence on conflict between antitrust authorities. © 2016 Elsevier B.V. Source

Gould E.D.,Hebrew University | Gould E.D.,Institute for the Study of Labor | Lavy V.,Hebrew University | Lavy V.,Institute for the Study of Labor | And 3 more authors.
Review of Economic Studies | Year: 2011

This paper estimates the effect of the early childhood environment on a large array of social and economic outcomes lasting almost 60 years. To do this, we exploit variation in the living conditions experienced by Yemenite children after being airlifted to Israel in 1949. We find that children who were placed in a more modern environment (i.e. with better sanitary and infrastructure conditions) were more likely to obtain higher education, marry at an older age, have fewer children, and work at age 55. They were also more likely to be assimilated into Israeli society, to be less religious, and have more worldly tastes in music and food. However, these effects are found mainly for women and not for men. We also find an effect on the next generation-children who lived in a better environment grew up to have children with more education. © The Author 2011. Source

Brito D.,New University of Lisbon | Cabral L.,New York University | Vasconcelos H.,CEPR | Vasconcelos H.,University of Porto
International Journal of Industrial Organization | Year: 2014

We examine the consumer welfare effect of a firm's partial ownership of a competitor and compare the implications of alternative forms of divestiture. We identify conditions under which turning voting shares into non-voting shares is preferable to selling the shares to the firm's current shareholders (an option frequently chosen). We also show that selling the voting shares to a large independent shareholder is preferable to selling them to small shareholders. We provide additional theoretical results and apply them to the divestiture of Portugal Telecom's holdings in PTM. © 2014 Elsevier B.V. Source

Forslid R.,CEPR | Herzing M.,University of Stockholm
Health Economics (United Kingdom) | Year: 2015

This paper analyzes the profit maximizing capacity choice of a monopolistic vaccine producer facing the uncertain event of a pandemic in a homogenous population of forward-looking individuals. For any capacity level, the monopolist solves the intertemporal price discrimination problem within the dynamic setting generated by the standard mathematical epidemiological model of infectious diseases. Even though consumers are assumed to be identical, the monopolist will be able to exploit the ex post heterogeneity between infected and susceptible individuals by raising the price of vaccine in response to the increasing hazard rate. The monopolist thus bases its investment decision on the expected profits from the optimal price path given the infection dynamics. It is shown that the monopolist will always choose to invest in a lower production capacity than the social planner. Through numerical simulation, it is demonstrated how the loss to society of having a monopoly producer decreases with the speed of infection transmission. Moreover, it is illustrated how the monopolist's optimal vaccination rate increases as its discount rate rises for cost parameters based on Swedish data. However, the effect of the firm discount rate on its investment decision is sensitive to assumptions regarding the cost of production capacity. Copyright © 2014 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd. Copyright © 2014 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd. Source

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