Dunkirk Town Center, MD, United States
Dunkirk Town Center, MD, United States

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Henderson D.A.,Center for Biosecurity | Henderson D.A.,Johns Hopkins University
Public Health Reviews | Year: 2011

When I was a medical student, there were few lectures on public health at our university and such was true at most. The focus was on the treatment of individual patients with limited regard for the problems of the community. But as time has passed, there has been increasing concern about the population as a whole and approaches that might be appropriate for prevention of both acute and chronic diseases, for containing the spread of infection and for fostering healthy lifestyles. Many disciplines are involved but epidemiology, being the primary discipline of public health, lends itself well to serving as a common platform in joining all the disciplinary fields. Such was the case with the smallpox eradication program. The lessons learned from this experience are very relevant to current and future issues in public health. This is undoubtedly the most exciting time in history to enter the field of public health - so much is changing and so many new opportunities are presenting as the importance of population-based public health is increasingly perceived by governments, universities, and the community as a whole. The experience of working on the eradication of smallpox was a major development in my career as it was for many colleagues who served with me. I am pleased to be able to share this experience with a new generation, which faces both enormous challenges and opportunities in disease control and health promotion.


Franco C.,Center for Biosecurity | Bouri N.,Center for Biosecurity
Biosecurity and Bioterrorism | Year: 2010

The process of environmental decontamination is a key step in a successful response to a large-scale attack involving a biological agent. Costs for the decontamination response following the 2001 anthrax attacks were estimated in the hundreds of millions of dollars, and some facilities could not be reopened for more than 2 years. However, a large-scale biological attack would likely result in an even greater amount of contamination, more areas that need to be cleaned and made safe, and a much greater cost to the American public. This article identifies gaps in decontamination policy and technical practice at the federal level and provides practical recommendations that will better enable the U.S. to undertake a biological decontamination response. © Copyright 2010, Mary Ann Liebert, Inc..


Adalja A.A.,Center for Biosecurity | Watson M.,Center for Biosecurity | Wollner S.,Center for Biosecurity | Toner E.,Center for Biosecurity
Biosecurity and Bioterrorism | Year: 2011

After the detonation of an improvised nuclear device, several key actions will be necessary to save the greatest number of lives possible. Among these tasks, the identification of patients with impending acute radiation sickness is a critical problem that so far has lacked a clear solution in national planning. We present one possible solution: the formation of a public-private partnership to augment the capacity to identify those at risk for acute radiation sickness. © Copyright 2011, Mary Ann Liebert, Inc.


Toner E.S.,Center for Biosecurity | Nuzzo J.B.,Center for Biosecurity | Watson M.,Center for Biosecurity | Franco C.,Center for Biosecurity | And 3 more authors.
Biosecurity and Bioterrorism | Year: 2011

In recent years, improved biosurveillance has become a bipartisan national security priority. As has been pointed out by the National Biosurveillance Advisory Subcommittee and others, building a national biosurveillance enterprise requires having strong biosurveillance systems at the state and local levels, and additional policies are needed to strengthen their biosurveillance capabilities. Because of the foundational role that state and local health departments play in biosurveillance, we sought to determine to what extent state and local health departments have the right capabilities in place to provide the information needed to detect and manage an epidemic or public health emergency-both for state and local outbreak management and for reporting to federal agencies during national public health crises. We also sought to identify those policies or actions that would improve state and local biosurveillance and make recommendations to federal policymakers who are interested in improving national biosurveillance capabilities. © Copyright 2011, Mary Ann Liebert, Inc.


Fitzgerald J.,Center for Biosecurity | Wollner S.B.,Center for Biosecurity | Adalja A.A.,Center for Biosecurity | Morhard R.,Center for Biosecurity | And 2 more authors.
Biosecurity and Bioterrorism | Year: 2012

Even amidst the devastation following the earthquake and tsunami in Japan that killed more than 20,000 people, it was the accident at the Fukushima Daiichi nuclear power plant that led the country's prime minister, Naoto Kan, to fear for "the very existence of the Japanese nation." While accidents that result in mass radiological releases have been rare throughout the operating histories of existing nuclear power plants, the growing number of plants worldwide increases the likelihood that such releases will occur again in the future. Nuclear power is an important source of energy in the U.S. and will be for the foreseeable future. Accidents far smaller in scale than the one in Fukushima could have major societal consequences. Given the extensive, ongoing Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) and industry assessment of nuclear power plant safety and preparedness issues, the Center for Biosecurity of UPMC focused on offsite policies and plans intended to reduce radiation exposure to the public in the aftermath of an accident. This report provides an assessment of Japan's efforts at nuclear consequence management; identifies concerns with current U.S. policies and practices for "outside the fence" management of such an event in the U.S.; and makes recommendations for steps that can be taken to strengthen U.S. government, industry, and community response to large-scale accidents at nuclear power plants. © 2012 Mary Ann Liebert, Inc.


Morhard R.,Center for Biosecurity | Ravi S.,University of Pittsburgh | Ravi S.,Center for Biosecurity
Biosecurity and Bioterrorism | Year: 2012

Legal Perspectives is aimed at informing healthcare providers, emergency planners, and other decision makers about important legal issues related to public health and healthcare preparedness and response. The articles describe these potentially challenging topics and conclude with the authors' suggestions for further action. The articles do not provide legal advice. Therefore, those affected by the issues discussed in this column should seek further guidance from legal counsel. Readers may submit topics of interest to the column's editor, Ryan Morhard, JD, through the Journal's editorial office at jfox@upmc-biosecurity.org. © 2012, Mary Ann Liebert, Inc.


Franco C.,Center for Biosecurity | Sell T.K.,Center for Biosecurity
Biosecurity and Bioterrorism | Year: 2012

Since 2001, the United States government has spent substantial resources on preparing the nation against a bioterrorist attack. Earlier articles in this series have analyzed civilian biodefense funding by the federal government for fiscal years (FY) 2001 through proposed funding for FY2012. This article updates those figures with budgeted amounts for FY2013, specifically analyzing the budgets and allocations for civilian biodefense at the Departments of Health and Human Services, Defense, Homeland Security, Agriculture, Commerce, and State; the Environmental Protection Agency; and the National Science Foundation. As in previous years, our analysis indicates that the majority (>90%) of the "biodefense" programs included in the FY2013 budget have both biodefense and non-biodefense goals and applications-that is, programs to improve infectious disease research, public health and hospital preparedness, and disaster response more broadly. Programs that focus solely on biodefense represent a small proportion (<10%) of our analysis, as the federal agencies continue to prioritize all-hazards preparedness. For FY2013, the federal budget for programs focused solely on civilian biodefense totals $574.2 million, and the budget for programs with multiple goals and applications, including biodefense, is $4.96 billion, for an overall total of $5.54 billion. © 2012 Mary Ann Liebert, Inc.

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