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Vaughen B.K.,Baker Engineering and Risk Consultants Inc.
30th Center for Chemical Process Safety International Conference 2015 - Topical Conference at the 2015 AIChE Spring Meeting and 11th Global Congress on Process Safety | Year: 2015

While no industrial chemical incident has had the magnitude for loss of life that occurred in 1984 at Bhopal, process safety incidents continue to occur today often resulting in serious injuries, fatalities, environmental harm, property damage and business interruption. Over the last three decades since Bhopal, we have learned that these three inter-related foundations are essential for effective process safety programs: 1) process safety culture and leadership, 2) process safety systems, and 3) operational discipline. If any one of these foundations is weak, the process safety programs will be weak, process safety incidents will occur and the organization's process safety performance will be poor. This paper explores how the process safety systems are essential barriers when protecting against incidents and presents a visual tool which can be used to help illustrate the gaps in the process safety program foundations and systems. This paper presents a novel visual tool which combines the layer of protection model with the bow tie barrier analysis model, helping summarize the systemic gaps which have been identified during an investigation. Bhopal is presented as the case study using this visual tool, showing which process safety systems failed (ultimately all of them) due to poor safety culture, poor process safety leadership, and poor operational discipline. Copyright © (2015) by AIChE All rights reserved.


Broadribb M.P.,Baker Engineering and Risk Consultants Inc.
Process Safety Progress | Year: 2012

People have inherent strengths and weaknesses that can affect their performance. Issues such as fatigue, emotional stress, and motivation can adversely affect performance. Their performance is also influenced by factors external to the individual, such as poor equipment design, inadequate training, excessive workload, and the work environment. Most incidents in the process and related industries involve human factors, often as a key causal factor. Understanding these performance-shaping factors is essential for conducting good incident investigations. However, besides those involved in the actual incident, human factors can affect other aspects of the incident investigation process, especially when considering other stakeholders. The content of this article will raise awareness of how human factors can affect the success of the incident investigation process, and help others plan for improved investigations. © 2012 American Institute of Chemical Engineers (AIChE).


Wasileski R.F.,Baker Engineering and Risk Consultants Inc.
5th Process Safety Management Mentoring Forum 2016, PSM2 2016 - Topical Conference at the 2016 AIChE Spring Meeting and 12th Global Congress on Process Safety | Year: 2016

The Chemical Procebing Industry (CPI) has witnebed growth in mechanical integrity (MI) programs, which have evolved from standards-based compliance, to continuous improvement programs, and on to risk-based programs. For instance, operators (i.e., manufacturers) have redesigned corporate standards, plant-level procedures and field practices to keep pace with incident learnings and published best practices, such as those produced by the American Institute of Chemical Engineers' (AIChE) Center for Chemical Proceb Safety (CCPS). Furthermore, the property insurance industry has duly taken note of this MI evolution, giving rise to a significantly greater focus on MI programs during insurance surveys and inspections. Meanwhile, incident investigators remain in demand as relatively large incidents with MI-related causes continue to occur in the CPI. This apparent disconnect naturally raises questions in regards to subjects such as "risk based inspection (RBI)", "reliability centered maintenance (RCM)," "inspection frequency", "industry best practice" and "inspection, testing and preventive maintenance (ITPM)". MI programs play a considerably important role in the proceb safety lifecycle of equipment. The engineering design phase of a project may be on the order of just days, up to several years for a complete plant. Procurement and construction typically follow a similar timeline proportionate with the engineering design phase. However, once a facility becomes fully operational, the time devoted towards operation and maintenance will normally far out-weigh the engineering, procurement and construction (EPC) period, and may last for many decades. As such, the proceb safety equipment lifecycle (PSEL) is typically dominated by the MI program, relative to other lifecycle phases such as the EPC period or decommibioning and retirement. The PSEL is explained in this article, with an in-depth examination of the central elements which should be embraced by a comprehensive MI program. While the article demonstrates the breadth and depth of MI, it aptly proposes an innovative approach towards the management system that should form the foundation of a robust MI program. The proposed framework leverages the common "Onion Skin" diagram in the context of the equipment lifecycle to create an intuitive approach to MI management. This unique management system framework is comprehensive, sound, and yet practical for implementation at facilities of most any size. Copyright © 2016 by AIChE.


Wasileski R.F.,Baker Engineering and Risk Consultants Inc.
18th Process Plant Safety Symposium, PPSS 2016 - Topical Conference at the 2016 AIChE Spring Meeting and 12th Global Congress on Process Safety | Year: 2016

The Chemical Processing Industry (CPI) has witnessed growth in mechanical integrity (MI) programs, which have evolved from standards-based compliance, to continuous improvement programs, and on to risk-based programs. For instance, operators (i.e., manufacturers) have redesigned corporate standards, plant-level procedures and field practices to keep pace with incident learnings and published best practices, such as those produced by the American Institute of Chemical Engineers' (AIChE) Center for Chemical Process Safety (CCPS). Furthermore, the property insurance industry has duly taken note of this MI evolution, giving rise to a significantly greater focus on MI programs during insurance surveys and inspections. Meanwhile, incident investigators remain in demand as relatively large incidents with MI-related causes continue to occur in the CPI. This apparent disconnect naturally raises questions in regards to subjects such as "risk based inspection (RBI)", "reliability centered maintenance (RCM)," "inspection frequency", "industry best practice" and "inspection, testing and preventive maintenance (ITPM)". MI programs play a considerably important role in the process safety lifecycle of equipment. The engineering design phase of a project may be on the order of just days, up to several years for a complete plant. Procurement and construction typically follow a similar timeline proportionate with the engineering design phase. However, once a facility becomes fully operational, the time devoted towards operation and maintenance will normally far out-weigh the engineering, procurement and construction (EPC) period, and may last for many decades. As such, the process safety equipment lifecycle (PSEL) is typically dominated by the MI program, relative to other lifecycle phases such as the EPC period or decommissioning and retirement. The PSEL is explained in this article, with an in-depth examination of the central elements which should be embraced by a comprehensive MI program. While the article demonstrates the breadth and depth of MI, it aptly proposes an innovative approach towards the management system that should form the foundation of a robust MI program. The proposed framework leverages the common "Onion Skin" diagram in the context of the equipment lifecycle to create an intuitive approach to MI management. This unique management system framework is comprehensive, sound, and yet practical for implementation at facilities of most any size. Copyright © 2016 Retained by Authors, April, UNPUBLISHED.


Moosemiller M.,Baker Engineering and Risk Consultants Inc.
Journal of Loss Prevention in the Process Industries | Year: 2011

A project was performed for the Explosion Research Cooperative to develop algorithms for predicting the frequencies of explosions based on a variety of design, operating and environmental conditions. Algorithms were developed for estimating unit-based explosion frequencies, such as those reported in API Recommended Practice 752, but in more detail and covering a much broader range of chemical process types. The project also developed methods for predicting scenario-based explosion frequencies, using frequencies of initiating events and conditional probabilities of immediate ignition and delayed ignition resulting in explosion. The algorithms were based on a combination of published data and expert opinion. © 2011 M. Moosemiller.


Broadribb M.,Baker Engineering and Risk Consultants Inc.
Proceedings of the Annual Offshore Technology Conference | Year: 2015

Objective/Scope Process safety management systems are widely credited with reductions in major accident risk for onshore operations. Yet although offshore oil and gas operations also have the potential for catastrophic disaster, process safety management systems offshore are not as mature. Over the past thirty years, the author has been involved in the application of offshore process safety. The paper will discuss the strengths and weaknesses observed, some common themes involving process safety management systems, and future approaches for continuous improvement. Methods, Procedures, Process Many of today's process safety practices are a result of lessons learned by industry after experiencing major accidents. Although certain process safety practices were in place prior to the Piper Alpha disaster, the incident paved the way for major changes to process safety in the UK and USA. Those process safety changes were mainly focused on: The Safety Case in the North Sea, and a voluntary Safety and Environmental Management Program in the Gulf of Mexico. More recently the Deepwater Horizon incident led to adoption of a mandatory Safety and Environmental Management System. Results, Observations, Conclusions Some aspects of the Safety Case approach (and its integral process safety practices) could be improved, but nevertheless, such an approach has led to a significant reduction in risk for North Sea operations. Performance has stagnated to some extent, but a number of initiatives are underway to drive continuous improvement. The Deepwater Horizon incident raised awareness that prevention of major accidents requires a specific focus on process safety management over and above that for conventional occupational safety-a lesson already learned by onshore process industries. Although there is a strong emphasis on personal safety within the drilling industry, it is not often balanced by an equal focus on process safety. Since process safety is not universally well understood offshore, there are opportunities to strengthen safety management systems. The author has personally witnessed weaknesses in various process safety elements, including asset integrity of safety critical equipment/ elements. Novel/Additive Information Despite improvements in risk reduction and recent regulatory changes, the industry must not become complacent and needs to maintain a sense of vulnerability. The next drivers for performance improvementare likely to include more pro-active leadership, use of leading metrics, and culture change that leads to greater workforce involvement and a 'beyond compliance' mentality. The magnitude of the culture change that will be needed to advance process safety management is significant, but it can be facilitated by strong leadership enforcing standards. The industry requires carefully selected metrics to provide early warning of low probability/high consequence process safety incidents. Above all else, the industry needs to recognize that good safety performance requires that hazards are identified, the associated risks are understood, and the risks are managed by "doing the right thing". Copyright © (2015) by the Offshore Technology Conference All rights reserved.


Sarrack A.G.,Baker Engineering and Risk Consultants Inc.
Chemical Engineering Transactions | Year: 2012

Baker Engineering and Risk Consultants, Inc. (BakerRisk) has performed quantitative risk analyses (QRAs) for many facilities including companies handling anhydrous ammonia and other toxic materials. This paper compares several methods of estimating toxic risk exposure to personnel located within buildings. Historically, toxic risk impacts have been assessed simplistically by developing geographic contours for threshold values and applying corresponding vulnerability values for personnel within those areas (e.g., a dose function is applied by assuming an exposure time). Building occupants were treated in a similar manner as outdoor personnel, although mitigation factors were often applied to credit toxic gas detection, ventilation isolation, and protective equipment such as escape packs. Using a detailed method of evaluating toxic risks to personnel in buildings accounts for the calculated concentration at the building for each scenario, ventilation intake rate, ventilation isolation reliability, leak tightness of the building, lethality of the toxin, duration of the release, protective equipment, and clean purge air supplies, as applicable. In addition, rather than plotting the impact area and assessing it in a series of directions, the detailed method calculates the probability of directionalities of interest. This eliminates issues with long, narrow toxic plume "petals" that can result in toxic risks being underestimated. This presentation provides an overview of simple vs. detailed toxic risk analysis methods. An example case will show how calculations are performed and how results are presented. A series of sensitivities will be discussed to explain how effective various potential mitigation strategies would be in improving safety. Copyright © 2012, AIDIC Servizi S.r.l.


Baker A.S.,Baker Engineering and Risk Consultants Inc.
31st Center for Chemical Process Safety International Conference 2016 - Topical Conference at the 2016 AIChE Spring Meeting and 12th Global Congress on Process Safety | Year: 2016

Facilities with potentially significant toxic and/or flammable hazards often establish shclter-in- place locations (SIPs) in order to mitigate risks associated with an accidental release of hazardous materials. Typical toxic risk mitigation strategies regarding SIPs include reliably isolating the ventilation system in a timely manner upon detection of predetermined concentrations of hazardous gases, making the SIP as leak- Tight as possible, and providing an effective fallback (evacuation) plan. While a properly designed SIP can provide significant risk reduction benefits, complex decisions are required to ensure the adequacy of the SIP design. In addition, a robust management program needs to be in place to ensure the on-going effectiveness of the SIP to avoid providing a false sense of safety. This paper outlines methods for quantifying effects of SIP parameters of interest and provides guidance for optimizing risk mitigation through SIP design and operation and development of a highly effective fallback/evacuation plan.


Grant
Agency: Department of Defense | Branch: Air Force | Program: SBIR | Phase: Phase I | Award Amount: 100.00K | Year: 2011

A 9-month, $100,000 effort is proposed to (a) extend STMG capability to include non-U.S. construction standards for mechanical, electrical, plumbing, data, and architectural systems and components; (b) extend STMG capability to include hardened (belowground) construction; (c) perform fragment tests on typical booster pump components and define their fragility for eventual incorporation into MEVA. For feasibility demonstration, enhanced STMG functionality will be limited to one geographic grouping and will represent plumbing systems only. The automated generation algorithms will rely on proven industry experience derived from design of realistic systems for a variety of building types. The testing will be augmented as necessary by analysis and consideration of accidental explosion data in petrochemical facilities. BENEFIT: The new fragility models will aid the Air Force in predicting functional kill on a facility based on assessment of the building's mechanical, electrical, data, and plumbing systems. New capabilities will be developed in model generation software supporting the definition of such systems within simplified target models used by assessment codes. In the commercial sector, the models and tools being developed will be of great interest to developers and urban planners doing top-level sizing and planning of new facilities. The automated rules for generation of MEP components could then be linked to databases of equipment cost, installation cost and difficulty, and maintenance cost, facilitating quantification of tradeoffs between alternate building footprints/heights, functions, and locations. Potential users would primarily be architect/engineer companies involved in planning and design of commercial/industrial buildings.


Pierorazio A.,Baker Engineering and Risk Consultants Inc.
30th Center for Chemical Process Safety International Conference 2015 - Topical Conference at the 2015 AIChE Spring Meeting and 11th Global Congress on Process Safety | Year: 2015

The history of process safety management (PSM) in Canada is quite different than in other countries. The practices and guidelines have evolved through industrial collaboration (often involving regulators and other stakeholders) rather than by unilateral legislation. This paper presents the history of this collaboration and it's direction in the near future. Copyright © (2015) by AIChE All rights reserved.

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