Central Bank of Luxembourg

Luxembourg, Luxembourg

Central Bank of Luxembourg

Luxembourg, Luxembourg
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Bertinelli L.,University of Luxembourg | Marchiori L.,Central Bank of Luxembourg | Tabakovic A.,University of Luxembourg | Zou B.,University of Luxembourg
Environmental Modeling and Assessment | Year: 2017

To reach a common target of environmental quality, countries can choose to commit to a stream of pollution abatement right from the beginning of the game or decide upon abatement at each moment of time. Though most of the previous literature studies homogeneous strategies where no country or all countries commit to a (same) predefined policy, reality goes along a different way: some countries make more efforts than others to reduce pollutant emission. The main novelty of this paper resides in the introduction of this kind of heterogeneous strategic behavior currently observed among large pollution nations. We find that the pollution level can be lower under heterogeneous than under homogeneous strategies. A stringent environmental quality target will induce the committed player to produce an abatement effort that more than compensates the free-riding attitude of the non-committed player. © 2017 Springer International Publishing Switzerland

Hauser F.,University of Innsbruck | Huber J.,University of Innsbruck | Kaempff B.,Central Bank of Luxembourg
Computational Economics | Year: 2015

We analyze the value of costly information in agent-based markets with nine distinct information levels. We use genetic programming where agents optimize how much information to buy and how to process it. We find that most agents first buy high information levels, but in equilibrium buy either complete or no information, with the respective shares depending on the information costs. When information is auctioned, markets are first inefficient, so agents raise their bids to buy the highest information levels, before they learn to bid amounts that they can cover with their trading profits. In equilibrium, markets are not fully efficient, but contain just enough noise to allow informed agents to earn their information costs. © 2014, Springer Science+Business Media New York.

Marchiori L.,Central Bank of Luxembourg | Marchiori L.,Catholic University of Louvain | Maystadt J.-F.,International Food Policy Research Institute | Schumacher I.,France Business School | Schumacher I.,Ecole Polytechnique - Palaiseau
Journal of Environmental Economics and Management | Year: 2012

This paper analyzes the effects of weather anomalies on migration in sub-Saharan Africa. We present a theoretical model that demonstrates how weather anomalies induce rural-urban migration that subsequently triggers international migration. We distinguish two transmission channels, an amenity channel and an economic geography channel. Based on annual, cross-country panel data for sub-Saharan Africa, we present an empirical model that suggests that weather anomalies increased internal and international migration through both channels. We estimate that temperature and rainfall anomalies caused a total net displacement of 5 million people during the period 1960-2000, i.e. a minimum of 128,000 people every year. Based on medium UN population and IPCC climate change projections, we expect future weather anomalies to lead to an additional annual displacement of 11.8 million people by the end of the 21st century. © 2012 Elsevier Inc.

Giordana G.A.,Central Bank of Luxembourg | Montginoul M.,IRSTEA | Willinger M.,Montpellier University
Agricultural and Resource Economics Review | Year: 2010

Overexploitation of coastal aquifers may lead to seawater intrusion, which irreversibly degrades groundwater. The seawater intrusion process may imply that its consequences would not be perceptible until after decades of accumulated overexploitation. In such a dynamic setting, static externalities may enhance the users' awareness about the resource's common nature, inducing more conservative individual behaviors. Aiming to evaluate this hypothesis, we experimentally test predictions from a dynamic game of substitutable common-pool resource (CPR) exploitation. The players have to decide whether to use a free private good or to extract from one of two costly CPRs. Our findings do not give substantial support to the initial conjecture. Nevertheless, the presence of static externalities does induce some kind of payoff reassurance strategies in the resource choice decisions, but these strategies do not correspond to the optimum benchmark. Copyright 2010 Northeastern Agricultural and Resource Economics Association.

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