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Ares Security Corporation, Saber Software Corporation and ARES Corporation | Date: 2011-01-04

Computer software for the simulation, analysis, education and training of security or defense forces against opposing forces and threats.


News Article | December 13, 2016
Site: www.prweb.com

Advanced Core Concepts and its wholly-owned subsidiary International Logistics Group, together a small business provider of engineering and technical support, logistics, sustainment services, acquisition support, Foreign Military Sales (FMS) support and information technology solutions to the Department of Defense and other federal government customers, are proud to announce the appointment of Dr. William Vantine, Trase Travers and James Fugit to the combined enterprise’s Board of Directors. Dr. William Vantine is the president and CEO of Systems Planning and Analysis, Inc., a provider of technical and analytics support services to the national defense, security and advanced technologies communities. Dr. Vantine has more than 30 years’ experience in the government and commercial sectors, including serving as president and CEO of Los Alamos Technical Associates, president and COO of the ARES Corporation, and executive management positions within the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA). Trase Travers is an accomplished executive leader with significant background managing and growing business entities operating in highly technical engineering and product development markets. Mr. Travers served as president and CEO of Millennium Engineering and Integration and as vice president and general manager of SRS Technologies, now part of ManTech International Corporation. James Fugit is co-founder and CEO of ARMA Aviation Corporation, a provider of logistics, training and maintenance-repair-overhaul services. Previously, Mr. Fugit was co-founder and president of ARMA Global Corporation, which was acquired by General Dynamics Information Technology. He is a former Army officer and also served as program director at General Dynamics Ordnance and Tactical Systems and senior program manager at Tower Automotive. “William, Trase and James are experienced executives who rank among the foremost experts in many of the most important and sophisticated technical areas of the aerospace and national security sectors,” said John Willis, president of Advanced Core Concepts. “We look forward to benefiting from their combined leadership and guidance as we continue our 12-year history of supporting high-priority programs in these technical areas.” About Advanced Core Concepts Advanced Core Concepts, combined with its subsidiary International Logistics Group, is an innovative small business dedicated to providing high-quality services to the Department of Defense and other federal government customers. The company currently provides engineering and technical support, logistics, sustainment services, acquisition support, Foreign Military Sales (FMS) support and information technology solutions to its customers. Based in Warner Robins, Ga., the combined enterprise employs over 250 personnel and is seeking to grow in collaboration with customers, people and companies that we trust and respect. For additional information, please visit http://www.advancedcoreconcepts.com. For more information, media representatives should contact Jeanne Zepp, director of public relations, at jzepp(at)dprgroup(dot)com. Please direct company-related inquiries to Dee Woods, director of operations, at dee.woods(at)advancedcoreconcepts(dot)com.


Moore M.,ARES Corporation
European Space Agency, (Special Publication) ESA SP | Year: 2010

Safe operations of payloads on the International Space Station (ISS) are a result of years of rigorous preparations and thoughtful execution by various space agencies, payload developers, safety review panels, as well as various operations and support teams around the globe. With so many teams distributed across great distances, payload operations safety teams have developed many processes, databases, handbooks, and console tools in addition to developing various interfaces to ensure that payloads are in compliance with all appropriate requirements, and operated efficiently and in the safest possible manner. With the emphasis on payload science getting more attention each day, safety operations must continue to optimize products, consolidate redundant systems, and incorporate lesson learned to improve the overall safety of ISS and reduced the risk of mishaps when performing experiments. This paper will explore how safety operations personnel operate experiments on-board ISS in the safest possible manner.


Morris A.T.,NASA | Massie M.J.,ARES Corporation
AIAA Infotech at Aerospace 2010 | Year: 2010

Large scale integration of today's aerospace systems is achievable through the use of distributed systems. Validating the safety of distributed systems is significantly more difficult as compared to centralized systems because of the complexity of the interactions between simultaneously active components. Integrated hazard analysis (IHA), a process used to identify unacceptable risks and to provide a means of controlling them, can be applied to either centralized or distributed systems. IHA, though, must be tailored to fit the particular system being analyzed. Distributed systems, for instance, must be analyzed for hazards in terms of the functions that rely on them. This paper will describe systems-oriented IHA techniques (as opposed to traditional failure-event or reliability techniques) that should be employed for distributed systems in aerospace environments. Special considerations will be addressed when dealing with specific distributed systems such as active thermal control, electrical power, command and data handling, and software systems (including the interaction with fault management systems). Because of the significance of second-order effects in large scale distributed systems, the paper will also describe how to analyze secondary functions to secondary functions through the use of channelization.


Massie M.J.,ARES Corporation | Terry Morris A.,NASA
AIAA Infotech at Aerospace Conference and Exhibit 2011 | Year: 2011

The purpose of integrated hazard analyses, probabilistic risk assessments, failure modes and effects analyses, fault trees and many other similar tools is to give managers of a program some idea of the risks associated with their program. All risk tools establish a set of undesired events and then try to evaluate the risk to the program by assessing the severity of the undesired event and the likelihood of that event occurring. Some tools provide qualitative results, some provide quantitative results and some do both. However, in the end the program manager and his/her team must decide which risks are acceptable and which are not. Even with a wide array of analysis tools available, risk acceptance is often a controversial and difficult decision making process. And yet, today's space exploration programs are moving toward more "risk based design" approaches. Thus, risk identification and good risk assessment is becoming even more vital to the engineering development process. This paper explores how known and unknown information influences risk-based decisions by looking at how the various parts of our personalities are affected by what they know and what they don't know. This paper then offers some criteria for consideration when making risk-based decisions.


Terry Morris A.,NASA | Massie M.J.,ARES Corporation
AIAA Infotech at Aerospace Conference and Exhibit 2011 | Year: 2011

As large scale integrated systems evolve, there is a need to adjust the organizational structure of the people developing the system to efficiently align strategy, people and functions to accomplish program objectives. One of the primary objectives for NASA programs is to ensure system safety. An effective means to accomplish this objective is the practice of embedding integrated hazard analysis (IHA) within the organizational structure to facilitate insight into system and programmatic hazards and to develop strategic mitigations. System safety should be a central focus of the organization throughout the program life cycle. Undesired consequences can occur if an organization fails to establish and maintain this focus. As stated by members of the Columbia Accident Investigation Board (CAIB), "In our view, the NASA organizational culture had as much to do with this accident as the foam." The culture of an organization is influenced by its organizational structure which either encourages or hinders communication paths and imperatives for safety. Organizations that develop large scale systems have opportunities, like those provided to NASA through the CAIB report, to re-evaluate and re-align organizational structures to be more responsive to system safety considerations. In order to prevent systemic and unwarranted conflicts within the organization, the alignment should harmonize with the structures of authority, responsibility and accountability of the program. This paper suggests where the hazard analysis function should strategically reside within a typical large scale program and provides guidance that must be considered when determining the placement of the hazard analysis team within that structure.


Hanson J.M.,NASA | Beard B.B.,ARES Corporation
Journal of Spacecraft and Rockets | Year: 2012

This paper is focused on applying a Monte Carlo simulation to probabilistic launch vehicle design and requirements verification. The approaches developed in this paper can be applied to other complex design efforts as well. Typically, the verification must show that requirement "x" is met for at least "y%" of cases, with, say, 10% consumer risk or 90% confidence. Two aspects of making these runs will be explored in this paper. First, there are several types of uncertainties that should be handled in different ways, depending on when they become known (or not). The paper describes how to handle different types of uncertainties and how to develop vehicle models that can be used to examine their characteristics. This includes items that are not known exactly during the design phase, but will be known for each assembled vehicle; other items that become known before or on flight day; and items that remain unknown on flight day. Second, this paper explains a method (order statistics) for determining whether certain probabilistic requirements are met and enables the user to determine how many Monte Carlo samples are required. The methods also apply to determining the design values of parameters of interest in driving the vehicle design. Copyright © 2011 by Bianca Capra and Richard Morgan.


Lengyel D.M.,NASA | Newman J.S.,Ares Corporation
SpaceOps 2010 Conference | Year: 2010

The conceptual framework of the Explorations Systems Mission Directorate (ESMD) Integrated Risk and Knowledge Management approach is based on the assumption that risks highlight potential knowledge gaps that might be mitigated through one or more knowledge management practices or artifacts. These same risks also serve as cues for the collection of knowledge, particularly knowledge of technical or programmatic challenges that might recur. ESMD uses a variety of modes-text, video, case studies, and classroom activities-to communicate the knowledge and continue to emphasize "learning through conversation." Lessons from the Space Shuttle and International Space Station programs are an important element of this knowledge base. The speaker will highlight approaches and lessons learned to date.


Hanson J.M.,Marshall Space Flight Center | Beard B.B.,ARES Corporation
AIAA Guidance, Navigation, and Control Conference | Year: 2010

This paper is focused on applying Monte Carlo simulation to probabilistic launch vehicle design and requirements verification. The approaches developed in this paper can be applied to other complex design efforts as well. Typically the verification must show that requirement "x" is met for at least "y"% of cases, with, say, 10% "consumer risk" or 90% confidence. Two particular aspects of making these runs for requirements verification will be explored in this paper. First, there are several types of uncertainties that should be handled in different ways, depending on when they become known (or not). The paper describes how to handle different types of uncertainties and how to develop vehicle models that can be used to examine their characteristics. This includes items that are not known exactly during the design phase but that will be known for each assembled vehicle (can be used to determine the payload capability and overall behavior of that vehicle), other items that become known before or on flight day (can be used for flight day trajectory design and go/no go decision), and items that remain unknown on flight day. Second, this paper explains a method (order statistics) for determining whether certain probabilistic requirements are met or not and enables the user to determine how many Monte Carlo samples are required. Order statistics is not new, but may not be known in general to the GN&C community. The methods also apply to determining the design values of parameters of interest in driving the vehicle design. The paper briefly discusses when it is desirable to fit a distribution to the experimental Monte Carlo results rather than using order statistics.


Trademark
Ares Corporation | Date: 2012-01-17

portable surveillance system consisting of a video or infrared camera, radar antenna and radar control box.

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